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Abstract
This thesis critically evaluates some of the main arguments for, and main 
challenges to, the claim that free will and moral responsibility are com-
patible with determinism. In the first two chapters I undertake a detailed 
examination of the so called ‘leeway’ problem. In chapter one I examine 
the issue of whether alternative possibilities are required for morally re-
sponsible agency by evaluating the Frankfurt example literature. In the 
second chapter I consider whether the compatibilist can offer an account 
of alternative possibilities consistent with determinism. Chapter one con-
cludes that the Frankfurt example strategy fails to establish that alterna-
tives are not required. Furthermore, we have good reason to think alter-
natives are necessary for responsibility.  The arguments of chapter two 
conclude that none of the main compatibilist attempts to capture the al-
ternative possibilities condition are successful.
In chapter three I consider a challenge any compatibilist theory must 
face independently of the issue of alternative possibilities: the ‘source’ 
problem. This is the issue concerning whether we could be the source of 
our actions in the way necessary for moral responsibility if determinism 
were true. To this end I will examine Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipu-
lation argument in detail here. I conclude that, as things stand, compati-
bilism is  unable to adequately respond to the manipulation argument 
strategy.  Hence we have good reason to think that determinism would 
mean that we couldn’t be the source of our actions in the way required 
!2
for free and responsible agency. In summary, compatibilism has not giv-
en us satisfactory answers to either the ‘leeway’ or ‘source’ worries. Con-
sequently, in chapter 4 I endorse a position in light of this, concluding 
that although diagnostic  incompatibilism may be true,  we nevertheless 
can and should be prescriptive compatibilists. This is to say, despite the 
fact that our concepts and practices associated with responsible agency 
are inconsistent with determinism as they stand, we nevertheless have 




I first became interested in the free will problem as an undergraduate 
on the University of London intercollegiate federal BA in Philosophy, as 
a student at King’s College London. Thomas Pink’s course on free will 
and Michael Otsuka’s course on ethics with its focus on the Frankfurt ex-
ample literature sparked an interest that was set to dominate throughout 
my time as an undergraduate and grad student. I would like to thank 
them both for starting me off with this topic. I feel particularly lucky that 
I was in one of the last cohorts to go through the federal BA before it was 
discontinued. Our lecturers were drawn from across the colleges of the 
University of London and I took courses under faculty from King’s, UCL, 
LSE, Birkbeck and Heythrop. It  was thanks to the federal programme 
that I was able to attend Otsuka’s course as well as Pink’s. I have worked 
on other topics as a graduate student, the mind body problem and con-
temporary political philosophy in the Rawlsian tradition with the associ-
ated problems of global justice, but I’ve always returned to the free will 
problem when it came to writing theses and extended pieces of work. It 
is an utterly gripping problem that once explained demands attention in 
such a way that makes it  hard to disengage with. A great part of our 
manifest image is challenged by the problem, both metaphysically and 
ethically in a way that simply can’t be ignored. I have now been fortu-
nate enough to be able to write my MPhilStud and PhD theses at King’s 
on free will and responsibility. I would like to thank the UK Arts and 
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Humanities Research Council (AHRC) for both my masters and doctoral 
studentships over the last few years without which it would have been 
impossible to pursue graduate study. The departmental culture at King’s 
College London Philosophy is as much responsible for my choosing to 
undertake graduate work as my interest in the topics themselves. I will 
always feel fortunate for having been in such a friendly, inclusive and 
supportive atmosphere. Thank you to the department!
I am not the first person to say that the free will problem never goes 
out  of  philosophical  fashion but  it  is  noteworthy that  in  recent  years 
there has been a profusion of new literature on these issues. I am grateful 
that my time as a grad student has coincided with this. I would also not 
be the first to record my debt to the supportive and friendly culture that 
seems to be the status quo in this sub field of metaphysics. Everyone I’ve 
encountered in both Europe and the United States working on free will 
and responsibility, students and faculty alike, have been a joy to interact 
and engage with. Faculty going out of their way to help young people 
working in this field seems to be the norm here. 
I would like to thank Maria Alvarez for being my primary supervisor 
while I’ve been on the PhD at King’s College London. Maria’s great in-
sight into these problems and attention to detail with my work have been 
invaluable and I am very grateful for her support over the last four years. 
I would also like to thank Bill Brewer for his supervision while Maria 
was on sabbatical. Bill was very encouraging at a trying time for me and 
when the writing up pressure was starting to build his advice and sup-
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port helped me keep going. John Callanan, my secondary supervisor has 
also been invaluable. I am grateful to him for both pastoral and intellec-
tual support throughout my time as a graduate student. I would like to 
thank Tom Pink for letting me have his unpublished material to read and 
for tutorial support at short notice. I am also grateful to Andrea Sangio-
vanni who supervised me on the connections between the free will de-
bates and theories of justice early on in my PhD.
I spent the autumn semester of my writing up year in 2013 on the 
Norman Malcolm fellowship in the philosophy department at  Cornell 
University under Derk Pereboom. I was lucky enough to coincide with 
Pereboom’s excellent graduate course on free will while I was there. I 
was also supervised by Derk on draft work. His weekly graduate semi-
nars provided an extraordinarily in depth survey of the current state of 
the literature as  well  as  a  pre-publication reading of  Derk’s  Free  Will, 
Agency, and Meaning in Life. This helped me greatly in choosing how to 
structure my thesis. I would like to thank Derk for all his support during 
my time in Ithaca. I am grateful to Cornell and King’s College for fund-
ing the Norman Malcolm fellowship and making it possible for me to 
study in  the  USA.  Michael  McKenna has  also  been a  great  source  of 
philosophical help and general encouragement over the last few years. 
Michael has guided me in selecting which topics and issues to work on 
and put me in touch with other academics at a moments notice when I 
needed help with recent literature. I am grateful to Michael for his con-
tinued support and friendship. I have also benefitted from attending the 
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London based Action Reading Group. I would like to thank Maria Al-
varez, Jennifer Hornsby and John Hyman as well as the other grad stu-
dents  for  these  productive  sessions.  Of  particular  importance  to  my 
progress was the close reading the group undertook of Helen Steward’s 
A Metaphysics for Freedom in 2012. 
I would like to thank my peers for their support and friendship over 
the last few years: Gary Hayes, Glyn Salton-Cox, Mike Coxhead, Chris 
Cowie,  Patrick Butlin,  Peter  Sutton,  Peter  Ridley,  Rory O’Connell,  Jen 
Wright, Caspar Wilson, Clare Moriarty, James Arnold, Alex Davies, Alex 
Geddes,  Fay  Edwards,  Lucy  Campbell  and  Luke  Brunning  have  all 
helped in countless ways and without them pursuing graduate study 
would be a different prospect entirely. I am fortunate to be in such a peer 
group. Lastly I thank my family for everything they have done to sup-
port me while I’ve been a student. Without their understanding of the 
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This thesis is an evaluation of whether compatibilism about free will and 
moral responsibility can succeed. In this introduction I will start by stat-
ing the definitions of free will, moral responsibility and determinism that 
I’ll be working with. I’ll then introduce some of the key positions, con-
cepts and general problems around which the free will debate is organ-
ised. After that I will outline the overall dialectic of the thesis and sum-
marise the arguments of the individual chapters.
Free Will, Responsibility and Determinism
I understand free will as the control condition on morally responsible ac-
tion. Free will is the metaphysical control necessary but not sufficient for 
morally responsible action, whatever that amounts to. On its own free 
will is not sufficient for morally responsible agency, as there are further 
necessary conditions as well: epistemic and other psychological condi-
tions such as understanding how your actions can influence others as 
well as possessing a certain level of moral understanding for example. In 
defining free will this way I leave it open that there could be value in 
possessing this type of control that is independent of the link with moral 
responsibility. For example, we might think it valuable to have free will 
where this means ‘making your life journey your own.’ I make no as-
sumptions here other than claiming that free will is the necessary control 
condition on moral responsibility.
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I understand moral responsibility in what has become known as the 
‘basic desert’ sense, following Pereboom: 
This sense of moral responsibility, the one at issue in the free will de-
bate, is set apart by the notion of basic desert (Feinberg 1970; Pere-
boom 2001, 2007a; G. Strawson 1994; Fischer 2007: 82; Clarke 2005; 
Scanlon 2013). For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in 
this sense is for it to be hers in such a way that she would deserve to 
be  blamed if  she  understood  that  it  was  morally  wrong,  and  she 
would deserve to be praised if she understood that it was morally 
exemplary. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agent 
would deserve  to  be  blamed or  praised just  because  she  has  per-
formed the action, given an understanding of its moral status, and 
not, for example, merely by virtue of consequentialist or contractual-
ist considerations.1
Although I agree with Pereboom that this has been the sense of moral 
responsibility at issue in the traditional free will debate, at later stages in 
the thesis I discuss the relevance of other senses of responsibility as well. 
I do this in the context of chapter four where I examine the potential for 
concept revision about responsibility. 
The determinism at issue in the free will debate is more specifically 
‘nomological determinism’. As Kadri Vihvelin says: 
we can understand determinism as the thesis that a complete descrip-
tion of the state of the world at any time t and a complete statement 
of the laws of nature together entail every truth about the world at 
every time later than t. Alternatively, and using the language of pos-
sible worlds: Determinism is true at a possible world w iff the follow-
ing is true at that world: Any world which has the same laws of na-
ture as w and which is exactly like w at any time t is exactly like w at 
 Pereboom (2014: 2)1
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all times which are future relative to t. (See van Inwagen 1983, Ear-
man 1986, Ginet 1990).2
Given an initial starting state plus strict laws, the way history unfolds 
after that point would always be the same even if God ‘rewound time’ 
and let things play out again. It’s important to be clear that this definition 
is not committed to a particular analysis of laws and law-likeness. As Vi-
hvelin continues: 
Determinism is  a  claim about  the  relation of  entailment  that 
holds between, on the one hand, statements of law and state-
ments of particular fact at a time, and, on the other hand, state-
ments of particular fact at any later time. This claim about en-
tailment relations is neutral between different accounts of law-
hood,  ranging  from  the  so-called  “naïve  regularity”  account 
(Swartz  1986)  to  broadly Humean or  “best  system” accounts 
(Lewis 1973, Earman 1986, Loewer 1996a, Beebee 2000, Schaffer 
2008)  to  various  kinds  of  necessitarian  accounts  (Shoemaker 
1980, Armstrong 1983, Carroll 1994 and 2008).  3
With respect to the various arguments and examples discussed in the 
thesis, I sometimes talk in terms of free will and moral responsibility in-
terchangeably. Given the definition of free will stated above nothing of 
importance for the question at issue hangs on this.
Incompatibilism
Incompatibilists hold that free will and thus moral responsibility are in-
compatible with determinism. Under the incompatibilist umbrella there 
 Vihvelin (2011: s1.) 2
 Vihvelin (2011: s1.)3
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are the ‘libertarians’ who think we do have free will and hence determin-
ism must be false. There are further distinctions to be made among liber-
tarians in terms of how they understand the indeterministic metaphysics 
of free will. Some hold that event causation is required, others that agent 
causation is, and thirdly some think that the powers at work here are 
non-causal. Yet more subdivisions exist in the form of competing theories 
of these three families. 
There are also the so called ‘hard determinists’ and ‘hard incompati-
bilists’ who are incompatibilists about the concepts of free will and re-
sponsibility and also think that we don’t have free will. Hard determin-
ists believe determinism is true and hence we don’t have free will. Hard 
incompatibilists  might  be  agnostic  about  the truth of  determinism,  or 
even think it false. But they also think that we couldn’t have the kind of 
free will required for moral responsibility even if determinism were in 
fact false, or more weakly, that it is hard to see how we could. Both hard 
determinists  and  hard  incompatibilists  can  be  more  or  less  ‘positive’ 
about the fallout for moral responsibility and its associated practices giv-
en their positions. For example, at one end of a spectrum, some hard in-
compatibilists are outright sceptics about moral responsibility and say 
that nothing remotely like the concept is applicable. In contrast, others 
hold that although moral responsibility in the basic desert sense itself is 
not to be had, we can nevertheless make do well enough with something 
else. Perhaps, for example, a set of reactive attitudes explicitly defined so 
as  to  be  compatible  with  determinism  (or  indeterminism)  might  be 
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adopted by a hard incompatibilist. At this other end of the spectrum, a 
hard incompatibilist might well think that we can carry on much as we 
were before with our responsibility practices, incompatibilism about the 
concept notwithstanding.
Compatibilism 
Compatibilists hold that free will and determinism are compatible. This 
might just be because they think determinism poses no threat to the re-
quired metaphysics of control or because, more strongly, they think de-
terminism is necessary for free will and believe that we couldn’t be in 
control  without it  as  any indeterminism in a system would introduce 
randomness or chance in a problematic way. For those compatibilists that 
don’t think determinism necessary for free will, the functionality of their 
models might not be challenged by indeterminism if, for example, micro 
level physical indeterminism doesn’t ‘rise up’ or become ‘amplified’ to 
effect the functionality of higher level processes involved in agency, or 
perhaps because, even if that did happen, it wouldn’t necessarily impede 
the requisite control. 
Alternative Possibilities
Cutting across the central distinction between incompatibilist and com-
patibilist and crucial to organising the various positions in the free will 
problem outlined thus far is the separate distinction between those who 
think alternative possibilities are required for morally responsible action 
!14
and those who deny this. The former are sometimes referred to as leeway 
theorists and the latter as causal-history or source theorists. It is possible to 
be either a leeway or a source/causal-history incompatibilist. It is also 
possible to be a leeway or source/causal-history compatibilist.  For ex-
ample, leeway incompatibilism is defended by Peter van Inwagen and 
Carl Ginet. Source incompatibilism is defended by Derk Pereboom. Lee-
way compatibilism (this is sometimes referred to as ‘classical compatibil-
ism’ in contemporary literature)  was defended by A.  J  Ayer and G.E. 
Moore and traces its roots back to Hume’s discussion in the Treatise. In 
recent work, Kadri Vihvelin, Michael Fara and Michael Smith have de-
fended  sophisticated  versions  of  leeway  compatibilism  known  as  the 
‘new dispositionalism.’ Source and causal history compatibilist theories 
reject the need for alternative possibilities. Frankfurt’s own positive ‘hi-
erarchical theory’ of freedom is one such example. Fisher and Ravizza’s 
‘reasons responsiveness’ theory, another.
Challenges for Compatibilism
There are two main challenges that  compatibilist  theories have to ad-
dress. These two issues, the leeway problem,  and the source problem,  are 
quickly motivated by the prospect of determinism.
i. The leeway problem
The leeway problem is a problem on the assumption that alternative pos-
sibilities are necessary for moral responsibility. If determinism is true, the 
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thought goes, we would never be able to act otherwise than we in fact 
do, as there would only be one physically possible future, and this seems 
to undermine our responsibility since we would be deprived of the nec-
essary  alternatives.  The  leeway  problem  can  be  addressed  by  either 
showing that  the salient  kind of  alternative possibilities  for  moral  re-
sponsibility  can still  be  had in  a  deterministic  world  (as  the  classical 
compatibilists like Moore and Ayer or the new dispositionalists argue), 
or by arguing that alternative possibilities are not after all necessary for 
responsibility and so there is no leeway for determinism to threaten (this 
is the line taken by the Frankfurt example strategy). The compatibilist 
burden is to do at least one of these two things.
ii. The source or causal-history problem
Arguing that alternative possibilities are not necessary for moral respon-
sibility does not by itself mean compatibilism is viable. This is because 
even if it were the case that alternative possibilities were not required for 
moral responsibility, if determinism is true then our actions would ap-
pear to have sufficient causes before we were even born: the previous 
states of the world and the laws of nature would seem to entail what we 
do throughout our lives. This gives rise to the worry about source-hood 
independently  of  the  leeway  problem.  If  determinism  were  true,  the 
thought goes, then we couldn’t be the source of our actions in the way 
necessary  for  moral  responsibility,  even  if  morally  responsible  action 
doesn’t require alternative possibilities of any kind. In fact, even for a 
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compatibilist who defends a leeway position and the necessity of com-
patibilist alternative possibilities, the source worry is still an issue they 
need to address as well. Manipulation arguments are not automatically 
defused because a compatibilist theory has a leeway requirement. That is 
because, if the manipulation arguments are sound, that kind of leeway 
won’t entail the agent is the source of their actions in the way required if 
determinism is true.
Thesis Overview
A considerable amount of new material has been published in the last 
two decades on the free will problem and this thesis will attempt to bring 
some of the different strands together in an illuminating way in order to 
get clear on the state of the debate today and the prospects for compati-
bilism. I will argue that compatibilism has still not managed to overcome 
its key difficulties, namely the leeway and source problems. However, I 
will conclude by arguing that despite the failure of compatibilist theories, 
we should nevertheless adopt a revised concept of moral responsibility 
that is consistent with determinism. In other words, even though I reject 
diagnostic compatibilism I embrace prescriptive compatibilism. In summa-
ry, I will argue that even though our concept of moral responsibility as it 
is currently instantiated in ordinary language and practice is inconsistent 
with determinism, we should revise our concept so it is consistent with 
determinism.
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This may seem like a surprising way to go instead of adopting incom-
patibilism. However, I am working on the assumption that incompatibil-
ism is not a viable option at this point. I won’t defend this claim in the 
thesis. I’m assuming that incompatibilist theories, whether they are event 
causal, non-causal or appeal to agent causation are either internally inco-
herent or, if coherent, unrealistic given our best scientific models of the 
natural world. The proper evaluation of the various incompatibilist theo-
ries to defend this assumption would demand another thesis. Hence, this 
thesis should be read on the assumption incompatibilism is not a plausi-
ble option. I realise this is to bracket half the free will debate but it is nec-
essary in order to give a thorough treatment of the challenges compatibil-
ism faces. There are sophisticated incompatibilist theories in the recent 
literature, namely Helen Steward’s (2012) A Metaphysics for Freedom and 
Mark Balaguer’s (2009) Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem to name just 
two  central  new  texts.  However,  I  am  persuaded  by  the  arguments 
against the feasibility of incompatibilism as developed by Pereboom in 
recent work including his Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014: Chs 
2-3).
Finally,  given I’m arguing traditional  diagnostic  compatibilism fails 
and also assuming that incompatibilism isn’t plausible, I need to justify 
the move towards revisionism about moral responsibility and prescrip-
tive compatibilism, as opposed to embracing some form of hard incom-
patibilism or moral responsibility scepticism. Considerations about the 
methodology of concept revision in general, combined with a normative 
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argument about needing a concept of moral responsibility, will therefore 
be developed at the end of the thesis in order to justify revisionism and 
prescriptive compatibilism in the face of the failure of both the tradition-
al compatibilist and incompatibilist projects.
Summary of Dialectic
The first two chapters will deal with the leeway worry. In chapter one, 
the question of whether alternative possibilities are necessary for moral 
responsibility will be addressed. In chapter two, I will evaluate whether 
compatibilists can provide a satisfactory account of these alternatives if 
they are required. I will conclude at the end of the first chapter that we 
have no good reason to believe that alternative possibilities are not nec-
essary for responsibility and then, in chapter two, I will argue that com-
patibilist attempts to give an account of the necessary alternatives fail. 
These two chapters alone, if successful, would be sufficient to establish 
the failure of the diagnostic compatibilist project. However, for the pur-
poses of completeness, given that some of the most prominent compati-
bilists reject the need for alternative possibilities, in chapter three I will 
evaluate the manipulation arguments which aim to show that even if (as 
opposed to what I conclude in chapter one) alternative possibilities were 
not required for responsibility, determinism would still make it impossi-
ble for us to be the source of our actions in the way required for moral 
responsibility.  I  will  conclude that compatibilists fail  to adequately re-
spond to these arguments as well. By the end of chapter three I will have 
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therefore shown that all the routes to traditional diagnostic compatibil-
ism fail. Given this conclusion and working on the assumption that in-
compatibilist theories of free will are not coherent or plausible either, I 
will be left with the job in the fourth and final chapter of justifying the 
prescriptive compatibilist project instead of embracing hard incompati-
bilism and moral responsibility scepticism.
Chapter Summary
Chapter 1
In the first chapter I will evaluate whether there is a good argument to 
establish that alternative possibilities are not required for moral respon-
sibility by considering the Frankfurt-style example strategy. Since Harry 
Frankfurt published his original case in ‘Moral Responsibility and Alter-
nate Possibilities’ in 1969, a large literature has developed wherein sce-
narios are put forward that purport to show agents acting, who are intu-
itively morally responsible for what they do, yet (due to the structure of 
the cases), could not have done otherwise. I will consider both the origi-
nal cases and the full range of modified examples that have been devel-
oped over the last four decades. I argue that the strategy fails. I will first 
evaluate the original examples, sometimes referred to as prior-sign ex-
amples,  and  then  go  on  to  look  at  the  no-prior  sign  cases  involving 
blockage and overdetermination. Finally I will examine the most sophis-
ticated Frankfurt-style cases to date, the so called buffer cases developed 
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over the last fifteen years. It is within the discussion of a particular criti-
cism of buffer cases, the so called ‘timing criticism’ that I develop a new 
line of argument in defence of the principle of alternate possibilities. The 
timing criticism is one of the most important challenges to the Frankfurt 
strategy to date but in the recent literature it has come under attack from 
prominent Frankfurt example defenders. I show that once (i) a key as-
sumption held by both sides in this debate is rejected and (ii) armed with 
the appropriate understanding of the epistemic requirements on alterna-
tive possibility, the principle of alternative possibilities can be defended 
in a coherent and intuitive way. At the end of the chapter I will also ar-
gue that a key new development in the buffer strategy as developed by 
Pereboom likewise fails to establish that alternatives are not necessary 
for responsibility. Pereboom’s most recent buffer case, Tax Cut,  as out-
lined in his 2014 Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, is a response to 
earlier criticisms of his original buffer case Tax Evasion 2.  I  argue that 
these latest modified buffer cases will not work either.
Chapter 2
Having  established  in  chapter  one  that  we  can’t  conclude  alternative 
possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and furthermore, 
that we have good reason to think they are required, in the second chap-
ter  I  will  consider  compatibilist  attempts  to  show that  the  alternative 
possibilities  required are  consistent  with  determinism.  The alternative 
possibilities  requirement  is  traditionally  captured  by  the  claim that  a 
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morally responsible agent ‘could have done otherwise’ than she in fact 
did. In the first section I will evaluate the so called ‘classical conditional 
analysis’ of Hume, Moore and Ayer. This is the thought that to say an 
agent ‘could have done otherwise’ is equivalent to saying that an agent 
‘would  have  done  otherwise,  had  they  wanted  (or  tried)  to  do 
otherwise’.  If  the  conditional  analysis  were  true,  these  compatibilists 
(rightly)  argued,  those  conditional  statements  are  consistent  with  the 
truth of determinism. However, I will argue that the classical conditional 
analysis fails  as it  can be shown that the claimed equivalence doesn’t 
hold by appeal to cases. I’ll also discuss a regress worry that threatens 
the conditional analysis independently of the appeal to cases. In the sec-
ond section I will go on to examine the so called ‘new dispositionalist’ 
analysis of the ability to do otherwise. Recent work on the nature of dis-
positions by Kadri Vihvelin and Michael Fara has revived the compati-
bilist project of trying to give an account of the relevant abilities in terms 
of conditionals, but not the simple counterfactuals of the traditional con-
ditional analysis. The new dispositionalist project is sophisticated but I’ll 
argue that in the end it also fails to capture the sense of ‘could have done 
otherwise’ that is at issue in the free will debate. 
Lastly, in the third section of this chapter I will discuss recent work by 
Christian List who has defended a modal interpretation of the ability to 
do otherwise that explicitly rejects the approach of the classical condi-
tional analysis and the new dispositionalists. Given the initial threat that 
determinism appears to pose for the ability to do otherwise this might 
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seem like a counterintuitive move. After all, wasn’t the point of trying for 
a  conditional  analysis  precisely  that  the  unqualified  modal  analysis 
looked to be unrealisable if there was only one physically possible fu-
ture? However, List motivates his argument by drawing a distinction be-
tween agentive and physical possibility and claims that restrictions on 
the latter don’t necessarily constrain the former. The methodological ap-
proach List uses to defend this move will be examined at length. In the 
course of my evaluation of List’s position I develop two new lines of ar-
gument. Firstly, I argue that the sense of agentive possibility List claims 
is the appropriate one, while sufficient for us reasoning over the rationali-
ty of alternative possibilities in the way required by rational choice theo-
ry, is not necessarily sufficient for the attribution of basic-desert respon-
sibility. In other words, the free will List defends isn’t obviously connect-
ed up with the concept of moral responsibility in the way it would have 
to be in order to speak to the traditional problem at issue in the free will 
debate. Secondly, I provide an independent argument claiming that we 
cannot divorce agentive modality as List explicates that notion from the 
micro-physical modalities in the way we’d need to if List’s compatibilism 
is to succeed. Specifically, I develop this argument by considering how 
the location of the microphysical particles that constitute our bodies in 
space-time is intuitively relevant to where we, as agents, can be. Hence, 
contrary to what List claims, what’s physically possible for our micro-
physical constituent particles is constraining as to what’s agentially pos-
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sible for us when we make our choices. I conclude that despite its origi-
nality, List’s compatibilism is unsuccessful. 
Chapter 3
If the first two chapters are sound, I will have shown, firstly, that alterna-
tive possibilities are required for moral responsibility and, secondly, that 
compatibilist accounts of those alternatives fail. That alone would be suf-
ficient  to  establish  the  failure  of  diagnostic  compatibilism.  However, 
many prominent contemporary compatibilists, notably Fischer, Ravizza 
and Sartorio,  reject  the need for  alternative possibilities  (because they 
embrace the Frankfurt-example strategy) and have developed versions of 
causal history compatibilism. Because of this, in the third chapter I will 
examine the challenge that manipulation arguments pose for these com-
patibilists.  In other words I will examine compatibilist responses to the 
source worry independently of the leeway worry. More specifically, I will 
examine how prominent  causal  history  compatibilists  attempt  to  deal 
with  the  most  sophisticated  manipulation  argument  in  the  literature, 
Pereboom’s four-case argument.  The point of manipulation arguments 
such as Pereboom’s is to generate a clear intuition of non-responsibility 
in a case involving deterministic manipulation of an agent and then ar-
gue that there is no principled morally relevant difference between such 
a case and the ordinary deterministic world where no manipulation oc-
curs. Pereboom runs his argument by developing intermediate cases in-
volving less extreme interference between the full blown manipulation 
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and the ordinary deterministic case to further support the point about 
there being no morally relevant difference. I will argue that it is hard for 
the compatibilist to deal with the recalcitrant intuitions of both compati-
bilist and incompatibilist alike about manipulation cases. It will be neces-
sary to be very careful in reconstructing the dialectic here and to pay 
special attention to where the burdens lie in these difficult cases. By the 
end of the third chapter I will therefore have concluded that none of the 
traditional routes to diagnostic compatibilism succeed, whether they are 
leeway or source/causal history theories. This conclusion combined with 
the  assumption  that  incompatibilist  theories  are  not  viable  leaves  me 
with a choice between hard incompatibilism with some degree of moral 
responsibility scepticism, or the revisionist route to prescriptive compat-
ibilism. That is the issue that I take up in chapter 4. 
Chapter 4
In the fourth and final chapter, having taken stock of the problems that 
traditional diagnostic compatibilist accounts still face, I will argue for the 
prescriptive compatibilist project. As I said above, if analysis reveals that 
we can’t square our ordinary understanding of free will and responsibili-
ty with determinism, but incompatibilist theories about free will aren’t 
viable, then the fact remains that we may be justified in revising our con-
cepts  to  make  them compatible  with  determinism.  Following Manuel 
Vargas’ work, I build on an argument that proceeds by looking at the 
methodology of concept revision in other fields and then consider what 
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parallels can be drawn for moral responsibility. I will argue that there is a 
good case to be made for the claim that, even allowing for the fact that 
our existing concept of responsibility has incompatibilist content, enough 
other content constitutes the concept such that we could drop the incom-
patibilist ideas and still be left with a concept that preserves the majority 
of the inferential role of moral responsibility. More specifically, we would 
be justified in continuing to call this a concept of moral responsibility as 
it would have the majority import of the existing concept. Secondly, and 
independently of the point about concept revision, I will consider a more 
direct argument to the effect that we need a concept that does at least 
most of the work of the existing concept of responsibility. This second 
argument is not necessarily an argument for prescriptive compatibilism 
per say as a very ‘positive’ type of hard incompatibilist can run this line 
of argument as well. Pereboom himself thinks that much of moral prac-
tice and value in life as we understand it can make use of and appeal to 
compatibilist analogues of certain responsibility centred concepts.  Given 
this, I argue it is the combination of these two ideas: the preservation of 
inferential role on the one hand and the normative argument about the 
need for a concept of responsibility on the other that constitutes a per-
suasive defence of prescriptive compatibilism.
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Chapter 1
1. Are alternative possibilities necessary for moral responsi-
bility?
1.1 Frankfurt examples
It is very natural to think that in order to be morally responsible for some 
action an agent must have been able to have done otherwise than they 
did in fact do. When we hold someone responsible for some action and 
blame them, we surely think that they should have done something else 
instead. Furthermore, it wouldn’t make much sense to think that if they 
couldn’t have done something else instead, hence we very easily arrive at 
the  alternative  possibilities  requirement  for  moral  responsibility.  This 
reasoning  is  just  the  ‘ought  implies  can’  principle  coupled  with  the 
thought that the morally blameworthy (and perhaps those rightly subject 
to the other reactive attitudes as well) ought to have done other than they 
did  do.  The  conceptual  connection  was  traditionally  even  considered 
tight enough to be thought a conceptual truth. However, all of this was 
challenged when Harry Frankfurt published his paper ‘Alternate Possi-
bilities and Moral Responsibility.’  In that paper Frankfurt claims to de4 -
 See Frankfurt (1969). Frankfurt credits Robert Nozick with an earlier case with 4
a similar structure. It’s important to note that John Locke put forward a related 
case concerning voluntariness when he considered the man who willingly re-
mains in the locked room. See Locke (1690), An Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing, Bk II, Ch 21 (Of Power), S10.
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scribe a case where it seems uncontroversial that the agent involved was 
morally responsible for what they did and moreover, that they did what 
they  did  in  the  normal  way any  responsible  agent  does  such  things. 
However, given the structure of the example, Frankfurt also claims that 
the agent could not have done otherwise.  If  Frankfurt  is  right then it 
would appear we have an example that shows that alternative possibili-
ties for action are not required for moral responsibility. Frankfurt’s origi-
nal example is as follows:
Suppose someone - Black, let us say - wants Jones to perform a cer-
tain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his 
way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he 
waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he 
does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of 
such things) that Jones is going to decide to do something other than 
what he wants him to do. If it does become clear that Jones is going to 
decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that 
Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do. 
Whatever Jones’s initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will 
have his way.5
There are various ways to fill out the details of the example and it’s 
important to fill it out in the most powerful way possible before evaluat-
ing its force. So we can assume that Black is able to closely monitor and 
directly manipulate Jones’ brain processes (either directly or remotely) in 
order to bring about the results Black desires. We should build into the 
case that Black has the maximum amount of information it’s possible to 
have about Jones regarding his past behaviour and thought processes. 
That is, he knows the sum total of Jones’ previous thoughts, deliberative 
 Frankfurt (1969: 835)5
!28
processes and subsequent actions as well as the resultant patterns and 
probabilities of future actions given certain deliberative antecedents and 
counterfactual circumstances. Assume Black knows the lot.  The classic 
rendering of the example then involves Jones deliberating about whether 
to kill Smith. Black also wants Smith dead for reasons of his own and so 
waits  to  see  how the  situation  will  pan  out  without  interfering  with 
Jones. As it happens Jones deliberates and decides to kill Smith on his 
own, in the normal way, without Black having to do anything at all. It is 
important to note that what actually happens, i.e. the actual sequence of 
events that leads up to Smith’s death at the hands of Jones is exactly the 
same as it would be had Black not been present at all. Black doesn’t show 
his hand and his monitoring doesn’t causally interact with Jones so as to 
affect what he does. However if it had looked to Black like Jones was go-
ing to do otherwise than kill Smith, then Black would have intervened 
and manipulated Jones so that Jones kills Smith. The case is presented as 
one  where  it’s  uncontroversial  that  Jones  is  morally  responsible  for 
killing Smith. Intuitively, Jones is morally responsible for his action and 
yet, because of the counterfactual process that was never set in motion 
(by  which  I  mean  Black’s  intervention  and  manipulation),  Frankfurt 
claims that Jones could not have done otherwise than he did do. Hence 
we have an apparent refutation of the principle of alternate possibilities.
It’s important to note that we must not assume the case takes place in 
a deterministic world as this would beg the question against the incom-
patibilist position Frankfurt seeks to refute with the example. Specifically, 
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it would not be intuitive (at least to the incompatibilist) that Jones was 
morally responsible for killing Smith if the example was assumed to be 
deterministic.6
1.2 The prior-sign dilemma
It is now widely agreed that Frankfurt’s original example fails to co-
herently describe a case where an agent is responsible without having 
any alternate possibilities. The original example and cases with analo-
gous structure (sometimes called prior-sign  examples because Black -or 
the analogue of Black- has to wait for a sign before they know whether or 
not to intervene in the process),  fall  prey to a dilemma. On one horn, 
Jones (upon closer inspection) does have alternative possibilities; on the 
other horn, the possibilities are ruled out but so too is the intuition of re-
sponsibility along with them. The dilemma is referred to in the literature 
as  the prior-sign dilemma or  the Widerker/Kane/Ginet  defence.  The 7
response focusses on the sign that Black must take as a reason not to in-
tervene and let Jones continue to deliberate, choose and act on his own. 
The thought runs as follows; either that sign not to intervene causally de-
termines Jones’ subsequent decision to kill Smith or it doesn’t. If it does, 
then as I said above, the incompatibilist will complain that this is a ques-
 It should be noted that some commentators, notably John Martin Fischer, dis6 -
agree that assuming a deterministic setting is dialectically problematic here. I 
leave this issue to one side. Many incompatibilists would predictably take issue 
with the assumption of determinism.
 See Ginet (1996), Kane (1996), Widerker (1995).7
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tion begging description of  responsible agency and they consequently 
won’t have (or at least can’t be expected to have) the intuition that Jones 
is morally responsible when he goes on to kill  Smith. However, if  the 
sign for Black not to intervene doesn't determine Jones’ subsequent deci-
sion to kill  Smith then it  seems that Jones has alternative possibilities 
available to him. He could presumably decide to do something else in-
stead. Even if Black would immediately override that decision (through 
manipulation of Jones’ brain), it nevertheless looks like Jones could have 
done otherwise, i.e. chosen otherwise. This is consistent with the fact that 
because of the speed of Black’s interventions (when they do occur), Jones 
doesn’t necessarily have alternative possibilities of macro bodily action in 
the example. Specifically, he couldn’t necessarily have started to move in 
some ways that would constitute him following through on a decision 
not to kill (i.e going over to shake hands with Smith). However, the key 
point here is just to note that the dilemma defence is not threatened by 
the fact that there are no alternate possibilities of macro bodily action in 
the sense of Jones moving around in the context of tables and chairs after 
a decision not to kill. This is a good way of getting clear on the fact that 
decision as opposed to macro bodily action is the locus of responsible 
agency.
Robert Kane and David Widerker were the first to make the type of 
response outlined above. The very first formulation came in a footnote in 
Kane’s 1985 book Free Will and Values:
...It is interesting to ask what would happen to a Frankfurt controller 
if [the action in question were an undetermined choice.] The Frank-
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furt controller would wait to see if the agent would choose A on his 
own before intervening to make him choose A. But if ... neither the 
choosing of A nor the doing otherwise [is] determined ... [the] con-
troller cannot tell until the moment of choice itself whether the agent 
is going to choose A or do otherwise. If the controller wants to ensure 
that the choice of A is made, he must act in advance to bring it about. 
But  if  he  does  this  the  agent  will  not  be  responsible  because  the 
agent’s choice would have been controlled by the controller. 8
It might be thought that even though we must allow the case to be in-
deterministic so as not to beg the question against the incompatibilist, 
perhaps if Black really was that powerful with regards to his monitoring 
and knowledge of Jones’ behaviour then he would only not intervene in 
those cases where Jones was going to decide to kill Smith on his own. 
Perhaps Black errs on the side of caution and manipulates in all those 
situations apart from the ones where it is practically speaking obvious 
that Jones is going to commit murder. In response to this potential worry 
it must simply be reiterated that in all those cases where Black doesn’t 
intervene it just is possible that Jones can choose otherwise. The structure 
of the case does nothing to rule that out. Even in a weird possible world 
where Black and Jones have gone through this process a very large num-
ber of times before, and Black is detecting a pattern of deliberation and a 
weighing of reasons that indicates Jones will decide to kill with a very 
high probability, Jones might choose otherwise. That’s just what it means 
for a decision to be undetermined. The incompatibilist is entitled to make 
this claim given their considered position. The only way to get around 
that would be to make the case deterministic and give Black the ability to 
 Kane (1985: 51)8
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calculate infallibly what will happen from past states of the world and 
the laws of nature. However, as has already been said, this is dialectically 
unacceptable as the incompatibilist cannot be expected to have the intu-
ition of moral responsibility in that case.9
1.3 Problems with Frankfurt’s stipulations about the counterfac-
tual case
The prior-sign dilemma outlined above aims to show that, on the only 
dialectically acceptable version of the Frankfurt case, there is a salient al-
ternative possibility present: namely, when the relation between the sign 
for Black not to intervene and Jones’ decision is indeterministic (as it has 
to be in order not to beg the question against the incompatibilist) it ap-
pears that Jones can decide not to kill Smith, notwithstanding the fact 
that he’ll  immediately be overruled by Black’ intervention.  The prior 10
sign dilemma doesn’t take issue with the coherence of Frankfurt’s case 
 There is some debate about whether it’s coherent for libertarians to claim that 9
agents can chose otherwise than they in fact do in very clear cases when all the 
relevant background desires and reasons strongly favour a particular choice. 
For  example,  Steward  (2012:  140-144)  is  an  incompatibilist  who  denies  this 
makes sense in certain kinds of cases. However, this point doesn’t undermine 
my claims above about Jones’ decision in the Frankfurt example. It doesn’t seen 
incoherent  or  puzzling,  given Jones’ background beliefs  and desires,  that  he 
should chose not to kill Smith (independently that is, of whether the structure 
of the Frankfurt case permits such a decision).
 When I say sign not to intervene here what I strictly mean is the lack of a sign 10
to intervene. The case requires a sign for him to intervene and a lack of a sign 
for him not to intervene
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other than to point out that there is (contrary to what Frankfurt and oth-
ers have thought) an alternative present. 
In addition to the prior-sign dilemma, an independent line of criticism 
has been levelled at Frankfurt’s original case which does challenge the 
coherence of the stipulations Frankfurt makes about what happens in the 
counterfactual case where Black intervenes. In the actual case, Jones kills 
Smith on his own in the normal way and Black’s presence and readiness 
to intervene has no causal bearing on what actually happens. That all 
seems fine.  However,  Frankfurt  claims that  in  the  counterfactual  case 
where Black intervenes, “Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones 
decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him to do. Whatever 
Jones’s  initial  preferences  and  inclinations,  then,  Black  will  have  his 
way.”  The worry is that this isn’t obviously coherent. More specifically, 11
it isn’t clear that in the counterfactual case, the causal chain that Black 
initiates and which infallibly brings about the required outcome (Smith’s 
death),  constitutes a decision of  Jones  at  all.  It’s  crucially important to 
Frankfurt that Jones can’t avoid killing Smith. But is it legitimate then to 
stipulate that despite Black’s invasive control in the counterfactual case it 
is still Jones who acts? 
Maria  Alvarez,  Helen  Steward  and  Brendan  Larvor  articulate  this 
worry. Alvarez, referring to the brain sequence Black sets in motion (in 
Jones) and also referencing Hornsby’s 1980 distinction between transitive 
(T) and intransitive (I) forms of verbs, writes:
 Frankfurt (1969: 835)11
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Why would making this sequence happen amount to causing a deci-
sion? Just as the occurrence of a sequence of movementsI of Jones’s 
body is not sufficient for his having performed an action, the occur-
rence of a particular sequence of neural events is not sufficient for his 
having  made  a  decision—even  if,  had  Jones  made  a  decision,  that 
same sequence would have happened; and even if, whenever Jones 
makes a decision to perform an action of that kind, a sequence of 
neural  events  of  the  same kind occurs.  Thus  there  seem to  be  no 
grounds for thinking that it is legitimate to stipulate, as Frankfurt and 
others do, that what Black would cause by manipulating Jones’s brain 
would be a decision of Jones’s. Indeed, there are compelling reasons 
for denying that it is legitimate, because none of the criteria for some-
one to have decided something would apply to Jones in the counter-
factual case. For one thing, the ‘decision’ would not be the outcome of 
Jones’s practical reasoning, or of his emotional response to a situa-
tion.  But  it  is  in  such contexts,  i.e.  contexts  of  deliberation,  of  ap-
praisal and reaction to a situation, etc., that the concept of a decision 
has application.12
Larvor (again referring to Black’s intervention in the counterfactual 
case) writes:
Black presses his button, initiating a reliable causal chain that ends in 
Smith’s  death.  This  is  Black’s  deed.  The fact  that  the  causal  chain 
passes through parts of Jones’s body does not make it Jones’s deed. 
Jones  is  merely  Black’s  unwilling  instrument.  In  this  scenario,  it 
would be false to say that Jones kills Smith. Black kills Smith, which is 
why we would hold Black responsible for Smith’s death, and not the 
hapless Jones.13
Steward discuses the status of intervention by a manipulative process 
or agent in the counterfactual case in the context of another modified 
Frankfurt case (the Mele/Robb case), which I will evaluate later in this 
 Alvarez (2009: 71)12
 Larvor (2010: 507), my italics.13
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chapter. In the Mele/Robb case an agent, Bob, is deliberating whether to 
steal Ann’s car. Black wants him to and has in this case initiated a process 
P in Bob’s brain that will ensure Bob decides to steal by some time t only 
if Bob has not already by that time decided to steal the car. Leaving aside 
for  the  moment  all  discussion  of  other  aspects  of  this  modified case, 
Steward’s comments on this case are equally applicable to the considera-
tion of the status of the counterfactual intervention scenario in the classic 
Frankfurt case:
But  when  process  P  culminates  in  Bob’s  so-called  ‘decision’,  Bob 
seems to have had nothing whatever to do with the resulting event 
(except that he has, by refraining from thus deciding ‘on his own’, 
inadvertently permitted it to occur). The occurrence of this ‘decision’ 
in him, because brought about by a process over which he has no con-
trol, seems to be just that: an occurrence in him not a decision by him. 
It was not the consequence, for example, of any deliberation on the 
part of Bob and presumably bore none of the normal sorts of relation-
ship to such things as his emotional state, the content of prior imagin-
ings, etc. Its causal source, indeed, seems to have had nothing to do 
with him at all, except that some important parts of the process are 
located within his skin. Why, then, agree that what has occurred is 
anything that merits description as a decision, on the part of Bob, to 
steal Ann’s car?14
This  seems right.  It’s  not  at  all  obvious that  interventions to  bring 
about a causal sequence in an agent along these lines could ever consti-
tute a decision and action on the part of that agent. The first thought that 
comes to mind is that these situations are ones where Black ‘acts through’ 
Jones or Bob etc. Further, as Alvarez and Steward both say, the activity 
that  is  characteristically  associated  with  a  person  making  a  decision 
 Steward (2012: 179-80)14
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would be absent, i.e. the process Black initiates would not be the out-
come of Jones’ deliberation and practical reasoning. If this is correct then 
it would not be the case, contrary to what Frankfurt claims, that this is a 
situation where Jones is responsible despite the fact that he couldn’t have 
done otherwise. If Alvarez, Steward and Larvor are right that Jones does 
not  act  in the counterfactual  case,  then when Jones kills  Smith in the 
normal way on his own in the actual case, it’s not true that he could not 
have  failed  to  act  as  he  does,  as  in  the  counterfactual  situation,  he 
wouldn’t act at all. The burden is with the Frankfurt defender to respond 
to these worries.
Regarding this challenge to the coherence of the counterfactual case in 
Frankfurt examples, Michael Otsuka and Ezio Di Nucci have discussed 
the dialectical status (in the debate between compatibilist and incompat-
ibilist) of stipulations about the structure of the counterfactual case. It’s 
important to be sensitive to the burden of explanation and possibility of 
question begging in articulating these worries. These examples are meant 
to persuade us that alternate possibilities are not required for moral re-
sponsibility  without  introducing  anything  contentious.  The  Frankfurt 
defender has the task of telling a plausible story which doesn’t assume 
anything that the incompatibilist would take issue with here. Just as it 
was important that in the actual sequence in the Frankfurt case (where 
Black doesn’t intervene) we assume that determinism is false, we must 
not assume anything problematic in the counterfactual case either.
Michael Otsuka says the following about the counterfactual case:
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To those who maintain that such neural manipulation is not compati-
ble with agency on the part of Jones, we can imagine, on Frankfurt’s 
behalf, that Black is an omnipotent being who has the power to im-
pose deterministic laws of physics that make it inevitable that Jones 
kill Smith. Frankfurt’s opponent would not want to deny the compat-
ibility of determinism and action, for such a denial would beg the 
question against Frankfurt, since then, a fortiori, determinism would 
have to be false for there to be action for which one could be blame-
worthy.15
However, I don’t see how in the version of the counterfactual case Ot-
suka points to here, ‘omnipotent’ Black avoids the worries articulated by 
Alvarez, Steward and Larvor. Firstly, it’s still the case that after a period 
of deliberation and authentic mental activity on the part of Jones, when 
Black intervenes the resultant behaviour of Jones is not connected up in 
the appropriate kind of way with the previous activity (the activity on 
the basis of which Black decided he had to intervene) to constitute a de-
cision of  Jones.  Alvarez  and Steward’s  point  above seems to  retain  as 
much force  in  this  respect  however  sophisticated Black becomes.  The 
power to impose deterministic laws of physics in such a way that the 
process that then occurs as a result of this is neurologically identical to 
the one that would have happened had Jones’ deliberation gone differ-
ently earlier (more favourably from Black’s point of view) still doesn’t 
mean that it is a decision of Jones, rather than Black acting through Jones’ 
neural pathways. The original criticism that there is no decision or action 
by Jones in the counterfactual case is not itself threatened by Otsuka’s 
point that to assume the falsity of determinism necessary for action itself 
 Otsuka (1998: 687)15
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would  be  question  begging  against  Frankfurt  here.  Determinism was 
never the source of that worry, it was the disconnection from previous 
mental activity pre intervention as well as the related worry that causing 
a sequence of physical events might not constitute causing someone to 
act at all. The point about disconnection applies equally to both deter-
ministic and indeterministic contexts in these kinds of counterfactual in-
terventions.
The second point of interest is Otsuka’s claim that to deny that a de-
terministic process in Jones (in the counterfactual case) could count as an 
action here would be to beg the question against Frankfurt. These cases 
are meant to be stories that persuade people that alternative possibilities 
are not required for moral responsibility without introducing anything 
contentious that the target group would reject. That said, why, if it’s di-
alectically unacceptable for a Frankfurt defender to assume determinism 
in the actual case when Jones acts without intervention (as one horn of 
the prior-sign dilemma outlined above made clear), is it nevertheless ac-
ceptable  to  assume  that  Black  operates  by  initiating  a  deterministic 
causal process in the counterfactual case? It might look as if what goes 
for the actual case must also go for the counterfactual case here - but the 
terrain is more complicated. In the eyes of an incompatibilist about moral 
responsibility who thought you needed leeway control which is inconsis-
tent with determinism, a Frankfurt defender putting forward a determin-
istic story in the actual case and expecting an intuition of moral respon-
sibility from the incompatibilist is indeed begging the question. But just 
!39
because an incompatibilist is an incompatibilist about morally responsible 
action it doesn’t follow that they’re an incompatibilist about action sim-
pliciter. Plausibly, many people in the leeway incompatibilist camp might 
conclude that we all still continue to act under determinism although no-
one is ever morally responsible for what they do. So Otsuka is quite right 
in this respect. However, for those incompatibilists (like Steward) who 
are agency incompatibilists, assuming a deterministic story in the coun-
terfactual case is just as dialectically problematic as it is in the normal 
case (though for different reasons to those outlined here).
Taking stock then, for a large class of incompatibilists, Otsuka is right 
that assuming Black operates by imposing deterministic causal laws in 
the counterfactual case is not dialectically problematic because he’s impos-
ing determinism (though it is for the agency incompatibilists who have in-
dependently motivated their positions like Steward). However, Alvarez, 
Steward and Larvor’s original points remain as forceful here when Black 
operates  as  a  counterfactual  intervener.  The  reason  for  thinking  Jones 
doesn’t do anything in the counterfactual case has nothing to do with de-
terminism. It is instead that the neural activity post Black’s intervention 
is not connected up in the right kind of way with the neural activity pre 
intervention for the latter  to plausibly count as an action of  Jones.  In 
summary, we have no reason to conclude that Jones is responsible for 
something he couldn’t avoid doing because Jones doesn’t do anything in 
the counterfactual case. The history and genesis of an event matter when 
it comes to whether that event can constitute a decision.
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This concludes my discussion of the classic Frankfurt case. In the rest 
of this chapter these points will be relevant against some of the modified 
Frankfurt style cases as well.
1.4 What kind of alternative possibilities are relevant in Frank-
furt style cases?
The issue of ‘robustness’
So far I have only argued that there are alternate possibilities present in a 
traditional  (prior  sign  style)  Frankfurt  case.  However,  in  the  dialectic 
with a proponent of any kind of Frankfurt case it’s not enough merely to 
point out that, contrary to the purported structure of the example, alter-
natives are in fact present. In addition, it has to be shown that these are 
the right kind of alternatives to ground moral responsibility. More specif-
ically, it has to be the case that alternatives confer the status of responsi-
bility on the agent in the example. In other words, the agent must be 
morally responsible partly in virtue of the fact that they could have done 
otherwise. In the terms of the debate, the alternatives have to be robust. 
Imagine that a person made an undetermined free choice to do A. The 
indeterminism means A is not guaranteed, but if (by stipulation) the only 
other possibilities were involuntary twitches or spasms (things that hap-
pened to the agent as opposed to voluntary choices or omissions by the 
agent), it’s hard to see how the possibility of those spasms or twitches 
even partly underwrote the responsibility ascription. We don’t tend to 
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think it’s in virtue of the existence of those merely possible events that 
responsibility is conferred. When someone makes a free voluntary choice 
to do something immoral, the thought is that they didn’t have to make 
that choice and the filling out of ‘didn’t have to’ here should be thicker 
than the mere possibility that a different event of any kind could have by 
chance occurred. What we plausibly mean is that something else was not 
merely possible (in the thin sense of possibility given the indeterminism) 
but that some other voluntary action or omission was possible, given the 
deliberative undetermined agency in question. I will now look in more 
detail  at  how we should  understand the  salient  notion  of  robustness 
here, given recent work by Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom.
The central requirement for alternatives to be robust is the demand 
that the alternative possibilities be exempting. It should be the case that 
when  an  agent  avails  themselves  of  such  an  alternative,  they  would 
thereby exempt themselves from blame for the thing they would have 
otherwise done. In Pereboom’s words, “The core intuition that underlies 
the proposal to explain moral responsibility by access to alternative pos-
sibilities is  that to be blameworthy for an action,  an agent must have 
been able to do something that would have resulted in her being “off the 
hook.”  There is an epistemic requirement on robustness: it must also be 16
the case, broadly speaking, that an agent understands that by taking an 
alternative course to the one they do in fact take, they would have been 
exempted from the responsibility they in fact have for their chosen path. 
 Pereboom (2014: 10-11)16
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There are some tricky issues with getting the notion of robustness pre-
cisely stated given the nature of the knowledge requirement arising from 
the need to understand here. In Living without Free Will Pereboom initial-
ly characterised robustness as follows:
Robustness (A): For agent to have a robust alternative to her action 
A,  that  is,  an  alternative  relevant  per  se  to  explaining why she  is 
morally responsible for A, she must have understood that instead she 
could  have  voluntarily  done  something  as  a  result  of  which  she 
would have been precluded from the moral responsibility she actual-
ly has for A.17
Pereboom summarises a number of potential problems for this formu-
lation of robustness and then goes on to offer a more nuanced version. To 
begin with, following a point raised by Jonathan Vance, there is the ques-
tion  of  how much  credence  in  the  claim that  a  particular  alternative 
course of action is exempting an agent needs to have. Vance gives the ex-
ample of an agent who had a belief with a very low degree of subjective 
probability that a certain course of action might be exempting. Intuitively 
this would not count as a robust possibility. On the other hand requiring 
certainty seems far too strong in many cases. This will clearly be a matter 
of  degree  for  most  descriptions  of  action.  Pereboom  replies  that  the 
threshold credence required will be ‘difficult or impossible to determine’ 
but implies that this isn’t a special problem for being able to tell what 
counts as robust. This seems right - each case must be judged individual-
ly when it comes to the status of the alternatives an agent has, given their 
knowledge, beliefs and credences at the time. This is just the general is-
 Pereboom (2014: 11)17
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sue of justification and credence raising its head with respect to the con-
cept of robustness and does not indicate that there is anything wrong 
with the attempt to characterise robustness this way per say. Secondly, 
and more importantly, Pereboom discusses a worry Dana Nelkin raises 
about whether knowledge is even required. Nelkin discusses a case from 
Mark Twain in which Huckleberry Finn is deciding whether to let Jim 
the slave boy go free, Pereboom says the following:
In a familiar example from Mark Twain, Huck Finn sincerely express-
es the view that allowing Jim, the slave, to go free, is morally wrong, 
but nonetheless allows him to go free instead of returning him to his 
owner. Suppose that he instead, holding that moral psychology fixed, 
did return him to his owner, and that this is in fact morally wrong. 
Does  Huck  have  a  robust  blameworthiness-explaining  alternative 
possibility—i.e.,  his  allowing  Jim  to  go  free?  My  sense  is  that  he 
might well, despite his not clearly understanding that letting Jim go 
free is morally right, and that letting him go free would have pre-
cluded  him  from  the  blameworthiness  he  actually  incurs.  For,  as 
Nelkin points out, we suppose that Huck has at least some cognitive 
sensitivity to the moral rightness of letting Jim go free and the moral 
wrongness of returning him to his owner. As a result, she thinks that 
Robustness (A) is too strong, and I believe she is right. Nelkin sug-
gests  that  understanding isn’t  needed,  but rather only some lower 
level cognitive sensitivity. I propose that what’s required is that Huck 
has some cognitive sensitivity to the fact that he could do otherwise, 
and to  the  fact  that  if  he  did do otherwise,  he  would then be,  or 
would likely be, blameless.18
This seems right, requiring full knowledge seems to set the bar too 
high in cases where we would feel intuitively that the agent had suffi-
cient sensitivity or awareness enough to qualify as a candidate for re-
 Pereboom (2014: 12)18
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sponsibility. Consequently, Pereboom reformulates his robustness condi-
tion as follows:
Robustness (B):  For an agent to have a robust alternative to her 
immoral action A, that is, an alternative relevant per se to explain-
ing why she is blameworthy for performing A, it must be that
(i) she instead could have voluntarily acted or refrained 
from acting as a result of which she would be blame-
less, and
(ii) for  at  least  one such exempting acting or  refraining, 
she was cognitively sensitive to the fact that she could 
so voluntarily act or refrain, and to the fact that if she 
voluntarily so acted or refrained she would then be, or 
would likely be, blameless.19
In many cases,  perhaps most cases in the actual world, agents will 
have knowledge of, rather than mere cognitive sensitivity to the fact that 
an alternative is exempting for them. I will henceforth work with this de-
finition (Pereboom’s Robustness B) as I examine the different kinds of 
Frankfurt style cases to determine whether there are in fact robust alter-
native possibilities present.
Alternatives to do some other thing or just to refrain from what you in 
fact did?
We need robust alternatives but it seems as if there are two ways of con-
ceiving robust alternatives given the requirements explored in the section 
above. It’s natural to think that whenever an agent makes some decision 
they are morally responsible for and where they could have done other-
 Pereboom (2014: 13)19
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wise, that means they could have decided otherwise. For example, perhaps 
someone illicitly parks in a disabled parking space when they could have 
just as easily chosen to park in a regular bay. There are also the cases 
where the alternative decision is just a decision to not do the thing you ac-
tually did, though not to do something different instead. For example, I’m 
responsible for choosing the chocolate cake but I could have chosen not to 
take the cake instead etc. In both the previous examples about parking and 
cake you choose something but you could have chosen something else in-
stead.  As the two slightly different examples illustrate,  that  something 
else instead might be a different option altogether or just the decision not 
to do the thing you actually did. It’s very natural to offer these kinds of 
alternatives up as stereotypical examples of what we mean when we are 
talking about alternate possibilities for action. On the other hand, when 
we say of someone’s decision, ‘you didn’t have to do that…’, we might 
just mean that they could have refrained, i.e.  not done the thing, in a 
sense that needn’t require them to have made some other concrete decision 
at all, whether that other decision is to do something else altogether or 
just a decision to not do the thing they did do. It looks like there is a 
weaker and a stronger sense of ‘refrain’ available in ordinary discourse. 
You can refrain from choosing A (in the stronger sense) when you make 
an explicit decision to do something other than A (say B) or by making 
an explicit decision simply to not choose A. Refraining in the stronger 
sense is just the same thing as deciding otherwise as illustrated with the 
examples of parking spaces and cake. However, as already mentioned 
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above, you can also refrain from choosing A (in the weaker sense) simply 
by not choosing A where this doesn’t entail any other voluntary decision 
(maybe you just continue deliberating).  Maria Alvarez argues that the 
alternative possibilities requirement should be understood in the weaker 
sense here.  Sometimes, elsewhere in the literature this distinction isn’t 20
made clear. As we go through the different Frankfurt cases I will make 
explicit how the incompatibilist is best placed to argue with respect to 
this  distinction.  I  don’t  necessarily  want  to  take  a  firm  position  on 
whether the stronger or weaker requirement is the one to endorse here. 
The most important thing from my perspective is to find (if they exist) 
robust alternatives in Frankfurt cases. For each type of case evaluated I 
will discuss the type of alternative present. Either way, if they exist there 
will be an intuitively grounded robust alternative in a Frankfurt case and 
that is bad news for the compatibilist project.
In summary, given I have now outlined the importance of both ro-
bustness and the distinction between deciding to do something else and 
refraining from deciding, where both can count as ‘doing otherwise', it’s 
clear that the original Frankfurt case has robust alternatives in it. On one 
horn of the dilemma defence, if the situation is indeterministic and the 
sign for Black not to intervene doesn’t necessitate what happens, when 
Black doesn’t intervene and Jones goes ahead and kills Smith in the nor-
mal way, it’s true that Jones has the following robust alternatives avail-
able. Firstly, Jones could make a decision not to kill Smith (again, this is 
 Alvarez (2009: 63)20
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consistent with such a decision being immediately overridden by Black’s 
neural  intervention).  Such an alternative decision would be voluntary 
and  meet  the  epistemic  requirement  on  robustness.  Jones  would  of 
course know that by choosing not to kill he was choosing a path that 
would exempt him from the responsibility he would have incurred for 
killing. Secondly, Jones could have refrained from deciding to kill Smith 
where refraining meant nothing more than ‘not deciding to kill  Smith 
and not ‘deciding not to kill Smith’. Perhaps Jones just continued with 
his deliberation etc. If this was the alternative then it would also be vol-
untary and robust as Jones knows that by continuing to deliberate as op-
posed to deciding to kill he is exempt from the responsibility that would 
be  his  had he  instead decided to  kill.  Both alternatives,  stronger  and 
weaker, meet the requirements for robustness. I now turn to the evalua-
tion of more recent modified Frankfurt style cases.
1.5 Modified Frankfurt examples
Much  of  the  discussion  subsequent  to  the  mid-nineties  has  revolved 
around whether it is possible to construct an example that won’t fall vic-
tim to the prior-sign dilemma. To this end, ingenious new types of ex-
amples with different structures have been developed. In addition to the 
classic prior-sign Frankfurt case there are now no-prior-sign cases involv-
ing overdetermination and/or blockage as part of their structure. More 
recently, buffer cases have been developed which do involve prior signs 
but in a way that purports to evade the dilemma defence. I will evaluate 
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each of these different types in turn, taking the best instances of each 
kind. In addition to possible evasion of the prior-sign dilemma, it will 
also be important to see if the modified cases avoid the problems associ-
ated with the counterfactual case as outlined by Alvarez, Steward and 
Larvor. One crucial point about example structure is worth keeping in 
mind here. The principle of alternative possibilities states that in order 
for an agent to be morally responsible for some action, it must be the case 
that they could have avoided performing it. In other words, we need a 
case  where  there  is  an  instance  of  unavoidable  action,  for  which  the 
agent in question remains intuitively responsible. That is what you need 
for a successful Frankfurt-style case. It is consistent with saying that that 
not all alternative possibilities need to be removed from the case struc-
ture.  For  example  there  might  be  wiggle  room and various  ways the 
agent might act or deliberate in the lead up to the (purported) instance of 
unavoidable action for which they are intuitively responsible. None of 
that would matter as long as the case is indeed a case of responsible un-
avoidable action. Even with loads of other alternatives present the case 
would still refute the principle of alternative possibilities. It is important 
to bear this point in mind while exploring the variety of modified cases 
in the rest of chapter one.21
 I  am grateful  to Michael  Otsuka for  making this  last  point  explicit  in his 21
comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. In what follows it should be clear 
how the different types of cases engage (or don’t engage) with this requirement. 
In particular my discussion of buffer cases and the ‘timing dialectic’ clarifies 
these issues for the most advanced cases to date.
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The Mele-Robb case
In the original prior sign Frankfurt case, when Black doesn’t intervene, 
the indeterminism of Jones’  agency left  it  open that  Jones could have 
chosen otherwise than he did. The ensuring condition (i.e. Black inter-
vening so that the desired ‘behaviour’ of Jones occurs) did not block off 
alternate possibilities at the locus of freely willed agency (the moment of 
choice itself), even if it did mean that at the level of macro bodily action, 
Jones could never follow through on certain decisions, i.e. by enacting a 
course of action that Black doesn’t want. Is it possible to construct an ex-
ample where the ensuring condition operates in a way that doesn’t leave 
this space between what the agent actually does (in the normal way on 
his own) and what the ensuring condition wants to ensure? To this end 
the Mele/Robb example attempts to describe a situation where two dis-
tinct processes each bring about the desired result (the decision to act a 
certain way) but where the ensuring process does not make use of any 
prior sign. One process just is the agent deliberating and then deciding in 
the normal way. We must again assume this first process is indeterminis-
tic so as not to beg the question against the incompatibilist. The other 
process (the ensuring condition) is deterministic and is such that it brings 
about the desired action by a certain time unless the first indeterministic 
process itself brings about that same course of action by that time. These 
processes are independent and when the agent deliberates and chooses 
as desired in the normal way it’s meant to be the case that the determin-
istic ensuring process does not causally interfere at all in what goes on. 
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However, if at the crucial moment, the agent fails to choose as desired 
then the deterministic process would bring about the desired result at 
just that moment instead. Just like in the original Frankfurt case, if coher-
ent, we would have a situation wherein an agent deliberates and chooses 
in the normal way and is intuitively morally responsible for what they 
do yet couldn’t have chosen otherwise. The Mele/Robb example runs as 
follows:
Our scenario features an agent, Bob, who inhabits a world at which 
determinism is  false...  At  t1,  Black  initiates  a  certain  deterministic 
process P in Bob’s brain with the intention of thereby causing Bob to 
decide at t2 (an hour later) to steal Ann’s car. The process, which is 
screened off from Bob’s consciousness, will deterministically culmi-
nate in Bob’s deciding at t2 to steal Ann’s car unless he decides on his 
own at t2 to steal it or is incapable at t2 of making a decision (because, 
for example, he is dead by t2) …… The process is in no way sensitive 
to any ‘sign’of what Bob will decide. As it happens, at t2 Bob decides 
on his own to steal the car, on the basis of his own indeterministic de-
liberation about whether to steal it, and his decision has no determin-
istic cause. But if he had not just then decided on his own to steal it, P 
would have deterministically issued, at t2, in his deciding to steal it. 
Rest assured that P in no way influences the indeterministic decision-
making process that actually issues in Bob’s decision.22
What are we to make of this case? Before t2 it is clearly open to Bob to 
decide not to steal the car and so consequently, any decision to steal be-
fore t2 is one where Bob has robust alternate possibilities open to him. It 
is the structure of the situation at t2 itself that is meant to be a counterex-
ample to the principle of alternative possibilities. It seems that Mele and 
Robb want the following to be true; P will ensure that Bob chooses to steal 
 Mele and Robb (1998: 101-2)22
!51
the car at t2 if he hasn’t already and doesn’t at that very instant decide 
himself to steal it. In addition, if he chooses to steal it himself at t2 then P 
doesn’t come into it. Is this coherent?
One of the worries here is that it's hard to make sense of how, when x 
(the agent’s own indeterministic decision process) and P both coincide on 
a decision to steal the car at t2, it's x that does the causing and not the de-
terministic process P. Widerker expresses this worry when he says (refer-
ring again to the situation where Bob’s own indeterministic deliberative 
process  chooses  to  steal  at  t2, “what  happens  in  that  scenario  to  the 
causal efficacy of P  so that at  the time of the decision it  is  absent?”  23
Widerker calls this the 'Efficacy Problem'. He suggests that this problem 
may be overcome if:
…when the two processes are about to culminate in Bob's decision to 
steal Ann's car, the deterministic process P is somehow preempted. 
Then, there arises another problem that needs to be resolved: given 
that P is now preempted and Bob decides to steal Ann's car on his 
own, there is the distinct possibility that at the last moment he might 
decide not to steal the car. In that case, the following counterfactual
(K) If Bob had not decided on his own to steal the car, P would have 
deterministically issued, at t2, in his deciding to steal the car
would be false. The truth of (K), however, is crucial to the success of 
the Mele/Robb example.”.24
This is the 'Divergence Problem'. Mele and Robb attempt to deal with 
these issues by adding more detail to their example:
 Widerker (2003: 54)23
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[There are] two different 'decision nodes' in Bob's brain. The 'lighting 
up' of node N1 represents his deciding to steal the car, and the 'light-
ing up of node N2' represents his deciding not to steal the car. Under 
normal circumstances and in the absence of preemption, a process's 
hitting a decision node in Bob 'light's up' that node. If it were to be the 
case both that P hits N1 at t2 and that [the indeterministic process] x 
does not hit N1 at t2, then P would light up N1. If both processes 
were  to  hit  N1 at  t2,  Bob's  indeterministic  deliberative  process,  x, 
would light  up N1 and P would not....  [Furthermore],  although if 
both processes were to hit N1 at t2, Bob's indeterministic process, x, 
would preempt P and light up N1, it is also the case that if, at t2, P 
were to hit N1 and x were to hit N2, P would prevail. In the latter 
case, P would light up N1 and the indeterministic process would not 
light up N2. Of course, readers would like a story about why it is that 
although x would preempt P in the former situation, P would prevail 
over x in the latter. Here is one story. By t2, P has 'neutralized' N2 (but 
without affecting what goes on in x). That is why, if x were to hit N2 
at t2, N2 would not light up. More fully, by t2, P has neutralized all of 
the nodes in Bob for decisions that are contrary to a decision at t2 to 
steal Ann's car (for example, a decision at t2 never to steal anything). 
In convenient short hand, by t2, P has neutralized N2 and all its 'cog-
nate decision nodes.25
Even granting  all  this,  it  still  seems the  elaboration  leaves  at  least 
Widerker's 'efficacy' worry unresolved. Mele and Robb have given us a 
story which explains how x cannot light up N2 or other nodes at t2 be-
cause they have (by then) been neutralised but the issue of how when x acti-
vates N1, P doesn't do the causing is left unanswered. In other places howev-
er, Mele and Robb do directly engage with the efficacy problem when 
they discuss the analogy of a widget making machine and also make ap-
peal to models using seesaw-devices and ball bearings.  Their defence of 26
 Mele and Robb (1998: 105)25
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(the conceptual possibility of) current preemption appeals to a see-saw de-
vice like the one below.
U                              U
^           .
The machine is said to have right bias in the sense that when two ball 
bearings hit the cups at the same time the right cup will be pushed down 
and not the left come. Despite the ball bearings reaching the cups at ex-
actly the same time, we can say that the rightmost one caused the rele-
vant change. Applied to the Mele/Robb case, the idea is that the deter-
ministic process would terminate in the cup without the bias and the in-
deterministic deliberation terminates in the cup with the bias. Hence we 
can make sense of saying (as Mele and Robb want to) that the indeter-
ministic  process does the causing and not the process P,  even though 
they hit N1 at the same time. 
However, even granting that this ball bearing machine and see-saw 
analogy  make  occurrent  preemption  (trumping)  conceptually  possible 
for the sake of argument, there is still a problem for the Mele/Robb case. 
It’s the issue of the status of the causal process that is put in place when P 
does the causing and not x at t2. Following Otsuka’s point from the dis-
cussion  of  the  counterfactual  case  in  the  classic  Frankfurt  example,  I 
won’t take issue here with the fact that the process P is deterministic. The 
problem is that when it does the causing, process P is subject to exactly 
the  same  worry  that  Alvarez,  Steward  and  Larvor  articulate.  In  the 
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Mele/Robb case, process P starts a causal chain in Bob’s brain which is 
suitably disconnected from Bob’s previous neural activity before t2 that 
‘P lighting up N1 at t2’ when it occurs, is not a candidate for being consti-
tutive of an action of Bob’s. Just as the neural events produced as a result of 
Black’s intervention in the classic case are not appropriately the outcome 
of Jones’ deliberation or the result of his emotional response to the situa-
tion with respect to whether or not to kill  Smith, analogously, we can 
counter Mele and Robb by saying that Process P is not appropriately the 
outcome of Bob’s deliberation or the result of his emotional response to 
the situation involving Anne’s car. The same worry holds. To suddenly 
insist that P lighting up N1 is a decision of Bob’s is to stipulate some-
thing implausible given the uncontroversial historical conditions on de-
cisions. As Larvor might say, when P lights up N1 “it’s Black’s deed, not 
Bob’s” etc. Consequently, Mele and Robb have not coherently described a 
case where Bob is responsible for something he couldn’t avoid doing as 
in the counterfactual case he doesn’t act. The principle of alternate possi-
bilities is not threatened by the Mele/Robb case for the same reason here: 




The  classic  blockage  case  in  the  literature  was  developed  by  David 
Hunt.  As is the case with other Frankfurt style examples, the aim is to 27
describe a situation where an agent freely chooses a course of action in 
the usual way and where we find them intuitively responsible. However, 
given the structure of the case, they couldn’t have done otherwise. No 
sign and counterfactual intervention strategy is made use of by Hunt and 
instead it is stipulated that all of the neural pathways that constitute the 
supervenience  bases  of  alternative  decisions  are  blocked  off  or  neu-
tralised. The Mele/Robb example just examined is (in part) a blockage 
example as it was stipulated that other decision nodes are neutralised in 
Bob. I didn’t take issue with the blockage part of the Mele/Robb example 
as the problem with the counterfactual case when process P activates N1 
was sufficient to establish that Mele and Robb’s story doesn’t work, al-
though it is interesting to consider how similar the Mele/Robb example 
would be to Hunt’s blockage case if modified to exclude the process P 
and retain simply the ‘neutralised other decision nodes’ part of the story. 
However, Hunt’s example doesn’t involve any other mechanism apart 
from blockage.  After  considering  John Locke’s  discussion  of  the  man 
who willingly stays in a locked room, Hunt develops an example in the 
following way:
What is needed is a case in which unavoidability arises solely from 
blocked alternatives (rather than compulsion in the actual sequence), 
 Hunt (2000: 195-227)27
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and the amount of elbow room remaining to the agent approaches 
zero. Imagine then a mechanism that blocks neural pathways rather 
than doorways. Suppose that the actual series of Jones’s mental states 
leading up to the murder of Smith is compatible with PAP, except that 
the mechanism is in operation. The mechanism is not intervening di-
rectly in the series itself; it is allowing the series to unfold on its own, 
but simply blocking all alternatives to the series. Of course it can’t 
block alternatives in response to the way the series is unfolding, be-
cause then the blockage would be coming too late to have any effect 
on the avoidability or unavoidability of Jones’s actions. Instead, the 
mechanism blocks alternatives in advance, but owing to a fantastic 
coincidence the pathways it blocks just happen to be all the ones that 
will be unactualized in any case, while the single pathway that re-
mains unblocked is precisely the route the man’s thoughts would be 
following anyway (if all neutral pathways were unblocked). Under 
these  conditions,  the  man  appears  to  remain  responsible  for  his 
thoughts and actions,…28
Granting for the moment that the case is coherent, we can still legiti-
mately ask why the agent in question couldn’t have refrained from de-
ciding in the way they did in fact  decide.  In line with the distinction 
made above between making another decision on the one hand and sim-
ply refraining from deciding as you did on the other, we can ask why the 
weaker sense of refraining here should also have been ruled out in this 
case. If the blocked neural pathways are meant to be the supervenience 
bases for other possible decisions then maybe Hunt is indeed describing 
a situation where Jones couldn’t make any other decision apart from the 
one he does in fact make but that doesn’t entail that Jones could not have 
simply refrained from making the decision he does make. As Alvarez 
says, refraining from doing x need not amount to anything more than 
 Hunt (2000: 218)28
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simply failing to do x here: provided certain other conditions are met, the 
refraining will meet the condition for robustness. The progress down the 
only neural pathway available wasn’t inevitable because the situation is 
indeterministic.  As  with  all  Frankfurt  style  cases  the  actual  sequence 
(though as we saw above not necessarily the counterfactual sequence) 
has to be indeterministic in order not to beg the question against the in-
compatibilist. Given that, and the structure of the set up, it seems perfect-
ly reasonable to claim that Jones could have refrained where this would 
simply correspond to his neural activity not going down the only avail-
able path given his awareness of what’s at stake. It seems hard to see 
how Hunt can avoid this possibility given the dialectical constraints on 
the example here.29
The reply above which Alvarez presses is sufficient to conclude that 
there are robust alternative possibilities in a blockage case as the agent 
can  still  refrain.  However,  it  is  interesting  to  consider  whether  there 
might be other alternate possibilities in blockage cases as well as the pos-
sibility  of  simply refraining from deciding.  The blockage strategy has 
been described as an attempt to construct an ‘in the head’ analogue of 
John Locke’s example of the man who willingly chooses to remain in a 
locked room.  If  so,  just  as  we might  wonder whether the person in 30
Locke’s  room  could  have  tried  the  door  handle,  we  might  now  ask 
 Alvarez (2009:  69,  fn.  12) develops exactly this point against the blockage 29
strategy
 See Locke (1690), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk II, Ch 21, S10.30
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whether Jones in Hunt’s case could have ‘tried’ a blocked neural path-
way.  Is  this  a coherent possibility given Hunt’s  stipulations about the 
blockage case? The story we are told by Hunt is a physiological story 
about brain structure. Getting on board with this example and taking it 
seriously requires a certain level of commitment to a scientific superve-
nience  based model  of  the  mind but  it’s  important  to  tread carefully 
when considering how the electrical signals in the brain might behave, 
and consequently  what  that  entails  regarding  the  possibilities  for  the 
agent in this context. We know we can’t assume the process is determin-
istic because of the dialectical situation the Frankfurt example defender 
is in with the incompatibilist. Hunt wants to block off any neural path-
ways that weren’t going to be used anyway but we might still wonder 
whether neural activity that could plausibly be construed as the super-
venience base of ‘trying to decide otherwise’ can be so uncontroversially 
ruled out here. In short it’s not clear to me that given the indeterminism, 
electrical activity might not ‘flicker about’ in such a way that it  would 
have activated another neuronal pathway (the supervenience base for an 
alternative decision) had Hunt’s blockage stipulations not been in place. I 
don’t need to be too specific here about the physiological story, the di-
alectical burden means that’s Hunt’s job. It is sufficient if I point to some-
thing plausible that might constitute the analogue of John Locke’s man 
trying the handle on the locked door. If such indeterministic veers of ac-
tivity (towards blockages) were possible here then I think there is an ar-
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gument to be made that they would constitute robust alternate decisions. I 
develop this argument below.
Carl Ginet has argued elsewhere that decisions are discrete events. If 
you’ve resolved to take a certain decision then there is no temporal inter-
val which needs to be completed from start to finish before we can say 
that the decision event is complete.  I want to use Ginet’s point about 31
the discrete status of  choice or decision events in combination with a 
clarification of the proper status of these possible ‘electrical veers’ to ar-
gue that  there might be robust  alternate decisions in Hunt’s  blockage 
case. This is especially important given the worries John Martin Fischer 
has articulated about flickers of freedom not being robust enough in the 
context of Frankfurt style scenarios.
Might  not  electrical  veers  towards other  (blocked)  nodes constitute 
decisions to do otherwise here? Given the discrete structure of decisions 
it seems plausible that if we have the setting out towards a blocked node 
then we arguably already have a decision. We are considering an inde-
terministic context, where an agent is deliberating what to do and is fully 
aware of the different options and knows nothing of Black or any block-
ages.  More specifically, if (i) it was true that the indeterminism crucial 32
for the incompatibilist here was in the right place (i.e. between the delib-
 Ginet (1996)31
 I am admittedly shifting here between talk of the neural behaviour of electric32 -
ity and the behaviour of the agent when I talk about veers. I am assuming that 
the neural supervenience base of an agent’s decision could be such an electrical 
veer here. 
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eration and the initiation of the veer) and in addition (ii), if it was true 
that  had  the  veer  been  allowed to  develop  without  Black/Process  P/
Hunt’s blockages it would have (in all close possible worlds without in-
terference) been continuous with the causal processes to translate such a 
decision into the relevant set of bodily actions, then it seems correct to say 
that a decision has already been made. These two conditions are not ruled 
out by any part of the blockage case structure and together they consti-
tute an argument for the claim that we can understand the veer itself as a 
decision and that we don’t need to worry that nodes can’t be activated. If 
I’m correct then the nodes are nothing special, they’re just another part of 
the downstream neural journey after the actual decision (the veer) has 
already been made. It’s difficult to see this at first given how Hunt de-
scribes the case (Mele and Robb do the same with respect to their block-
age stipulations). It’s stipulated that other decision nodes have been neu-
tralised in these cases and hence it looks to be begging the question by 
pressing this particular line. However, on reflection, it appears acceptable 
to push this worry given the scientific framework Hunt is telling his sto-
ry in and moreover, understanding the status of the veers in the way out-
lined above seems in line with what we would expect from a leeway in-
compatibilist model and therefore not ad hoc. It’s up to Hunt to refine the 
physiological story in such a way that the move I make here is ruled out. 
Moreover, if the veers towards Hunt’s blocked alternatives do constitute 
full decisions to do otherwise then they uncontroversially meet the re-
quirements for robustness.
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Perhaps it might be said in reply to the argument above that if the 
other neural pathways are neutralised then you can’t even start a veer in 
the way I have suggested. There would be no wiggle room between the 
actual sequence of deliberation and decision as it unfolds and any any 
other neural pattern whatsoever. As I have already said however, given 
the indeterminism that must be present in these cases it isn’t clear one 
can at the same time simply stipulate this. In the end though, even grant-
ing the coherence of Hunt’s case and the impossibility of veering, Al-
varez’s point about there being robust alternate possibilities of refraining 
in blockage cases retains its force here.
At this point in the dialectic, it’s important to remind ourselves of the 
methodology in use and its parameters.  The task of the Frankfurt de-
fender is to tell a story in which we find an agent intuitively morally re-
sponsible in the normal way for some action that was unavoidable. So far 
the stories we have been considering have been mostly about the human 
brain  and manipulated neural  structure,  this  was  true  of  the  original 
Frankfurt case and then again with Mele/Robb and Hunt. In the above 
sections I have argued that the leeway compatibilist can still consistently 
find  robust  alternative  possibilities  within  those  cases.  Either  in  the 
(weaker) sense of having the ability to refrain from deciding what was in 
fact decided, or the (stronger) sense of having fully blown alternative de-
cisions available. Having evaluated these classic cases and found them 
wanting I now turn to the latest and most sophisticated Frankfurt style 
examples - the ‘buffer cases’. Interestingly, the buffer cases have not fo-
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cussed on trying to rule out alternative possibilities per say but instead 
on specifically trying to ensure there are no robust possibilities present at 
all. 
1.6 Buffer cases
The two main buffer examples in the literature are Pereboom's Tax 
Evasion 2 and Hunt's Revenge. Recently, Pereboom has also developed a 
new modified case, Tax Cut.  As with the classic counterfactual interven33 -
er Frankfurt cases, the buffer cases also make use of a sign to intervene 
but the difference is that the sign in a buffer case is meant to be a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for the agent availing themselves of a 
robust alternative.  The sign to intervene (the necessary condition) is the 34
buffer that needs to be crossed before robust alternatives become avail-
able to the agent, but the cases are designed such that, allegedly, crossing 
the buffer is not in  itself  a robust alternative. What crossing the buffer 
does, is immediately initiate the intervention and manipulation as in the 
standard prior-sign Frankfurt style cases. I will outline Pereboom's Tax 
!  See Pereboom (2000, 2001: Ch 1.) and Hunt (2000, 2005) for the original for33 -
mulations of the Tax Evasion and Revenge cases. See Pereboom (2014: Ch 1.) for 
Tax Cut and his up to date position on the buffer strategy
!  By ‘not sufficient’ here I simply mean that it is consistent with crossing the 34
buffer that the agent still not decide in the way the buffer enables them to de-
cide. In one sense crossing the buffer is sufficient for the ability to decide that 
way (that they previously couldn’t before they crossed the buffer), but it’s not 
sufficient for that choice simpliciter, as it’s still up to the libertarian agent which 
way they decide.
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Evasion 2 below and argue that the principle of alternate possibilities is 
not challenged. Pereboom's case runs as follows:
Tax Evasion 2: Joe is considering claiming a tax deduction for the reg-
istration fee that he paid when he bought a house. He knows that 
claiming  this  deduction  is  illegal,  but  that  he  probably  won't  be 
caught, and that if he were, he could convincingly plead ignorance. 
Suppose he has a strong but not always overriding desire to advance 
his self-interest regardless of its cost to others and even if it involves 
illegal  activity.  In  addition,  the  only  way  that  in  this  situation  he 
could fail to choose to evade taxes is for moral reasons, of which he is 
aware. He could not, for example, fail to choose to evade taxes for no 
reason or simply on a whim. Moreover, it is causally necessary for his 
failing to choose to evade taxes in this situation that he attain a cer-
tain level of attentiveness to moral reasons. Joe can secure this level of 
attentiveness voluntarily. However, his attaining this level of atten-
tiveness is not causally sufficient for his failing to choose to evade 
taxes. If he were to attain this level of attentiveness, he could, exercis-
ing his libertarian free will,  either choose to evade taxes or refrain 
from so choosing (without the intervener's device in place). However, 
to ensure that he will choose to evade taxes, a neuroscientist has, un-
beknownst to Joe, implanted a device in his brain, which, were it to 
sense the requisite level of attentiveness, would electronically stimu-
late the right neural centers so as to inevitably result in his making 
this choice. As it happens, Joe does not attain this level of attentive-
ness to his moral reasons, and he chooses to evade taxes on his own, 
while the device remains idle.35
The  salient  feature  of  the  case  is  allegedly  that  although there  are 
clearly alternate possibilities,  no robust  alternative is present.  Joe could 
have voluntarily of his own libertarian free will have been more attentive 
to moral reasons instead of not being so attentive.  However, according 
to Pereboom this is not a robust alternative because, he claims, without 
the device in place, being more attentive is still consistent with Joe either 
 Pereboom (2014: 15)35
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choosing to evade taxes or choosing not to. Joe therefore wouldn't know 
that by choosing to be more attentive he would thereby be avoiding re-
sponsibility for choosing to cheat because he would still see whether he 
chooses to cheat as undecided and up to him (even though with the de-
vice in place, he would in fact be immediately ‘forced’ to evade taxes and 
thus in actual fact avoid responsibility for choosing of his own accord - 
he doesn’t know that). Being more attentive (crossing the buffer) is the 
necessary condition for Joe being able to actually choose not to evade tax-
es. It’s not a sufficient condition because it is consistent with crossing the 
buffer that Joe nevertheless still chooses to cheat. Consequently, crossing 
the buffer doesn’t satisfy the epistemic requirements on robustness ac-
cording to Pereboom.
It’s also instructive to consider the other main buffer case in the recent 
literature before evaluating the strategy in general. David Hunt asks us 
to consider the following case, called Revenge:
Revenge: Jones, while attending a party, is deliberately humiliated by 
Smith.  The  first  thought  that  occurs  to  Jones,  after  realizing  what 
Smith has done to him, is that he would like to kill Smith. He leaves 
the party, escaping the immediate pressures of the situation and giv-
ing himself ample opportunity to pull back from this line of thinking. 
Given the kind of person Jones is, and given the situation in which he 
finds himself, the alternative of not killing Smith is not unthinkable 
for  him;  moreover,  should  he  entertain  this  alternative,  nothing 
would prevent him from deciding and acting on it. But Jones could 
decide (and act)  otherwise only if  he first  considered acting other-
wise, and he never does this (though he could); instead, he nurses his 
grievance without respite,  while the idea of  killing Smith becomes 
more and more attractive to him. Having finally decided to do the 
deed,  he gets  a  gun from his  car,  returns to the party,  and shoots 
Smith dead …. The final element to be added to Revenge is the coun-
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terfactual  intervener,  which  differs  from  the  device  in  …  [earlier 
FSCs] … inasmuch as it is programmed to hijack Jones’s mental pro-
cesses and force him to decide to kill Smith if he so much as considers 
not killing Smith. With this device in place, there is no alternative to 
Jones’s deciding to kill Smith: Jones can decide otherwise only if he 
first considers doing so, but then the device will force him to decide 
to kill Smith. So an alternative decision is not available to Jones in Re-
venge...[y]et Jones, who in fact proceeds to murder Smith on his own, 
leaving the device un-triggered, seems morally responsible for killing 
Smith.36
As with Pereboom’s Tax Evasion 2, the agent in Revenge uncontrover-
sially has  access to alternative possibilities.  The aim of the case is  to 
show that none of them is robust and therefore they can’t ground the in-
tuitive attribution of moral responsibility. Jones in Revenge can be granted 
whatever powers libertarian free will requires. The crux is in the stipula-
tion, ‘But Jones could decide (and act) otherwise only if he first considered 
acting otherwise, and he never does this (though he could).’  The coun37 -
terfactual intervener only acts if the necessary condition for doing oth-
erwise is instantiated, that is to say if the buffer is crossed.
1.7 Criticism of the buffer strategy
Are the buffer stipulations coherent with our concept of libertarian 
free will?
I will explore a number of potential problems with the buffer strategy 
below. I shall first examine whether Pereboom is justified in stipulating 
 Hunt (2005: 132–134)36
 Hunt (2005: 132)37
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the buffer as he does in Tax Evasion 2, before going on to examine internal 
problems, granting the example set up as Pereboom wishes.
 Upon initially encountering this case one might worry that it wasn’t 
legitimate to stipulate Joe had to cross the buffer of raising his moral at-
tentiveness before he could access the possibility of making a contrary 
decision.  You might  think this  for  two reasons,  which  taken together 
seem to suggest otherwise. Firstly, Pereboom allows that Joe has libertar-
ian free will in the example and secondly, the epistemic condition on re-
sponsibility is met when Joe goes ahead and voluntarily chooses to evade 
taxes ‘on his own’ without any intervention occurring. So although Joe 
allegedly doesn’t have sufficient moral attentiveness in order to be able 
to robustly choose otherwise, he must have sufficient moral attentiveness 
to meet the epistemic condition on responsibility. The latter means he has 
sufficient knowledge of the moral status of tax evasion and its implica-
tions to be held blameworthy when he chooses to evade. However,  it 
would seem that if you had that level of knowledge and libertarian free 
will  then there would be nothing to stop you simply choosing not to 
evade at any point. If you knew that much and your will is free, why 
can’t you simply choose otherwise? It would appear to be a part of our 
folk understanding of free will that you don’t necessarily need full moral 
attentiveness (or awareness) with respect to a course of action in order 
for it to be a live option for you, so to speak. Joe has sufficient under-
standing of the status of his actions to be blameworthy so it seems this 
level of moral sensitivity should be sufficient for Joe to be able to try to 
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avoid this course. This thought might be put in the form of the following 
dilemma. Either Joe has sufficient moral understanding of tax evasion to 
be blameworthy or not. If he doesn’t, then he can’t be responsible when 
he evades and we don’t have a candidate for a Frankfurt case. If on the 
other hand Joe does have sufficient moral understanding to be blame-
worthy, then regardless of whether he’s actually considering these issues 
as he thinks things over, it looks like that same level of understanding 
would also be enough to make not evading a live option for him (con-
trary to what Pereboom claims). I agree that even with libertarian meta-
physics in the example there are many decisions Joe just can’t make. For 
example, perhaps it’s true to say that he couldn’t just decide to pursue a 
course of action that had never entered his mind and that he had no 
knowledge or understanding of. But given that Joe does have relevant 
moral attentiveness here, coupled with the (allowed for) libertarian free-
dom, it would appear that the stipulation of the buffer is in tension with 
these features of the case.
Following this line of thought, it seems right to say that If you knew 
you shouldn't do something and you had libertarian free will and you 
were not subject to coercion or manipulation or irresistible desires etc 
then you can simply decide or attempt (when the time comes) to not do 
that thing. That surely falls out of the folk idea of libertarian freedom if 
anything does. It is consistent with saying this that some choices are both 
impossible or very difficult to make. Firstly, as I said above, when you 
don’t know about an option at all, it seems right to say you just can’t 
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choose it. Secondly, there are cases where we know certain courses of ac-
tion are very frightening, dangerous and difficult.  There are situations 
where, though we know what we should do, it’s very difficult to do it for 
other conflicting moral reasons,  but we don’t  think we can’t  do these 
things in the sense that’s at issue here, i.e. that they are impossible. In 
such cases  of  great  difficulty,  depending on the specifics,  we may at-
tribute diminished responsibility to the agent in question, but we don’t 
do this because they couldn’t do otherwise. We think their responsibility 
is mitigated because it was a lot harder to do otherwise than it would 
otherwise have been and we empathise with this given what we realisti-
cally expect from people. However, despite the possibility and coherence 
of these kinds of cases, Joe’s situation in Tax Evasion 2 is neither in the 
former nor the latter category. In summary then, it’s hard to see how the 
stipulation of this buffer is legitimate given that Pereboom allows liber-
tarian freedom and sufficient moral awareness in the case.
However,  this  worry about  the  legitimacy of  stipulating the  buffer 
misses the mark here. Even if everything I have said above is true of how 
our folk concept of libertarian free will  is  ordinarily supposed to work, 
Pereboom can just ask us to imagine a world as close to our own as pos-
sible but with the buffers stipulated as described.  This is  a  legitimate 
move and does not beg the question against the libertarian. Even if it’s 
true that ordinarily, in our closest possible libertarian worlds, the moral 
attentiveness Joe possesses before crossing the buffer would be sufficient 
to allow Joe to simply choose otherwise, there is logical space for Pere-
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boom to ask us to consider his buffer case. In short, there is nothing con-
tradictory about the buffer stipulation even if, in the closest libertarian 
world, Joe would not  need to cross a buffer in order to choose not to 
evade. We should therefore imagine it’s simply true by fiat that the buf-
fers operate as described. In the example Joe deliberates and then choos-
es in exactly the same way he would have done had the buffer not been 
there. Intuitively, it seems he is morally responsible for choosing to evade 
taxes just as he would be in the normal case without the buffer and in-
tervener.  If  he doesn’t  have any robust  alternatives then this  example 
would undermine the principle of alternate possibilities.
As  a  different  rejoinder  to  this  kind  of  buffer  example,  perhaps  it 
might be suggested that our intuition of responsibility isn’t uncontrover-
sial with these buffers stipulated. Specifically, if we’re asked to imagine 
Joe with libertarian freedom, it might be that (given the normal inferen-
tial import of libertarian freedom as discussed above) we are still tacitly 
imagining him with alternatives and hence our intuition is not reliable 
precisely because he is not meant to have any here. On reflection though, 
I feel I am able to clearly consider the case on the assumption that Joe 
doesn’t  have robust  alternatives present  by focussing carefully on the 
structure of the example. Joe chooses to evade in the same way he would 
in a libertarian possible world without the buffers. Furthermore, Joe re-
mains intuitively morally responsible. I don’t think therefore that there is 
anything inherently problematic with the stipulation of the buffers them-
selves. These last considerations are important as they make clear exactly 
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what is being argued about here. At issue is the idea that robust alternate 
possibilities  for  action are always required  for  moral  responsibility.  The 
leeway incompatibilist is claiming that it’s a necessary condition on the 
concept of responsibility that such alternatives are present. The point to 
note is that it’s consistent with the falsity of this last claim that our actual 
world concept of libertarian freedom could be in tension with the stipula-
tion of the buffers in the way I outline above. Again though, even if this 
were true, if on reflection we can coherently conceive of a case where an 
agent  chooses  voluntarily  in  a  buffered scenario and is  intuitively re-
sponsible, we might have an argument for the claim that robust alterna-
tives are not necessary for responsibility which is the claim at issue in 
this debate.
Derivative or direct responsibility in buffer cases?
In the literature, some PAP defenders have agreed that there are no ro-
bust alternative present in the buffer cases but have countered that this is 
because  the  intuition of  moral  responsibility  in  these  cases  tracks  de-
rivative and not direct responsibility. They go on to argue that PAP ap-
plies only to cases of direct responsibility. They claim that there will be 
some prior decision for which there were robust alternatives. For exam-
ple, Joe’s decision in tax evasion 2 can be traced back to prior failures to 
make better choices (in situations where PAP applied) it will be coun-
tered. Hence buffer cases do not show robust alternate possibilities are 
!71
not required for (direct) moral responsibility, which is what they take to 
be at issue in the debate. 
One classic example of derivative moral responsibility mentioned by 
Pereboom is the case of getting drunk when you know you’ll be unable 
to manage your temper while intoxicated. Despite this, you go on to get 
drunk and end up getting into an argument and assaulting one of your 
companions.  At the time of  the assault,  standard conditions on direct 
moral responsibility are not met. You are not able to sufficiently control 
your emotions and rationalise courses of action and so you are not direct-
ly responsible for the assault when it occurs. However, because you got 
drunk knowing you have this problem and knowing you would be com-
ing into contact with people, the decision to get drunk, or the failing to 
choose not to get drunk (for which we can assume there were robust al-
ternatives available) is one for which you are directly responsible. This 
makes the subsequent assault something you are responsible for deriva-
tively.  Another classic example is the case of drunk driving when you hit 
and kill a child ‘under the influence’. Could something analogous be go-
ing on with the buffer cases? Specifically, could the agents in buffer cases 
be  derivatively  morally  responsible  for  their  blameworthy  actions  in 
light of earlier choices and omissions for which they had robust alterna-
tives courses of action? Widerker and Ginet have both put forward this 
worry. Widerker says:
[A] problem with Pereboom’s example is that, in it, the agent is deriv-
atively  blameworthy for  the decision he made,  because he has  not 
done  his  reasonable  best  (or  has  not  made  a  reasonable  effort)  to 
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avoid making it.  He should have been more attentive to the moral 
reasons than he in fact was—something he could have done. And in 
that case, he would not be blameworthy for deciding to evade taxes, 
as then he would be forced by the neuroscientist so to decide. If this is 
correct, then Pereboom’s example is a case of derivative culpability, 
and hence is irrelevant to PAP, which …concerns itself only with di-
rect or non-derivative culpability.38
Pereboom’s response is somewhat ambiguous. He initially claims that 
such a response is  dialectically unsatisfactory because it  explicitly ap-
peals to a ‘leeway position in support of its verdict about Joe’s responsi-
bility.’  He claims that making this move risks failing to see the force of 39
an  important  counterexample.  However,  Pereboom does  also  concede 
that  the  derivative  responsibility  move ‘may get  matters  right.’  One 40
way to respond to Pereboom’s worry about dialectical status here is to 
point out that if we we can give an alternative explanation of the intu-
ition we have that Joe is responsible in this case, i.e. the derivative move 
as Widerker contends, then the Frankfurt defender must show that this is 
not in fact the proper account of what’s going on. Isn’t that alternative 
explanation of the intuition exactly what the Frankfurt defender would 
want to rule out here? It is also a notably non ad hoc possibility that might 
explain these intuitions. It is not in any way dialectically inappropriate to 
raise this as a possible explanation. That said, could these competing ex-
planations of the intuition not constitute a dialectical impasse here be-
 Widerker (2006: 173). Ginet (1996) anticipates this objection.38
 Pereboom (2014: 19)39
 Pereboom (2014: 19)40
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tween the leeway theorist and the Frankfurt defender? Well not if  we 
have the resources to be able to tell whether our intuitions in buffer cases 
are tracking direct or derivative responsibility and we plausibly do have 
just those resources in so far as we can compare and contrast the struc-
ture of these cases with paradigmatic examples of derivative responsibil-
ity.
But how plausible is this response? Is Tax Evasion 2 really an instance 
of derivative instead of direct moral responsibility? Pereboom cites an 
important disanalogy between the classic case of derivative responsibili-
ty with the drunk assault and Joe’s position in Tax Evasion 2. In the case 
of the drunk assault outlined above, the person knows before they drink 
that given the likely outcome of drinking and socialising, they are most 
likely  putting  themselves  in  a  situation  where  there  won’t  be  robust 
blameless alternate possibilities of action if they drink. By contrast, when 
Joe in Tax Evasion 2 is not sufficiently attentive to moral reasons (this is 
the purported analogue of the drinking), he does not know that this lack 
of further attention will ensure the final decision he’ll make will go a cer-
tain way. This disanalogy, if right, is surely key, for it seems that, during 
his inattentive deliberation, Joe wouldn’t be knowingly doing something 
that will likely lead to blameworthy outcomes, as with the drunk assault 
case.
But is this disanalogy right? In reply it might be countered that Joe is 
doing exactly that. It could be argued that not being properly attentive to 
moral reasoning is  just  the sort  of  thing that can lead to trouble and, 
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what’s more, that anyone capable of being morally responsible knows 
this full well. However, although not being attentive to moral reasoning 
puts  you  at  a  greater  risk  of  acting  in  morally  undesirable  ways,  it 
doesn’t do so in the same way as drinking alcohol in the drunken assault 
case already described. There is at the very least a significant difference 
in probability here. With the drunken assault case, the chances are very 
high that you’ll go on to act in a blameworthy way, that’s kind of a done 
deal. But is this really true of Joe in Tax Evasion 2? Again, Joe is aware 
that at any moment he can refocus and entertain more moral considera-
tions. Joe also still thinks it’s completely up to him whether he goes on to 
cheat or not in this case. Lastly, I think that the moral attentiveness that 
Joe does have in the example, which is already (by stipulation) sufficient 
to meet the epistemic requirements on moral responsibility when he goes 
ahead and cheats on his taxes without intervention, means he is not vio-
lating any general conditions on deliberation as the drunk is clearly do-
ing when they choose to drink. Even though it’s possible that Joe could 
have been more attentive and Joe (like anyone) knows that the more at-
tentive he is the better the chance of making the morally decent decision, 
it's still true that if Joe can believe his level is perfectly sufficient to make 
the morally decent decision then this is at odds with the paradigm cases 
under discussion. These disanalogies suggest to me that it’s fair to con-
clude that the intuition we have that Joe is morally responsible is not best 
explained by the derivative model here. However, none of this is to say 
that upon closer inspection, Joe in Tax Evasion 2, although directly moral-
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ly responsible, still doesn’t have access to robust alternative possibilities. 
That is to where I now turn.
1.8 The timing criticism
Carl Ginet had also responded to the original Tax Evasion examples, in 
his review of Pereboom’s Living Without Free Will.  The same line of crit41 -
icism that Ginet develops there is applicable against the more recent Tax 
Evasion 2. Building on earlier work from his 1996 paper on Frankfurt cas-
es,  Ginet points out that there is a distinction to be made between (i) 
knowing that by choosing to attend to moral reasons one wouldn't know 
one was thereby avoiding responsibility for what might end up happen-
ing - or end up happening by some deadline, and (ii) knowing that by 
choosing to attend to moral reasons at time t one was avoiding responsi-
bility for choosing to evade taxes at time t.
Ginet claims that if the second sense is at issue, then Joe's alternative 
(attending to moral reasons) is robust. This is because it is clear that by 
attending to moral reasons at t Joe would know that it was impossible 
that he was also choosing to evade taxes at the same time and hence he 
would be aware that by choosing to attend to reasons at time t he would 
be consequently avoiding responsibility for choosing to evade taxes at 
time t. This point can be run for any time t and for any buffer condition 
you might stipulate. It seems then that there is a robust alternate possibil-
 Ginet (2002)41
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ity present in Tax Evasion 2. On Ginet’s approach, any old bit of delibera-
tion at time t (whether or not the buffer of higher moral attentiveness is 
crossed) and where a decision to evade hasn’t yet been made would thus 
constitute a robust alternative: the alternative to refrain at t. Similar points 
to  Ginet’s  here  were  developed  by  David  Palmer  and  Christopher 
Franklin.  Both argue that there are robust alternatives when time index42 -
ing is factored into the description of the case.
 In summary then, although perhaps Pereboom is right about the dis-
analogy  with  cases  of  derivative  responsibility,  these  arguments  from 
Ginet, Palmer and Franklin undermine Pereboom and Hunt’s claims that 
there are no robust alternatives to choosing to evade taxes in Tax Evasion 
2 and analogously for Revenge. So when Joe does in fact choose to evade 
taxes at some time t, he could have availed himself of these robust possi-
bilities instead. If true, the timing criticism would undermine the claim 
that these buffer cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities.
Worries about the timing criticism and the scope of responsibility
Hunt and Shabo have defended the buffer strategy by taking issue 
with the timing criticism.  Their central worry is that the timing criti43 -
cism forces us to deny that agents in Frankfurt cases who act on their 
own (i.e. when the counterfactual intervention doesn’t occur) are respon-
sible for their actions simpliciter, with them being instead merely respon-
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sible for acting that way at t. Hunt and Shabo contend that this is at odds 
with how we standardly understand responsibility for avoidable action. 
The move to restrict responsibility to times, they argue, is therefore ad hoc 
and purely in the service of preserving PAP. Moreover, when we instead 
rightly focus on responsibility simpliciter, they argue that the buffer ex-
amples still constitute counterexamples to the principle of alternate pos-
sibilities. 
In what follows I will evaluate the arguments Hunt and Shabo put 
forward against the timing strategy and concede that we shouldn’t rela-
tivise responsibility to times as they say. However, despite this, I go on to 
develop a new line of argument defending the basis of the move Ginet 
makes about robustness in buffer cases without  having to relativise re-
sponsibility to times. Building on earlier work about whether agents in 
Frankfurt cases can be coherently said to act in the counterfactual case (as 
developed  by  Steward,  Alvarez  and  Larvor)  I  develop  a  response  to 
Hunt and Shabo which combines those insights about the counterfactual 
case with some new considerations about the epistemic requirements on 
robustness with respect to responsibility simpliciter.  In short, Hunt and 
Shabo might be right about the importance of responsibility simpliciter 
but this won’t ultimately help the buffer strategy as I will argue. It won’t 
help because we can happily combine the idea that agents in buffer cases 
are responsible simpliciter for their actions with the claim that they never-
theless have robust alternatives to those actions. I further claim that the 
possibility of making the line of argument I develop has been overlooked 
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precisely because all sides in the timing criticism dialectic share an as-
sumption (the very assumption that Alvarez, Steward and Larvor have 
given us good reasons to reject) that the agents in buffer cases still act in 
the counterfactual case. Once that assumption is dropped, I will argue 
that we have the means to successfully defend the principle of alterna-
tive possibilities against the buffer strategy.
Hunt and Shabo start by insightfully pointing out that it even if Ginet, 
Palmer and Franklin are correct about there being a robust possibility in 
the time restricted sense described above, it  had better not also  be the 
case that the agent in buffer cases is morally responsible for what they do 
in the actual sequence simpliciter. This is because then there will be some 
action which is both unavoidable for the agent and for which (in the ac-
tual sequence) the agent is morally responsible. But of course if that were 
true then we would still have a straightforward counterexample to the 
principle of alternative possibilities. Even if there is a robust alternative 
to being responsible at t, this won’t be of any consequence if the agent is 
nevertheless responsible simpliciter for an action they couldn’t avoid. 
Hunt and Shabo make two main points to illustrate it is wrongheaded 
to restrict responsibility to times. The first involves paying attention to 
the  same kind  of  action  being  performed in  almost  identical  circum-
stances apart from at slightly different times:
(Z1) Zeke has broken into Chad’s office, where he hopes to surprise 
and kill Chad as part of his plan to eliminate a key witness in the case 
against him. When Chad enters the office alone a short while later, 
Zeke steps out from the shadows, gun in hand. Suppressing pangs of 
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conscience, he stares into the other man’s eyes for a full second before 
deciding to pull the trigger without further ado.  44
They then consider variation Z2, where everything happens as in Z1 
apart from the fact that the trigger is pulled two seconds later rather than 
one. In Z3 Zeke doesn’t wait for the elevator and arrives at the office ten 
seconds earlier and shoots Chad straightaway. They contend that what 
all  these cases clearly have in common is that Zeke is  responsible for 
killing Chad:
Our contention is that these further, temporally specific attributions 
of moral responsibility are of little account. Barring special assump-
tions, once it’s been noted that Zeke is morally responsible for decid-
ing to shoot Chad as part of his plan to eliminate a witness, noting 
that Zeke is also morally responsible for so deciding at t in Z1 (and 
for  so  deciding  at  t  +  1  in  Z2)  adds  little  if  anything  of 
consequence….45
It might be said in response to Hunt and Shabo here that this isn’t exactly 
knockdown as Palmer and Franklin could presumably just repeat that 
what we are strictly responsible for is the time indexed event. That said, 
the burden is indeed on Palmer and Franklin to establish this as opposed 
to the more plausible attributions of responsibility simpliciter as Hunt and 
Shabo rightly contend is the more natural account of what’s going on 
here. The point is that in a standard case of avoidable action the pre-
sumption is that the agent is responsible simpliciter. Apart from the fact 
that the move to restrict responsibility to times allows the defender of 
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PAP to block the Frankfurt defender here, Palmer and Franklin have not 
argued it is independently well motivated. 
The second point Hunt and Shabo make is much more telling I think. 
They consider the spatial analogues of how responsibility would look if 
it was always indexed to the particular place you acted:
The prima facie moral triviality of the timing of Zeke’s decision is of a 
piece with the moral triviality of other properties of Zeke’s decision, 
making it all the more incumbent on Palmer to explain why the exact 
time at which an action is performed should play the unique role he 
assigns to it. In Z1, for example, Zeke not only decides at t to pull the 
trigger;  he also so decides from behind the desk, standing ten feet 
from Chad,  with a bead of  sweat running down the bridge of  his 
nose, as a car backfires on the street, while in Z2 he not only decides 
at t  + 1 to pull  the trigger;  he also decides near the filing cabinet, 
standing nine feet from Chad, with a bead of sweat hanging from the 
tip of his nose, as a second backfire is heard from the street. Just as 
Zeke is morally responsible in Z1 for deciding at a certain point in 
time (t) to shoot Chad, so he is morally responsible for deciding at a 
certain point in space (behind the desk, ten feet from Chad, and so 
on) to shoot him. But it would be absurd to suppose that in ordinary 
cases of avoidable action the location of the decision is an essential 
part of what the agent is morally responsible for, and that in a Frank-
furt version of Z1 Zeke wouldn’t be responsible for deciding to shoot 
Chad simpliciter but only for so deciding at the exact location where 
the decision is made.  46
This seems right. There are in fact many properties that seem irrelevant 
to the responsibility ascription and it is hard to see why the precise time 
at which a certain type of act occurs should be treated differently to these 
other properties (such as spatial location) that are intuitively of no conse-
quence. These are standard cases of avoidable action and it would be ad 
hoc  to insist things were different for unavoidable action, as Hunt and 
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Shabo say. This leaves the leeway defender in a tight spot as if responsi-
bility simpliciter is what the agent bears then we still have a counterex-
ample to PAP for the reason described above. However, I contend this 
can be remedied by paying attention to the status of the counterfactual 
case and the intervention that  takes place there as well  as the proper 
epistemic requirements on robustness.
1.9 A new response to the timing criticism dialectic: Defending 
the principle of alternate possibilities against Hunt and Shabo
The above section concludes with the thought that what goes for avoid-
able action should go for unavoidable action, i.e. it’s responsibility sim-
pliciter in both cases. Although I think Hunt and Shabo are right about 
responsibility simpliciter being the responsibility attribution that matters, 
I don’t think that there are instances of unavoidable action in Frankfurt 
cases. The problems of the status of the counterfactual case in Frankfurt 
examples where manipulation occurs have already been discussed fol-
lowing the examination of Alvarez, Steward and Larvor’s points earlier 
in this chapter. Manipulated agents don’t act in Frankfurt cases. What has 
not been noted in the literature to date is that the upshot of this point for 
the dialectic of the timing criticism means there is never anything that 
the agent is responsible for that wasn’t avoidable. If this is correct, then 
crucially, the leeway incompatibilist does not need to relativise to times 
in order to hang on to the avoidability requirement that is central to the 
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leeway position. Just as well given Hunt and Shabo are right about the 
problems  with  restricting  responsibility  to  times.  The  problem,  as  it 
seems to me, is that people on both sides of the debate about buffer ex-
amples have been (tacitly or otherwise) accepting that although the agent 
isn’t responsible when they are manipulated, they still  act in that sce-
nario. It is very interesting to see how many commentators take this for 
granted in these cases including, crucially for my argument here, those 
trying to defend the principle of alternative possibilities in the timing dia-
lectic. Ginet himself, in characterising the general schema of Pereboom’s 
original Tax Evasion case says, “The Intervenor, in order to ensure that 
Jones did B at t1, set up a backup mechanism such that, if C had occurred 
in t0 − t1, the mechanism would have caused Jones’ doing B at t1.”  Having 47
set out the schema he thinks Tax Evasion instantiates, and not just what 
he’s reporting Pereboom claims it instantiates, Ginet continues: “The PAP 
defender must further claim that, although Jones was morally responsi-
ble for his doing B at t1 (having had a robust alternative), he is not re-
sponsible for the less specific fact, for which he had no alternative, that he did 
B by t2.”  In Palmer we find, “In my view, while Joe can be responsible 48
for deciding to evade taxes at t1, he cannot be responsible for the more 
general fact that he decided to evade taxes simpliciter. This is because, due 
to the neuroscientist’s presence, this more general fact is not something that Joe 
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could have avoided.”  In Franklin’s 2011 discussion he says, “… if Jones 49
had considered not killing Smith at t3,  Black would have intervened and 
forced Jones to decide to kill Smith at some later time…”  It’s no different 50
with Hunt and Shabo themselves.  Indeed, a necessary part of Hunt and 
Shabo’s criticism of the timing move is based on the idea that it’s respon-
sibility simpliciter that counts and agents in buffer cases are responsible sim-
pliciter for actions they couldn’t avoid given the presence of manipulation mech-
anisms and interventions. Their argument against the timing move relies 
on the assumption we should reject.
There is thus a consensus between the opposing parties in the timing 
debate on the coherence of unavoidable action in the sense at issue when 
manipulation and intervention occur in Frankfurt cases. Whether in the 
actual sequence (where the agent acts responsibly on their own), or the 
counterfactual case (where although all agree the agent doesn’t act re-
sponsibly they think he still acts) all agree there is an action performed by 
an agent where that action is unavoidable for that agent given the struc-
ture of the situation. I claim this consensus is mistaken and should be re-
jected for the reasons already put forward by Steward, Alvarez and Lar-
vor. Furthermore, while I reject the claim that the agent in a Frankfurt 
case acts in the counterfactual scenario when they are manipulated, I can 
still employ Ginet’s observation about the robustness of refraining at any 
particular time t while maintaining the agent is nevertheless responsible 
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simpliciter for their decision at that time and not merely responsible for 
their  decision  at  t.  Responsibility  simpliciter  and  avoidability  are  both 
maintained in the intuitive way here. I can agree with Hunt and Shabo 
on responsibility simpliciter  and make use of Ginet’s insight about the 
awareness of not being responsible for something you’re not then doing to 
preserve the intuitive leeway incompatibilist picture here.
A defence of the combination of responsibility simpliciter and robust 
alternatives in Revenge and Tax Evasion 2
It might be said that even if the agent in a buffer case doesn’t act in the 
counterfactual scenario and that as a result there is no action the agent is 
both morally responsible for and which is also unavoidable, this doesn’t 
necessarily mean the alternative is robust in the way required for respon-
sibility simpliciter as opposed to mere responsibility for an act at a specific 
time. I think it’s clear enough that if responsibility at a time was what was 
at issue then the observation Ginet makes in his original statement of the 
timing criticism would decisively  mean that  the  alternative  is  robust. 
That is, it’s clear that when I refrain/deliberate at some time t or cross 
the buffer at some time t, I will be aware that at t I’m doing something 
such that I will not be responsible for avoiding tax at t etc. The crucial 
question now is whether this awareness of the status of the situation is 
sufficient to make the alternative robust with respect of the attribution of 
responsibility simpliciter. 
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In response to the above worry, it seems perfectly coherent to think 
that at any point in time when I’m not  making a decision for which I 
would be morally responsible (were I to make it) and I know this (in line 
with Ginet’s original point about the agent’s awareness) I can coherently 
be committed to the thought that I  would have been responsible sim-
pliciter for that decision and action had I made that decision right then 
instead. When I act in such a way that I’m morally responsible I know 
that I didn’t have to act that way then or ever.  I think this about every 
moment of time continuing into the future when it’s still up for grabs what I 
will eventually do as well as when I have committed myself to a course of action. 
Even in the latter case I standardly don’t think my commitments are un-
avoidable. One of the worries in the literature was that I would need to 
know that (in order for it to be robust) the alternative would rule out re-
sponsibility for what would end up happening and that (given that delib-
erating and merely crossing the buffer do not commit me epistemically 
either way), the alternatives in Revenge and Tax Evasion 2 are not robust. I 
think this assumption should be rejected. Although I may often commit 
myself to acting a certain way over time or in the future, an alternative to 
that course of action does not itself need any temporal commitments built 
into its epistemic component in order to be robust.
Why would anyone think that alternatives (in order to be robust and 
exempting) had to commit us to not do whatever bad action we were con-
templating at times continuing into the future? Of course sometimes we 
could have chosen an alternative path that included a short, medium or 
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long term commitment to do something else but the point is these vari-
able commitments of the alternatives are not important with respect to 
the question of whether they are robust. People can always change their 
minds  and frequently  do change their  minds.  New or  previously  ne-
glected reasons can at any point involuntarily weigh in on us and cause 
us to reconsider and change our minds. This can happen seconds after a 
decision has been made,  although of  course we often do stick by the 
courses of action decided upon. Because of this it would be wrong to re-
quire  of  an alternative  anything other  than that  taking it  absolves  us 
(right then) of responsibility simpliciter. We may seconds later change our 
minds and then incur that responsibility for which we avoided only sec-
onds earlier. All of this, as I said in the above paragraphs is consistent 
with the fact that when we do incur that responsibility, it’s responsibility 
simpliciter and not responsibility indexed to times. Hunt and Shabo focus 
on this very point when they discuss how we should understand the 
epistemic component of robustness. They consider the two possible read-
ings of Pereboom’s robustness condition that Franklin outlines. The first 
being the narrow reading that the agent only needs to know that by tak-
ing the alternative at some time t they will not be responsible for the ac-
tion at that time t and the stronger requirement that by taking the alter-
native the agent must understand that they will avoid responsibility for 
that action at all subsequent times into the future. Hunt and Shabo con-
cede that the stronger reading should be rejected:
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On the second, stronger reading (ibid.),  an agent must understand 
that, by realizing the alternative possibility, she will avoid being re-
sponsible for her action then and at all later times. It seems clear that 
Jones doesn’t meet this requirement; for all he knows, he might well 
decide to kill Smith immediately after considering (at t) not killing 
Smith. 
We agree with Franklin that EC seems implausibly strong on the sec-
ond reading.  Whatever else,  having a robust alternative possibility 
doesn’t require an agent to understand that, if she realizes that possi-
bility, she will never be morally responsible for a decision like the one 
she actually makes.51
Although they don’t elaborate on why this is, presumably it’s because 
the future is uncertain and people change their minds. But the crucial ob-
servation here is that this point is true of all  future times, not just the 
more distant times. Because of this it would be wrong to build any tem-
poral commitments into the robustness requirement.  This is  true even 
when people have in fact committed to a course of action over the long 
term. The point is that a robust alternative to them doing that need be 
nothing over and above them simply not doing that then, with them in-
stead simply continuing to deliberate or whatever.
Further evidence that there need be no temporal commitment about 
future actions or omissions built into the epistemic component of the al-
ternative is to be found by re-examining Pereboom’s own robustness cri-
terion: Robustness (B):
Robustness (B):  For an agent to have a robust alternative to her 
immoral action A, that is, an alternative relevant per se to explain-
ing why she is blameworthy for performing A, it must be that
 Hunt and Shabo (2013: 613) 51
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(i) she instead could have voluntarily acted or refrained 
from acting as a result of which she would be blame-
less, and
(ii) for  at  least  one such exempting acting or  refraining, 
she was cognitively sensitive to the fact that she could 
so voluntarily act or refrain, and to the fact that if she 
voluntarily so acted or refrained she would then be, or 
would likely be, blameless.52
It  requires  no argument to  see that  there  is  nothing whatsoever  in 
Pereboom’s Robustness (B)  criterion that  is  at  odds with what I  have 
been claiming above. Robustness (B) simply does not entail any temporal 
commitments should be included in the epistemic component of the al-
ternative in order for that alternative to be robust and in consequence ex-
empting in the intuitive way. All that is required, to summarise here, is 
that there needs to be something you could have done instead that (i) 
would have rendered you blameless and (ii) you were aware that that 
alternative  would  have  likely  rendered  you  blameless.  In  conclusion, 
these points can both be satisfied at every moment as an agent moves 
through time deliberating what to do and not to do while requiring no 
temporal commitment other than a commitment not to have done the ac-
tion for which you are responsible simpliciter when you in fact do it. 
Given these clarifications, it is useful in conclusion to return to Hunt 
and Shabo’s response to Ginet, Palmer and Franklin in order to illustrate 
how the leeway incompatibilist should now respond armed with these 
considerations.  Hunt  and Shabo (working  on  the  correct  assumption) 
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that it’s responsibility simpliciter that counts and (the false assumption) 
that agents in Frankfurt cases still act when manipulated say the follow-
ing:
On the other hand, if Jones is morally responsible for deciding to kill 
Smith, it’s hard to see what turns on his understanding that he can 
avoid responsibility for so deciding at t. If he is indeed morally re-
sponsible  for  so  deciding  simpliciter,  then  considering  not  killing 
Smith in Black’s  absence before deciding on his  own to kill  Smith 
wouldn’t absolve him of responsibility for so deciding. Why think, 
then, that what grounds or explains his responsibility for deciding to 
kill Smith in Black’s presence is his understanding that he can avoid 
responsibility for so deciding just then? Understanding that he can 
avoid responsibility for so deciding then doesn’t make his decision 
avoidable in any interesting sense.53
A little later we find:
More generally, if a PAP-defender claims to identify a robust alterna-
tive possibility in a Frankfurt case, we believe that it’s fair to ask her 
whether, in Black’s absence, exploiting that alternative possibility be-
fore adopting the course she actually does adopt would eliminate (or 
mitigate) her blameworthiness. If the answer is ‘‘no,’’ it is especially 
incumbent on her to explain why that unutilized ‘‘possibility space’’ 
should make the crucial difference to the agent’s responsibility.54
And finally:
Perhaps there is a good answer to this question in the case of deci-
sions. Perhaps, that is, there is room to explain why being able to de-
cide against killing Smith should be considered a robust alternative, 
even if exploiting this possibility in Black’s absence before deciding to 
kill Smith after all would not lessen Jones’s blameworthiness. Be this 
as it may, we believe that the question is a good one, and that there is 
a presumption against any view that cannot give it an affirmative an-
swer. If exploiting the residual leeway in Black’s absence would not 
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lessen Jones’s blameworthiness, why think that his actual responsibil-
ity in Black’s presence hinges on this unexploited leeway?  55
In response, the agent in a Frankfurt case doesn’t have to act that way at 
that particular time or any future time so when Hunt and Shabo say “…
Understanding  that  he  can  avoid  responsibility  for  so  deciding  then 
doesn’t make his decision avoidable in any interesting sense”, they are 
simply assuming that the action is in the end unavoidable. But this is 
precisely what I reject for the reasons already given regarding whether 
the agent acts in the counterfactual case. From the second quotation, they 
contend that it is a fair question to ask whether exploiting the earlier al-
ternative possibility would diminish responsibility when the agent ends 
up acting a certain way later in Black’s absence. If the answer is no they 
contend it seems hard to see why the same earlier alternative possibility 
should diminish responsibility for what you end up doing when Black is 
present in a Frankfurt case. Although the answer to the question they ask 
is indeed ‘no’ in the first case, this is unproblematic because when Black 
is present there is never an action of the agent for which they are respon-
sible  that  was  unavoidable.  If  they  acted  ‘on  their  own’  with  Black 
present then they are responsible but they didn’t have to act that way. If 
Black manipulates we no longer have a candidate for an action  of that 
agent. Another way of putting this would be to say that although the an-
swer to their question is ‘no’ when Black is absent, when Black is present 
the answer is still  unproblematically ‘no’ when the agent acts without 
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Black getting involved or, the question is simply inappropriate if Black 
intervenes as then the agent doesn’t end up doing anything. Agents are 
responsible when they freely and avoidably choose to act  as they do. 
They don’t act when manipulated by Black so as to causally guarantee 
outcomes. Finally, and along the same lines, responding to the question 
in the third quotation above, the ‘unexploited leeway’ is significant be-
cause it is in virtue of that unexploited leeway that the agent is responsi-
ble in both cases where Black is absent and present, i.e. in the cases where 
the agent acts without manipulation occurring. So I can happily agree that 
the leeway isn’t treated asymmetrically depending on Black’s presence as 
Hunt and Shabo rightly contend it shouldn’t be here. 
In summary, I conclude I have shown that a significant breakthrough 
is possible in the timing criticism dialectic for the leeway incompatibilist 
against  the  Frankfurt  defender.  The  timing  criticism and the  issue  of 
whether we should index responsibility to times is one of the most im-
portant  ongoing  debates  relevant  to  the  whether  the  buffer  strategy, 
which is the most sophisticated Frankfurt-style strategy to date, can be 
made to work.  I have shown that because of a consensus in the literature 
between certain leeway advocates and Frankfurt defenders regarding the 
status of the manipulated agents in buffer cases (their status as agents in 
the counterfactual case) a way of defending the leeway view has been 
overlooked. I have shown that, armed with the arguments from Alvarez, 
Steward and Larvor concerning the status of the counterfactual case, as 
well as the appropriately stated epistemic construal of the robustness cri-
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terion, the leeway theorist can make progress here and defend the prin-
ciple of alternative possibilities in an intuitively pleasing way.  The lee-
way incompatibilist can happily agree with Hunt and Shabo that agents 
are responsible simpliciter for what they do but she can at the same time 
defend the claim that those agents still have robust alternative possibili-
ties for the actions for which they do incur responsibility. In conclusion 
the classic buffer cases of Revenge and Tax Evasion 2 pose no threat to the 
principle of alternative possibilities.  So far so good, I  now turn to the 
very latest buffer case that Pereboom as developed in light of the timing 
criticism.
1.10 Tax Cut
Pereboom has recently constructed a new buffer case Tax Cut, which aims 
to avoid Ginet's timing criticism. Tax Cut runs as follows:
Tax Cut: Jones can vote for or against a modest tax cut for those in his 
high-income group by pushing either the ‘yes’or the ‘no’button in 
the voting booth. Once he has entered the voting booth, he has exact-
ly  two  minutes  to  vote,  and  a  downward-to-zero  ticking  timer  is 
prominently displayed. If he does not vote, he will have to pay a fine, 
substantial enough so that in his situation he is committed with cer-
tainty to voting (either for or against), and this is underlain by the fact 
that the prospect of the fine, together with background conditions, 
causally determines him to vote. Jones has concluded that voting for 
the tax cut is barely on balance morally wrong, since he believes it 
would not stimulate the economy appreciably, while adding wealth 
to the already wealthy without helping the less well off, despite how 
it has been advertised. He is receptive and reactive to these general 
sorts of moral reasons: he would vote against a substantially larger 
tax cut for his income group on account of reasons of this sort, and 
has actually done so in the past. He spends some time in the voting 
booth rehearsing the relevant moral and self-interested reasons. But 
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what would be required for him to decide to vote against the tax cut 
is for him to vividly imagine that his boss would find out, whereupon 
due to her political leanings she would punish him by not promoting 
him to a better position. In this situation it is causally necessary for 
his not deciding to vote for the tax cut, and to vote against it instead, 
that  he  vividly  imagine  her  finding  out  and  not  being  promoted, 
which can occur to him involuntarily or else voluntarily by his liber-
tarian free  will.  Jones  understands  that  imagining the  punishment 
scenario will put him in a motivational position to vote against. But 
so  imagining  is  not  causally  sufficient  for  him  to  decide  to  vote 
against the tax cut, for even then he could still, by his libertarian free 
will, either decide to vote for or against (without the intervener's de-
vice in place). However, a neuroscientist has, unbeknownst to him, 
implanted a device in his brain, which, were it to sense his vividly 
imagining the punishment scenario, would stimulate his brain so as 
to  causally  determine  the  decision  to  vote  for  the  tax  cut.  Jones’s 
imagination is not exercised in this way, and he decides to vote in fa-
vor while the device remains idle.56
The aim of Tax Cut is to eliminate the possibility of making Ginet's timing 
move right at the end of the 2 minute period. If successful this would 
mean that Jones wouldn’t be able to refrain at the end of the two minute 
period and hence PAP would be challenged as Jones is still intuitively 
morally responsible when he votes for the tax cut at  the last  possible 
moment. Up until the last minute possible, it will of course be open to 
the PAP defender to make the same move as before, i.e. following my 
suggestions in the section above, there are robust possibilities with or 
without crossing the buffer by just deliberating at any time t before the 
deadline. As I said in the previous section, these alternatives are robust 
as they meet the epistemic requirements and furthermore, responsibility 
(when it is incurred) is responsibility simpliciter.  What about at the last 
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point at which it is possible to make a decision before the timer runs out? 
Jones would have known that he had to make a decision right then and 
given the fact that the decision to not vote is not causally possible (by 
stipulation), Jones will not have a robust alternative to his choice to vote 
for the tax cut for which he is intuitively morally responsible.
Buffer crossing and intervention
One worry that appears to be relevant here concerns whether there is a 
time lag or not between the point in time when the buffer is crossed and 
the point when (once crossed) the ability to do otherwise becomes a live 
possibility and hence a robust possibility. If there was a time lag of any 
duration then presumably we could just stipulate into the example that 
the intervention process would be able to intervene and manipulate the 
agent during that time lag and hence before the agent had access to the 
robust  alternative,  in  line  with  Pereboom’s  approach  here.  But  what 
about if, as soon as the buffer was crossed, the robust alternative simul-
taneously became an option? That doesn’t seem to be incoherent and is 
perhaps even what we might expect here. If this was the case, then given 
the fact that the buffer is operating as a prior sign we know it must take 
some time (however short an interval) for the detection process to trigger 
the intervention process, we might have a window at which the agent 
could have access to a robust alternative, however short a window that 
might be, and that is going to be a problem for Tax Evasion 2 and Tax Cut. 
In Tax Evasion 2, it would mean that Joe could have chosen not to evade 
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as soon as he crossed the buffer for a short period of time before the in-
evitable intervention. What about in Tax Cut? Tax Cut is harder because 
Pereboom’s description of the case makes it seem like Jones will some-
how (if he has left the decision right to the last possible moment) not 
suddenly cross the buffer because that would mean letting the time win-
dow slip by instead of choosing to vote for the tax cut. However, if I’m 
right that the possibility of choosing to vote against can become a live 
possibility  simultaneously  with his  crossing the  buffer  (imagining the 
boss in this case), then even if the buffer was crossed at the last instant, it 
would then be possible for Jones to vote against at the last instant. Why should 
we think (given Jones’  understanding of  his  situation),  that  he would 
think he had to vote for the cut at the last moment any more than he had 
to vote against it (ignore for the moment whether it was possible for him 
to make the choice to vote against)? This last point taken together with 
the suggestion of the robust alternative becoming a live option simulta-
neous with the buffer crossing would mean that even in Tax Cut Jones 
might well have a robust alternative up to and including the last moment 
to choose to vote against. 
All of the above seems coherent as a possibility but is it  plausible? 
Perhaps it might be said that there has to be a period of time after the 
buffer has been crossed in order for deliberation to ‘digest’ the new con-
siderations, for the agent to mull over the options again in light of the 
new found sensitivity to moral reasons. I want to say two things in re-
sponse to this possibility. Firstly, I don’t see why one would insist on this. 
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Specifically, why doesn’t crossing the buffer immediately put the agents 
in just that state of heightened sensitivity necessary to make an properly 
informed decision? Why insist on a time lag? Secondly, suppose that it 
were conceded here that there would need to be a small time lag between 
the buffer being crossed and the time at which the robust alternative be-
came a live possibility so to speak. Even so, it should be noted that we 
are now working in a prior sign context again. Because of this, we might 
well ask why we should expect the period of time that it takes for the ro-
bust possibility to become truly available after the buffer is crossed to be 
longer than the necessary time lag before the intervention process is trig-
gered after it’s been detected that the buffers have been crossed. It looks 
like we are at a point in the dialectic where it is merely stipulation one 
way or another that could settle such a question. 
However,  perhaps  imagining  the  buffer  cases  in  a  possible  world 
where the time lags come out the way Pereboom needs them to is just as 
legitimate as I found the stipulation of the buffers in the first place. I ar-
gued above that even if our ordinary concept of what libertarian free will 
involves is in tension with the stipulation of the buffer in general, Pere-
boom can nevertheless legitimately ask us to imagine the closest possible 
world where the buffers did work (by stipulation) in the way he wanted. 
Now, analogously, he can also ask us to imagine a world where (again by 
stipulation) we needed a period of time to deliberate post crossing the 
buffer before we could access robust possibilities. Even if this world dif-
fered from how some libertarian possible worlds are structured, Pere-
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boom can concede this and nevertheless ask us to consider the world 
where the set up in his example works. There is nothing conceptually 
problematic about this stipulation at some possible world, even if there is 
given our actual conception of libertarian freedom and what that concept 
rules in and out in the actual world. As I said above, how the actual con-
cept of libertarian free will works here (if indeed there is a uniform, sta-
ble concept) is not necessarily a guide to whether robust alternates are 
conceptually necessary for moral responsibility. So far then, for all the buf-
fer cases examined, the buffer stipulations and associated time lag stipu-
lations  necessary  to  make  the  examples  work  are  not  problematic  in 
themselves. We must look to other features of the examples. 
1.11 A Dilemma for Tax Cut
One of the crucial aspects of the buffer cases to get clear on is the specifi-
cation of what the agent who is the subject of these cases knows regard-
ing their situation. There are two aspects that need to be clarified. Firstly, 
do the agents know about the counterfactual intervention should they 
deliberate/think a certain way (i.e. do they know they’re in a Frankfurt 
case) and secondly, do they know about the buffer (irrespective of know-
ing about the counterfactual intervention)? The answer to the first ques-
tion is uncontroversially ‘no’. It is part of the structure of Frankfurt cases 
that the intervention mechanism is hidden and doesn’t play any causal 
role in the actual sequence. The second issue is harder though and it isn’t 
immediately obvious from Pereboom’s description of the cases what is 
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being stipulated. For example, in the description of Tax Cut, Jones under-
stands that imagining the punishment scenario will put him in a motiva-
tional position to vote against the cut. Does this mean that Jones merely 
knows he’ll definitely be able to vote against then or that (more strongly) 
it is a necessary condition of him being able to vote against that he imag-
ines his boss and the punishment? It isn’t specified but we can consider 
how Tax Cut  looks in both the situation where Jones knows about the 
buffer and where he doesn’t. 
In the situation where Jones knows there is a buffer (functioning as a 
necessary  condition),  i.e.  where  he  knew that  he  had to  consider  his 
boss’s reaction if he was to be able to vote against; if he leaves the deci-
sion until the last possible moment and has not considered his boss’s re-
action by then he has knowingly put himself in a position where he is 
causally determined to vote for the cut. However, in this case the situa-
tion looks like a classic case of derivative responsibility. Jones omitted to 
do something at an earlier time that he knew he had to do (and could 
have done) if  he was to avoid the bad outcome later.  When we build 
knowledge of the buffer into the case and the buffer isn’t crossed, we 
have a situation which does look paradigmatically like the drunk driver 
or inevitably violent drunk man in Pereboom’s classic cases of derivative 
responsibility. But if this is the case then Tax Cut fails to provide a coun-
terexample as derivative responsibility is now traced back to an earlier 
situation where there was a robust alternative possibility. The fact that 
(referring to that  earlier  decision not  to cross  the buffer  to which de-
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rivative  responsibility  is  now  arguably  traced)  buffer  crossing  would 
have been consistent (without the immediate intervention) with still be-
ing able to vote for the cut is not a reason to think buffer crossing is not 
robust here. As I have already made clear in the section on the timing 
dialectic.,  robust  alternatives  do  not  need  to  epistemically  commit  the 
agent to avoiding an alternative at times into the future (though they 
may also do this).
So at any point during the ticking timer’s duration, in the scenario 
where Jones knows about the buffer being a necessary condition for vot-
ing against there is a robust alternative up to the last possible moment he 
can make a choice (i.e. his not choosing to vote in favour then) and at the 
last possible moment (if the buffer has not been crossed) Jones is causally 
determined to vote in favour but we get what looks like a paradigm case 
of  derivative  responsibility  that  traces  back  to  earlier  omissions  (the 
omission to cross the buffer)  for  which there were robust  alternatives 
available. Either way, there is no situation (when Jones knows about the 
buffer)  where  he  is  directly  morally  responsible  for  some decision for 
which he didn’t have a robust alternate possibility. 
On the other hand, if Jones doesn’t know about the buffer, presumably 
he believes (falsely) that he can make the decision to vote against at any 
point up to and including the last possible moment regardless of whether 
he has considered his boss’s response or not then. Before the last possible 
moment there is a robust possibility here (just as in the scenario where he 
knows about the buffer,) namely Jones not choosing to vote in favour at 
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that particular moment (as per the timing criticism). As for the deadline, 
if we take Pereboom’s stipulation seriously that it is causally determined 
that Jones votes by the deadline, then given he can’t vote against because 
he hasn’t crossed the buffer, he will be causally determined to vote for 
the cut.  But  then the trouble is  that  Jones will  have unwittingly (and 
without prior negligence) put himself in a position where he is causally 
determined to do something bad, for which many will have the intuition 
that he isn’t responsible. If Jones didn't know that he needed to cross the 
buffer in order to have the ability to vote against, this suggests that Jones 
might have acted differently had he known these things.  We can imag57 -
ine the same scenario as a ‘torn decision’ or, figuratively as a ‘mental coin 
toss’ where Jones is determined to decide by the deadline and (not know-
ing about the buffer) doesn’t have a preference either way. Once again, if 
we are to take Pereboom’s stipulation that it is causally impossible for 
Jones to decide to vote against if he hasn’t crossed the buffer seriously, 
then in the ‘mental  coin toss  scenario’  where the buffer  has not  been 
crossed we will have a situation where the decision made by Jones will 
always come out one way,  namely to vote in favour of  the cut.  Once 
again, it seems that this is not something for which Jones is intuitively 
responsible for the same reason as mentioned above.  We can imagine 
what Jones would subsequently say if told about the buffer. He might 
well say “that so called torn decision was rigged to come out that way 
 I am grateful to Carl Ginet and Nadine Elzein for suggesting to me in corres57 -
pondence that the causal process resulting in Jones’ voting for the cut at the 
deadline needn’t be something for which he is intuitively responsible.
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given the set up”…. or “I’ll stand by my freely made torn decisions but 
not  decisions  rigged  like  this”  etc.  In  summary,  on  this  horn  of  the 
dilemma, where Jones doesn’t know about the buffer, there is no scenario 
where he is directly morally responsible for something for which he had 
no robust  alternate  possibilities.  Before the deadline,  if  Jones votes  in 
favour  of  the  cut  there  are  robust  alternatives  (as  per  the  timing 
criticism). At the deadline it would appear that Jones is not intuitively 
morally responsible for what transpires after all given it will be causally 
guaranteed to happen.
1.12 Further problems with the structure of Tax Cut given the 
conditions on decision and action
In the section above, I criticised Tax Cut in the form of a dilemma and 
concluded that  there  is  no version of  the  scenario  playing out  where 
Jones makes a decision to vote for the tax cut for which he is directly 
morally responsible and for which he doesn’t have a robust alternative 
possibility. This is I believe the correct analysis for a leeway incompati-
bilist who believes that Jones still acts in all these scenarios. However, it 
should be noted that this analysis is at odds with my earlier claims about 
Revenge and Tax Evasion 2, where, given the analogous application of the 
arguments about classic Frankfurt cases by Steward, Alvarez and Larvor, 
I claimed the agent doesn’t act in the counterfactual case when they are 
manipulated and intervention occurs. This raises the question whether 
those same arguments can also be applied here. And it seems they can. 
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So we now need to examine whether Jones acts  in Tax Cut  when the 
causal set up ensures the outcome (given the fact the buffer hasn’t been 
crossed and the necessity of acting by the deadline). Before the deadline, 
if Jones chooses to vote in favour on his own in the normal way then he 
does of course act, is of course responsible but he has a robust alterna-
tive. If he crosses the buffer however, then just as before what happens 
next (given the intervention and causal determination of the subsequent 
state of affairs by the mechanism), we do not have a viable candidate for 
an action of Jones. This is for exactly the same reasons as given by Alvarez, 
Steward and Larvor. So this covers all the possibilities up until the deci-
sion deadline. At the decision deadline itself, given that the buffer will 
not have been crossed (if it had we would already have had an earlier 
case of ‘non action’ given the intervention) we have a situation where the 
lack of buffer crossing and the deadline causally necessitate the outcome 
irrespective of the state of Jones’ deliberations and emotional states by 
then. I therefore contend that this process should also not qualify as a de-
cision of Jones for just the same reasons, i.e. the so called ‘decision’ that 
comes about is not related to the earlier deliberative states in the right 
kind of way to qualify as an act of Jones. It is a little harder to see this at 
first, as the ‘decision guarantee’ mechanism in Tax Cut doesn’t immedi-
ately appear to be of the same invasive kind as in the classic counterfac-
tual case where Black swoops in and causally determines the outcome. 
However, if we take Pereboom’s stipulations about the buffer and the ne-
cessity of acting by the deadline seriously, then the case (at the deadline) 
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looks to share all the properties that ruled out the agent acting in the 
classic  counterfactual  intervention  scenarios.  I  conclude  that  Tax  Cut 
doesn’t provide a counterexample to PAP.
1.13 The ‘What-should-he-have-done’ defence and Otsuka’s 
‘avoidability of blame’ argument
So far in the discussion of the various Frankfurt cases I have been evalu-
ating, I have only criticised the internal structure of the examples. That is, 
I have been considering whether, on closer inspection, the cases are co-
herent, or whether they have robust alternative possibilities in them after 
all. It’s fair to say that the majority of the literature has proceeded in the 
same way. Commentators have got their hands dirty in the metaphysics 
of the examples as with Alvarez, Steward and Larvor's analysis of the 
counterfactual case, or argued that you can’t rule out the alternative pos-
sibilities,  as with the dilemma defence developed by Kane, Ginet and 
Widerker. There is however a distinct strand in the literature which takes 
a very different approach and argues directly against the purported con-
clusion of a (were it possible) coherent Frankfurt style case without chal-
lenging the details and set up of the cases, or at least without directly do-
ing so. David Widerker and Michael Otsuka have both formulated ar-
guments to this effect. These responses therefore directly challenge our 
having the intuition of responsibility about such cases, were they possi-
ble. Widerker has developed the ‘What-should-he-have-done defence’ or 
!104
the W-defence for short. He asks us to consider the following case, where 
the breaking of a promise was the salient action:
Let me grant, for the sake of discussion, that in the IRR-situation un-
der consideration, Jones acted freely in the sense that what he did he 
did for reasons of his own without being causally determined or co-
erced to so act. Still, since you, Frankfurt, wish to hold him blame-
worthy for his decision to break his promise,  tell  me what,  in your 
opinion, should he have done instead?  Now, you cannot claim that he 
should not have decided to break the promise, since this was some-
thing that was not in Jones’s power to do. Hence I do not see how you 
can hold Jones blameworthy for his decision to break the promise.58
Widerker considers some possible objections to the W-defence and re-
sponds to them. Firstly, someone might argue that it’s unfair to absolve 
the agent from Blame in a Frankfurt case because we can’t answer the 
question, ‘what should they have done instead?’ They might suggest this 
because for all the agent knew, they thought they could have done otherwise. 
Widerker rightly notes that this response misses the point.  If  the only 
way to be absolved of responsibility was to have an excuse then this ob-
jection might be right. However, the defender of alternative possibilities 
may argue that a lack of alternatives also undermines responsibility. Giv-
en that alternate possibilities are taken to be necessary for responsibility, 
their absence would undermine responsibility regardless of whether or 
not the agent in question had an excuse. Widerker goes on to suggest 
that perhaps what the critic might mean is that the agent is still blame-
worthy because he should have done what he believed was the right thing to 
do. But if this is what is meant then Widerker can simply reply with the 
 Widerker (2003: 63)58
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W-defence once again, namely that it  is surely unreasonable to expect 
that an agent should do something they are not able to do.
Secondly, Widerker suggests that someone might try to counter the W-
defence by taking the following line. Given that in a Frankfurt case what 
Jones’ decision reveals about him and his character is exactly the same as 
it  would be if  the Frankfurt apparatus was removed (and thus where 
Jones  has  alternatives),  the  situations  should  be  regarded  as  morally 
equivalent  and we should consequently  blame Jones  in  the  Frankfurt 
case as we would in the normal scenario. In fact,  this is a line that is 
strongly suggested by what Frankfurt himself says in the original 1969 
paper. After introducing the most developed version of his classic case 
(Jones 4), Frankfurt says, “In that case, it seems clear, Jones4 will bear 
precisely the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would 
have borne if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he did 
it. It would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones4 for his action, or to 
withhold the praise to which it would normally entitle him, on the basis 
of the fact that he could not have done otherwise. This fact played no 
role at all in leading him to act as he did. He would have acted the same 
even if  it  had not been a fact.  Indeed, everything happened just  as it 
would  have  happened  without  Black’s  presence  in  the  situation  and 
without  his  readiness  to  intrude  into  it.”  In  reply,  Widerker  rightly 59
points out that the two situations are not morally equivalent to someone 
who believes alternative possibilities are a necessary condition on moral 
 Frankfurt (1969: 836)59
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responsibility. The asymmetry is precisely what the W-defence aims to 
draw attention two. While it would be reasonable to expect Jones to act 
otherwise in the normal situation, it looks unreasonable in the Frankfurt 
scenario.  Widerker  does concede though that  saying this  is  consistent 
with us being able to assess Jones conduct negatively from a moral point 
of view: there are other forms of moral assessment apart from moral re-
sponsibility,  or ‘basic desert  moral responsibility’,  as Pereboom would 
call it.
The reasoning in the W-defence is persuasive because, as I said at the 
start  of  this  chapter,  we  move  very  naturally  from  the  thought  that 
someone is to blame to the thought that they should have done some-
thing other than they did in fact do. Coupled with the ‘ought implies 
can’  premise,  we  can  then  move  back  through  these  entailments  by 
modus tollens, firstly from the fact that you couldn’t have done otherwise 
to the negation of ‘you should have done something else instead’ and 
then in turn from the negation of that to the negation of the claim that the 
agent is blameworthy. The Frankfurt defender agrees that the agent can-
not do otherwise but they also hold the agent blameworthy so they must 
challenge  the  modus  tollens  somewhere.  Although  highly  counterintu-
itive, some Frankfurt case defenders here are prepared to bite the bullet 
and deny ‘ought implies can’. I won’t discuss these replies to Widerker 
here. I can happily agree with Widerker given I’ve argued that there are 
in fact robust alternative possibilities in the Frankfurt style examples. We 
should expect this perhaps given the strength of the W-defence. These 
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two lines of argument (the defence of the principle of alternate possibili-
ties on the one hand and the W-defence on the other) are mutually sup-
porting here. All well and good for the leeway incompatibilist then.
Michael Otsuka independently develops a response along the same 
lines: “I argue that blaming someone for what she has done is warranted 
only if she could have behaved less badly and that if she could have be-
haved less badly, then she could have behaved in a manner for which she 
would have been entirely blameless.”  After a section explaining away 60
intuitions that appear to support the view that we do hold people ac-
countable and blame them in situations that look to undermine this prin-
ciple, he says the following:
Take any imagined pair of individuals who have behaved badly (e.g., 
who have maliciously injured another) and hold everything constant 
except for the fact that the one could have behaved less badly, and 
knew that she could have, whereas the other could not have behaved 
less badly. The fact that the one person behaved as badly as she did 
even though she  knew that  she  didn’t  have  to  provides  sufficient 
grounds for indignation in her case that  are lacking in the second 
case. Moreover, there are no other grounds that are sufficient for in-
dignation in this  second case.  Such grounds are lacking no matter 
how malevolent or otherwise vicious this person might have been.61
To my mind, this exercise brings into sharper focus the point that it 
seems groundless to blame the latter agent once we know they couldn’t have 
behaved less badly. Proper reflection on the fact that an agent simply could 
not have behaved less badly raises a flag that would appear to be a prob-
 Otsuka (1998: 694)60
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lem for a Frankfurt case even if  it could be successfully described,  that is, 
even if such cases are structurally possible. Careful reflection and focus 
on the fact of unavoidability challenges the initial intuition of responsi-
bility we tend to have in a Frankfurt case. This is a problem that has been 
largely ignored in the literature. Most work in this area proceeds on the 
assumption that the intuitions of responsibility in Frankfurt cases are se-
cure and stable.  To my mind,  Widerker and Otsuka have shown that 
even if we granted the structural success of Frankfurt cases, the Frank-
furt example constructor would still have to defend against their argu-
ments. On the plausible assumption that many people find the intuition 
of responsibility misplaced after they have properly focused on the un-
avoidability point and the W-defence, it seems that the Frankfurt defend-
er may have simply run up against the very intuition he was out to chal-
lenge in  the  first  place,  i.e.  that  alternative  possibilities  are  necessary. 
Moreover, in terms of the overall dialectic here and the burdens of expla-
nation each side bears, this looks to be more problematic for the Frank-
furt defender than for Widerker and Otsuka, given the widespread ac-
ceptance  of  something  like  ‘ought  implies  can’,  as  opposed  to  the 
strength of  intuitions in response to increasingly arcane counterexam-
ples. As I said above in relation to Widerker, Otsuka’s position here is 
likewise in harmony with my diagnosis of the structure of the Frankfurt 
cases anyway.
In conclusion, neither the classic nor any of the modified Frankfurt 
style cases we have examined (which represent the range of cases offered 
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in the literature), show that agents can be morally responsible for deci-
sions for which they had no robust alternative possibilities. In addition to 
a comprehensive survey of the classic cases, I  have offered new argu-
ments as to why the buffer cases, despite their sophistication likewise fail 
to  undermine  the  principle  of  alternative  possibilities.  However,  this 
general conclusion about the Frankfurt strategy, although it means we 
need a leeway theory of moral responsibility, is not by itself sufficient to 
establish that this leeway theory must be incompatibilist. That is because 
there  are  also  compatibilist  leeway  theories  of  moral  responsibility.  I 
therefore now turn to the evaluation of compatibilist attempts to capture 
the alternative possibilities condition on moral responsibility.  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Chapter 2
2.  Compatibilist theories of alternate possibility
The conclusion of chapter one is that Frankfurt style cases, when proper-
ly understood, don’t show that alternate possibilities aren’t required for 
moral  responsibility.  Furthermore,  the discussion of  Widerker’s  W-de-
fence and Otsuka’s related argument give us good reason to believe al-
ternate possibilities are necessary for responsibility. Under the supposi-
tion that alternatives are necessary, in this second chapter I’ll  evaluate 
what I take to be the most prominent compatibilist theories of alternate 
possibility. Firstly, the so called ‘traditional conditional compatibilism’ or 
‘classical compatibilism’ of Hume, G. E. Moore, R. E. Hobart and A. J. 
Ayer.  Secondly, one of the more recent positions in the free will litera-
ture:  the  ‘new dispositionalist’  compatibilism developed by  Kadri  Vi-
hvelin and Michael Fara which can be seen as a sophisticated advance on 
the  old  conditional  compatibilism.  Thirdly,  I  shall  examine  the  new 
‘agentive modality’ analysis of compatibilist alternatives developed by 
Christian List. 
I shall argue that all these various forms of leeway compatibilism run 
into significant problems. Many of these points are familiar. But it is in 
the discussion of Christian List’s recent work that I advance two new ar-
guments against this sort of compatibilist position. In particular, I focus 
on his account of alternative possibilities. In the first argument, I aim to 
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show that even if List defends the reality of free will as a power over al-
ternatives  in  his  ‘higher  order  property  -  special  sciences’  sense,  this 
sense isn’t connected up with moral responsibility in the way required 
to speak to the traditional problem of free will and responsibility. Sec-
ondly, I develop a thought experiment based on agents having access to 
microphysical information about the location of the particles that consti-
tute  their  bodies  to  demonstrate  that,  List’s  model  notwithstanding, 
there are still powerful incompatibilist intuitions that are hard to explain 
away. My conclusion is that although List’s arguments are original and 
compelling in many respects, they also fail to establish compatibilism as 
a credible position.
2.1 Traditional conditional compatibilism
Hume puts forward the first recognisable conditional compatibilism or 
'conditional analysis' of freedom in the Enquiry Concerning Human Under-
standing:
by liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting ac-
cording to the determinations of the will – that is, if we choose to re-
main at rest, we may; if we choose to also move, we also may.62
The  view was  taken  up and popularised  in  the  twentieth  century, 
most notably by G. E. Moore and A. J. Ayer. The basic idea is that ability 
claims in natural language such as 'I could do X' or 'I could have done X' 
are equivalent to subjunctive conditionals such as 'I would do X if I chose 
 Hume, David. 1777. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, s. 7362
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to do X' or ' I would have done X if I had so chosen (or tried)'. It is then 
pointed out that the truth of such conditionals is consistent with deter-
minism. Even if it's fixed by the past state of the universe and the laws of 
nature that you were determined to do X at a certain point in time, the 
conditional may still be true that if you had chosen to do something oth-
er than X at that time you would have done. It might be true or false de-
pending on what you would have done if you had decided differently, 
even if you were determined to decide as you actually did. I take it to be 
uncontroversial that the truth of such subjunctive conditionals would not 
be undermined by the truth of determinism. The criticisms of this posi-
tion therefore turn on whether the semantics of everyday 'coulds' and 
'cans' really are correctly analysed as such conditionals.
Two of the most influential criticisms of the old conditional analysis 
were developed in the 1960s by Roderick Chisholm and Keith Lehrer. 
Take the following case of a man called Brown who fails to jump into the 
sea at some point in time to save a drowning child. In this case we can 
stipulate that the man is so terrified it is psychologically impossible for 
him to jump into the sea as he is. The conditional analysis claims that the 
following two claims are equivalent:
A. Brown could have jumped into the sea at t.
B.  If  Brown had chosen to jump into the sea at t,  he would have 
jumped into the sea at t.
!113
There are various formulations of the relevant subjunctive conditional 
in the literature with 'willed' or 'tried' sometimes being used instead of 
'chosen'.  These  variations  won't  make  any  difference  with  respect  to 
whether or not the following criticisms are salient. The problem is as fol-
lows. Suppose that, for whatever reason, it was psychologically impossible 
for Brown to jump in. Maybe he has a phobia of water, or he's terrified of 
drowning, or something similar. In such a case it is still seems true to 
claim that if he had chosen to jump he would have jumped (hence B can 
be true), yet it also seems false to claim that Brown could have jumped in 
– surely he couldn't given his phobia etc.  Hence A seems false. This kind 
of case appears to show that A and B don't have the same truth condi-
tions, and that consequently, they can't be equivalent.
There  are  other  arguments  in  the  contemporary  literature  that  tell 
against the conditional analysis. Christian List has recently defended an 
unqualified (i.e. non-conditional) sense of ‘could’ as part of his compati-
bilist position. He first criticises the conditional analysis in the following 
way (List credits Keith Lehrer with the original argument behind this):
A useful test for whether an interpretation of something is adequate 
is whether that interpretation can be substituted for its target without 
changing the meaning too significantly. To see that a conditional or 
dispositional  interpretation of  the ability  to  do otherwise  fails  this 
substitution test, notice that the sentences
(1) the agent does not try to do X,
and 
(2) if the agent does not try to do X, he or she cannot do X,
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entail the negation of
(3) the agent can do X,
whereas they do not entail the negation of
(3*) if the agent were to try to do X, he or she would succeed in doing 
X.63
List points out that (1) and (2) appear consistent with (3*) whereas 
they are clearly inconsistent with (3). The upshot is that (3) and (3*) can-
not be equivalent. The actual truth values of the above sentences are ir-
relevant in establishing this point. 
The arguments above from Chisholm and List strongly suggest that 
the everyday sentences we form with 'coulds' and 'cans' that are partly 
constitutive of the ability claims at issue in the free will debate do not 
have the same truth conditions as simple subjunctive conditionals.
There is also the related problem that, upon encountering the condi-
tional analysis, such as 'Agent A would have done X had they so chosen', 
people often ask (of the antecedent in the subjunctive conditional – in 
this case the 'had they so chosen’): but could the agent have so chosen? 
The critical thought behind this question is supposed to be that this is the 
relevant question at issue if we're worried about free will, and not the 
question  of  whether  the  subjunctive  conditionals  in  the  conditional 
analysis (that tie hypothetical (different) decisions to (different) bodily 
actions) are true. 
 List (2014: 159-160)63
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Now, strictly speaking, this is a dialectically unsatisfactory response 
because the conditional compatibilist has presumably already argued for 
the conditional analysis. In this context (where arguments for the analy-
sis are already on the table) an internal critique is properly called for (as 
in the case of Brown and the drowning child example above) or in any 
other form that would challenge the original argument the conditional 
analyst gave in favour of the analysis or its internal coherence. If this isn't 
done and the question about the antecedent  is  asked in isolation,  the 
conditional compatibilist is entitled to reply that the question asked of 
the antecedent is  appropriately also equivalent  to another subjunctive 
conditional, in this case 'Agent A would have so chosen, if they had so 
willed/tried/chosen so to choose'. Presumably the interlocutor here will 
stubbornly go on to ask exactly the same question about the antecedent 
of this conditional analysis of the original antecedent. Worries about the 
intelligibility of 'chosen so to choose' to one side, the question (posed on 
its own without further argument) therefore doesn't properly engage di-
alectically with the conditional compatibilist, it's a mere expression of the 
fact that the analysis 'seems wrongheaded' to them or whatever. Howev-
er, that said, the widespread insistence of a chain of questions of this sort 
suggests to me (even if they are not strictly speaking dialectically good 
arguments  for  the  claim)  that  the  ordinary  language  semantics  of 
'coulds', 'cans' and ability claims of the sort at issue in the free will debate 
are clearly not intuitively cashed out in terms of subjunctive conditionals. 
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At the very least, the conditional compatibilist owes us an explanation of 
why these regressive questions about the antecedents are so often asked.
There is however a better way to press the worry in the paragraph 
above (which I will term 'asking the could question about the antecedent 
of the conditional') that is both dialectically acceptable and problematic 
for the proponent of the conditional analysis. In the above paragraph I 
said that it might not make any sense to say 'would have chosen had 
they chosen so to chose'. This sentence is the one that is claimed to be 
equivalent to 'could have chosen', in the 'could question' about the an-
tecedent which is pressed upon the conditional analysis. The worry now 
is that if it doesn't in fact make sense to say 'would have chosen had they 
chosen so to choose' then we will have a reductio ad absurdum argument 
against  the  conditional  analysis  based  upon  the  claimed  conditional 
equivalences that the proponent of the analysis presumably must give. I 
say presumably here because perhaps it is possible for the conditional 
analyst to claim that not every 'could' claim is equivalent to a condition-
al. However, if they do this we will be entitled to ask what the truth con-
ditions of that 'could' are and whether they are consistent with the truth 
of determinism which was the whole motivation for the position in the 
first place. As the argument stands then, it looks like the conditional ana-
lyst will probably stick to their guns and offer the conditionalised version 
of the could question. What sense can we make of 'chosen so to choose’?
I think the interpretation of 'chosen so to choose' presents the condi-
tional analyst with a dilemma depending on whether we take the sen-
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tence literally or not. On the first horn, perhaps it is just a rhetorical way 
of saying nothing other and above that the person chose a certain way 
(perhaps with the rhetorical flavour here indicating careful or mindful 
choice etc). However, if that's all that's being (literally) said there will be 
a problem as the conditional will become trivial and uninformative, it 
will in fact read 'would have chosen X, if they had chosen X' which is a 
tautology. On the second horn, if 'chosen so to choose' is taken literally in 
a  way  that  implies  two  choices  have  been  made,  it  seems  just  plain 
wrongheaded to  speak  like  that.  You  don't  choose  to  make  a  certain 
choice – you just make a choice a certain way after deliberation. It is im-
portant to note that at this point in the argument, to say 'chosen so to 
choose' seems incoherent is not analogous to merely pressing the 'could 
question about the antecedent' as was described as dialectically unsatis-
factory above. The claim now being made in the second horn is that the 
phrase  seems  incoherent,  which  is  different  to  saying  a  position  just 
seems wrong. The thought here is that it's difficult to make intelligible 
what (when one makes a choice) saying one chose to make that choice 
could mean over and above the fact that someone made a choice a cer-
tain way for  certain reasons.  There is  another problem on the second 
horn as well. It looks like a regress threatens if every 'could question' is 
rendered  as  a  conditional.  If  every  time,  the  could  question  is  asked 
about the antecedent of some conditional, it will be claimed equivalent to 
another conditional a regress will result. It's not clear to me that this is 
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necessarily a problem in itself, but it is the argumentative burden of the 
conditional analyst to explain why not.
Either way then, I claim that pressing the 'could question about the 
antecedent'  enables a reductio argument to be made against the tradi-
tional conditional analysis.
2.2 The new dispositionalist analysis
Some criticisms  of  the  traditional  conditional  analysis  outlined  above 
were on the whole considered decisive by compatibilists and incompati-
bilists alike during the rest of the twentieth century. However, the failure 
to secure compatibilism by this route had soon become less of an issue 
given Harry Frankfurt's development of the view that alternate possibili-
ties are not required for moral responsibility. The main motivation to find 
a way of rendering the everyday modal claims about ability to do other-
wise consistent with determinism was therefore (for many) deflated and 
it’s fair to say that large numbers of compatibilists embraced Frankfurt's 
position  and  ceased  to  worry  about  the  problems  of  the  conditional 
analysis. Interestingly however, during the first decade of the twenty first 
century the core idea behind the conditional analysis has been revived 
and a number of  prominent philosophers have defended a somewhat 
analogous position which has come to be known as the ‘new disposition-
alism’. In the rest of this chapter I will outline and evaluate whether the 
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new dispositionalist position does any better than its twentieth century 
relative.
Kadri Vihvelin (2004), Michael Fara (2008) and Michael Smith (2003) 
have developed the new dispositionalist position. Vihvelin argues that 
the old conditional compatibilism was on the right track with respect to 
the fact that it offered us an analysis of ability in terms of dispositions 
but that it was mistaken to then analyse the relevant dispositions as sim-
ple  subjunctive  conditionals.  We  have  already  discussed  the  problem 
Chisholm raises whereby the relevant subjunctive conditional can be true 
for  some situation whereas  the agent  in  question intuitively does not 
have the relevant ability that the conditional is meant to be equivalent to. 
This was illustrated by the man who couldn't jump in the sea to save the 
child, or in other examples, the girl that can't pick up the spider out of 
paralysing fear though she would if she tried to etc. Vihvelin claims that 
“persons have abilities by having intrinsic properties that are the causal 
basis of the ability.”  She gives the following analysis of ability, which is 64
very similar to David Lewis’ revised analysis of dispositions themselves:
(RCAA) S has the ability at time t to do X iff, for some intrinsic prop-
erty or set of properties B that S has at t, for some time t’ after t, if S 
chose (decided, intended, or tried) at t to do X, and S were to retain B 
until t’, S’s choosing (deciding, intending, or trying) to do X and S’s 
having of B would jointly be an S-complete cause of S’s doing X.65
 Vihvelin (2004: 438)64
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RCAA stands for ‘revised conditional  analysis  of  ability’,  following 
David Lewis’ ‘revised account of dispositions’ which is as follows:
(RCAD) Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimu-
lus s iff, for some intrinsic property B that x has at t, for some time t’ 
after t, if x were to undergo stimulus s at time t and retain property B 
until t’, s and x’s having of B would jointly be an x-complete cause of 
x’s giving response r.66
Lewis defines ‘x-complete cause’ in his RCAD as “a cause complete in so 
far as havings of properties intrinsic to x are concerned, though perhaps 
omitting some events extrinsic to x.”  By analogy, I will understand Vi67 -
hvelin’s S-complete cause in her RCAA in just the same way: ‘a cause 
complete in so far as havings of properties intrinsic to S are concerned, 
though perhaps omitting some events extrinsic to S’. This is what Clarke 
refers to as an ‘agent-complete cause’ in his criticisms of Vihvelin dis-
cussed below.
The above account is primarily intended as an analysis of basic abili-
ties, abilities that are dispositions. More complex abilities, including the 
ability to make choices based on reasons, are not dispositions per say but 
bundles of dispositions.  RCAA is supposed to circumvent some of the 68
problems of the old conditional analysis. But does it? The objection dis-
cussed above showed that the truth of the conditional analysis analysans 
(would have chosen if had tried to etc) was not sufficient for the posses-
 Lewis (1997: 157)66
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sion of the ability itself. Randolph Clarke notes that this problem appears 
to apply to RCAA just as well:
It might be true, as Vihvelin (2004, p. 443) says, that an agent (an ani-
mal, or a young child) can have an ability to perform an action of A-
ing without having any ability to choose to A, but the further possi-
bility that some agent might lack that ability to choose and, for just 
that reason, lack the ability to A undermines RCAA as an analysis of 
ability to act. A phobic agent might, on some occasion, be unable to 
choose to A and unable to A without so choosing, while retaining all 
that she would need to implement such a choice, should she make it. 
Despite lacking the ability to choose to A, the agent might have some set of 
intrinsic properties B such that, if she chose to A and retained B, then her 
choosing to A and her having B would jointly be an agent-complete cause of 
her A-ing.69
So just as before,  it  looks like the analysans  is  not sufficient for the 
truth of the unqualified ability to act. There was another criticism of the 
traditional conditional analysis which I didn’t mention above that aims 
to show that the conditional analysans is in addition not necessary for the 
possession of the ability in question. J. L. Austin’s example of the skilled 
golfer who just misses a short putt appears to be a case where the golfer 
could have holed it in spite of the fact that he didn’t hole it though he tried.  70
Does an analogue of this apply to RCAA as well? Clarke says yes be-
cause the presence or absence of the ‘causal basis of the ability' makes no 
difference here. Vihvelin’s analysis gives the same result on the golf case 
as the original conditional analysis did. 
 Clarke (2009: 329) My italics. 69
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I don’t think the golf putt objection is a criticism of the relevant kind 
here though. That’s because it seems that the ‘could’ in the sentence ‘the 
golfer could have made that putt’ is plausibly the ‘could’ of general abili-
ty and not the ‘all in’ narrow ability that we’re after for free will. The 
sense of ability that’s at issue in the free will debate is not general ability 
and so the golf example doesn’t on the face of it give us an argument to 
say that Vihvelin’s analysis is wrong here. The fact that (as the golf putt 
example  shows)  we  can  retain  general  abilities  during  periods  and 
episodes where we lose the relevant ‘all in’ or narrow ability is widely 
accepted. The man who freezes at the moment when he should play his 
solo despite being a world class musician is a classic example of this kind 
of case. What we would need here is a golf case where the ‘all in’ or nar-
row ability to sink a putt was clearly the sense at issue in the phrase ‘but 
he could have putted it’. I think it’s problematic to imagine such a case 
because the environmental factors that can get in the way between the 
decision to strike the ball a certain way and the final position of the ball 
would seem to make that an inappropriate thing to say in the first place. 
This  point  can  be  appreciated  by  the  comparison  with  the  sense  of 
‘could’ in the other criticism that aimed to show the analysans wasn’t suf-
ficient. The ‘could’ in the sentence ‘the man could have jumped in the 
sea’ is much more plausibly the narrow ‘all in’ ‘could’ at issue here. We 
(arguably) mean something like - right there and then, holding every-
thing else fixed, he could have jumped rather than not jumped - whereas 
this seems at best unlikely for the ‘could’ in the golf putt case. J. L. Austin 
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notoriously argued that we can, in certain contexts, mean the ‘all in’ or 
what I’ve also called the ‘narrow’ sense of ‘could’ in cases such as the 
golf putt but I will set this aside as I think there are more powerful objec-
tions to press here.
Fara’s treatment of these issues is slightly different and is not immedi-
ately subject to analogous criticisms. He offers the following disposition-
al analysis of abilities to act:
(DAA) An agent has the ability to A in circumstances C if and only if 
she has the disposition to A when, in circumstances C, she tries to A.71
He goes on to claim that if dispositions were given a simple condi-
tional analysis, then his DAA would run into the same problems as the 
original conditional analysis. Consequently, Fara rejects that analysis and 
instead leaves dispositions unanalysed in his account of abilities.  This 
might appear surprising but it isn’t necessarily a problem if uncontrover-
sial claims about dispositions are used to deliver and explain our intu-
itive expectations of what’s required by unqualified abilities to act. 
Fara thinks he can get around the problem of Austin’s missed golf 
putt (the problem of the analysans not being necessary for the ability in 
question). According to Fara, DAA allows that the golfer can make the 
putt despite the fact he tried and failed because the golfer’s disposition 
to make the putt when he tries can be subject to masking and conse-
quently, so can his ability to make the putt. I won’t evaluate this move in 
response to the golf putt because as I have said above, I don’t think this 
 Fara (2008: 848)71
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is the appropriate type of criticism for the incompatibilist to make here. I 
think there is a much more clear cut problem with Fara’s proposal given 
the related problem of the analysans not being sufficient for the ability. 
Returning to the man who couldn’t jump in to the sea and the child so 
scared of spiders that she couldn’t even try to lift one, does Fara do any 
better then Vihvelin here? To reiterate,  the problem was that  it  seems 
right to say that the child can’t lift a spider, despite the fact that it might 
be true to say that they would lift one if they tried (on the old conditional 
analysis). The problem was that they couldn’t try given how frightened 
they were.  Analogously for  the man who couldn’t  jump into the sea. 
Fara’s response here is interesting as he says his DAA analysis would 
concur. He concedes that the girl can’t lift the spider and that the man 
can’t jump but this isn’t a problem because the child doesn’t have a dispo-
sition to lift the spider here anyway because her trying to lift a spider is 
impossible. Fara argues that objects don’t have dispositions to do things 
in conditions that can’t be realised. Clarke points out that Fara offers no 
analysis of the type of impossibility that is at issue here but we are given 
examples:
if a rubber ball is nailed to the wall, and so cannot (in the relevant 
sense of “cannot”) be dropped onto the floor, it is no more disposed 
to bounce when it is dropped than it is disposed to melt when it is 
dropped; it simply lacks any dispositions to behave one way or the 
other when it is placed in conditions that it cannot be placed in.72
 Fara (2008: 852)72
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I find this position very counterintuitive and agree with Clarke that 
that ball nailed to the wall does have a disposition to bounce if dropped 
here. The fact it can’t be dropped (even ever) does not seem relevant to 
that claim. Clarke goes on to say:
Likewise, it seems, salt that is permanently sealed in an unbreakable 
container remains soluble, disposed to dissolve if mixed with water, 
even though it cannot be so mixed. (If being so enclosed deprived it 
of solubility, that disposition would not be an intrinsic property.) Sim-
ilarly, two particles might be disposed to interact with each other in a 
certain way despite the fact that they are so short-lived and so distant 
that they cannot be brought into interaction. (Our evidence that they 
have such a disposition might be the actual interactions of pairs of 
intrinsic duplicates of them.) If there is some kind of impossibility of 
manifestation conditions (short of metaphysical or nomological im-
possibility) that precludes possession of a given disposition, Fara has 
not made clear what it is.73
I think these comments are decisive but charitably, Clarke finds an-
other way to press the sufficiency of the analysans worry, independent of 
the examples of not jumping into the sea and picking up spiders. He asks 
us to imagine a case where a man forms an intention to wave but then 
when the time comes, due to a temporary neural glitch, he can’t even try 
to wave, though he would have waved had he managed to try. Does this 
man have a  disposition to  wave when he  tries  to  wave asks  Clarke? 
Clarke describes the following case to help sharpen the intuition that the 
answer to that question is yes. He describes a coffee dispensing machine 
which drops sugar into the coffee when the sugar button is pressed. Due 
to a temporary malfunction with the internal mechanism, the sugar but-
 Clarke (2009: 335)73
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ton is pressed and the sugar is not released. It still seems intuitively cor-
rect to describe the machine as retaining its disposition to drop sugar 
into coffee. Likewise with the man who couldn’t wave due to his neural 
malfunction, he seems to retain the general disposition here. In conclu-
sion, I take these examples from Clarke to show that there is a sense of 
ability, plausibly the one at issue in the free will debate, which is not cap-
tured by the new dispositionalist analyses I have discussed. 
In conclusion then, it seems that criticisms analogous to those that ap-
ply to classic conditional compatibilism do after all apply to the new dis-
positionalist analyses as well.
2.3 A compatibilist ‘could’ that’s neither conditional or disposi-
tional: Christian List and ‘agentive modality’
The attempts  to  give  conditional  and dispositional  analyses  of  ‘could 
have done otherwise’, surveyed in the last two sections, are problematic 
and appear at odds with natural language semantics. However, there are 
still  other  options  for  compatibilists.  An understandable  move at  this 
point might be to give up on alternatives altogether and embrace the 
Frankfurt style strategy. If it was a choice between abandoning compati-
bilism for free will and responsibility scepticism or dropping the alterna-
tive possibilities requirement (assuming that strategy is well motivated), 
many people would and have gone down the latter route. In the second 
half of the twentieth century, many compatibilists adopted the Frankfurt 
strategy given the problems that beset classical conditional compatibil-
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ism. Assuming the new dispositionalist analyses don’t provide us with a 
satisfactory  treatment  of  alternative  possibilities  either  must  we  turn 
away from the requirement? Christian List has recently argued that we 
can and should embrace a compatibilism where alternative possibilities 
are  central  to  free  agency.  Moreover,  he  adopts  an   interpretation  of 
‘could have done otherwise’ where the alternate possibilities are unquali-
fied modalities, as List also rejects classical and new dispositional com-
patibilism. List concedes that embracing a modal interpretation of alter-
nate possibility in this unqualified way might look like a non starter for 
the compatibilist project, as it was precisely the tension between the fact 
that determinism entails there is only one physically possible future and 
the assumption of alternative possible futures that gives rise to the free 
will problem in the fist place. However, the unqualified modal interpre-
tation of ‘could’ is the one List develops and defends. I will outline and 
evaluate List’s argument below.
List ingeniously combines a number of claims which together enable 
him to argue for the position that physical  determinism wouldn’t  de-
prive us of the variety of alternate possibility we need for free will. Be-
fore examining those, it will be useful to revisit the traditional argument 
for incompatibilism in order to set the context for List’s point of depar-
ture. List gives the basic form of argument for leeway incompatibilism as 
follows:
Premise 1: A necessary condition for someone’s action to count as free 
is that the agent can do otherwise.
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Premise 2: Determinism implies that the agent cannot do otherwise.
Conclusion: Either there are no free actions, or determinism is false 
(or both).74
The same basic syllogism underpins van Inwagen’s consequence ar-
gument. List doesn’t challenge the first premise, that has already been 
done by the Frankfurt example strategy and evaluated in chapter one. 
List focusses instead on the second premise. He argues that premise 2 is 
false even when we interpret the ability to do otherwise in an unquali-
fied modal way and not conditionally or dispositionally as I said above. 
With this in mind List specifies the basic argument more precisely:
Premise 1: Free will requires that (at the time of interest) more than 
one alternative course of action is possible for the agent.
Premise 2: Determinism implies that (at the time of interest) only one 
alternative course of action is possible for the agent.
Conclusion: Free will and determinism are incompatible.75
List says that the thesis of determinism is a claim about physical possi-
bility. The truth of physical determinism doesn’t entail the truth of the 
second premise here as that premise is about what’s possible for an agent. 
Premise 2 above would be true if a certain linking assumption was true 
connecting physical and agential possibility. It would have to be the case 
that if at a given time only one sequence of events was physically possi-
ble then, as a consequence of that fact, only one course of events would 
be possible for the agent. List says that this is not generally true. This 
 List (2014: 156)74
 List (2014: 160) My italics.75
!129
claim, that the linking assumption is false is not question begging against 
the definition of determinism precisely because there is a difference be-
tween these two types of possibility,  agential and physical, and therefore 
they can’t be just assumed to run together. 
What is List’s argument for the distinct type of agentive modality be-
ing the salient one here then? His case is built on some basic method-
ological and theoretical assumptions from the philosophy of science and 
the special sciences. Essentially, the claim is that physical possibility is an 
inappropriate level of description (or frame of reference) when we are 
talking about what’s possible for an agent;
When we are interested in whether a particular action is possible for 
an agent, by contrast, the appropriate frame of reference is not the 
one given by fundamental physics, but rather the one given by our 
best theory of human agency. Thus the description of the world that 
matters here is not a (microscopic) physical one, but a (macroscopic) 
psychological one. Candidate theories that provide the right level of 
description include some advanced versions of  psychological  deci-
sion theory, such as those we find in economic psychology or cogni-
tive science, which are currently our best attempts to make scientific 
sense of intentional agency. In fact, even folk psychology outperforms 
physics or neuroscience when it comes to understanding and explain-
ing human behaviour across different domains and outside isolated 
laboratory conditions.76
What exactly is it though that makes the course grained ‘macroscopic’ 
reference  frame  the  one  we  should  be  working  in  when  we  evaluate 
what’s possible for an agent here? List appeals to the natural ontological 
attitude in addition to some claims about supervenience and multiple 
 List (2014: 161-2)76
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realisability of mental states.  Together these claims support the distinc77 -
tion and the point that the agentive and not the physical modality is the 
relevant type of possibility when thinking about an agent’s options. The 
natural ontological attitude is the idea that we should posit the theoreti-
cal commitments of our most successful theories as real, as existing in the 
world. For example, in fundamental physics, if electrons and quarks are 
part  of  the  scientific  model  that  allows us  to  most  accurately  explain 
what’s going on in the physical world then electrons and quarks really 
exist. In a similar vein, when we are modelling and analysing human be-
haviour in the social sciences, the most successful theories are decision 
and social choice theory. Crucially, those theories posit the ability to se-
lect options from sets of possibilities on the basis of rational deliberation. 
That feature is part of the theoretical apparatus that allows us to best 
model and make sense of human behaviour. Analogously then, the reali-
ty of agents choosing options from sets of alternate possibilities is conse-
quently brought about. This is what allows us to say free will exists just 
like electrons exist! In this instance, it’s a higher level (special sciences) 
phenomenon - an ontology akin to desire and belief. List says that, “… 
Free will, in the technical sense of an agent’s having a choice between 
more than one course of action in many situations, is a key presupposi-
tion of our best scientific theories of agency, at least when these theories 
 On the natural ontological attitude see Quine, W. V. O. (1977) Ontological 77
Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press and Fine, A. 
(1984) “The Natural Ontological Attitude”, in J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 83-107.
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are  understood literally.”  So it’s  because the agentive modalities  are 78
part  of  our  most  successful  theories  about  human behaviour  that  we 
should focus on those modalities, rather than on (microscopic) physical 
possibility. The microphysical scientific reference frame is not one where 
we have anything like success in modelling human behaviour. It is virtu-
ally impossible to explain even basic human behaviour in microphysical 
terms.  You need a supercomputer,  Laplace’s  demon or God and even 
then the content of those physical statements wouldn’t obviously trans-
late into understandable propositions in terms of agency as there are ad-
ditional worries about whether one can map and translate higher-level 
descriptions  from microphysical  ones.  This  is  what  underwrites  List’s 
claim that we should work with agentive, not microphysical modality. I 
will not here criticise anything List says about multiple realisability and 
the supervenience of agential states on the microphysical states of the 
brain. I wish to grant all the latter for the purposes of argument. Like-
wise with the toy model List develops to demonstrate how the agentive 
modalities might supervene on the physical modalities. I agree List has 
successfully shown how in principle higher level indeterminism can su-
pervene on a system which is deterministic at a lower level of description 
or frame of reference.  The key question however, is whether the seman79 -
tics of that higher level agential indeterminism List argues for are what 
we need to speak to the traditional free problem. I shall focus on two is-
 List (2014: 168)78
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sues here. Firstly, I will examine the status of the free will List claims ex-
ists given our best theories of human behaviour and folk psychology and 
develop a new line of argument that shows it  doesn’t follow that this 
kind of free will is appropriately connected up with the conditions on 
moral responsibility, as any concept of free will must be if it is to be rele-
vant to the core issue at the heart of the traditional problem of free will 
and moral responsibility. That is to say there is a gap in the argument 
here that must be plugged. Secondly, I will develop a new argument that 
directly challenges the claim that the agentive modalities as List expli-
cates and defends them are coextensive with our ordinary language con-
cepts of free will (and consequently moral responsibility). Specifically, I 
will develop and outline a case where, in spite of what List claims, facts 
about the microphysical level of description are intuitively pertinent and 
constraining on what can be said to be possible for agents at the psycho-
logical  course  grained level  of  description.  If  my second argument  is 
sound then the incompatibilist will be in a position to not only claim that 
List’s ‘agentive possibility’ is not necessarily our ordinary language con-
cept at issue in the free will debate, but in addition, that our everyday 
concept of free will is still incompatible with microphysical determinism. 
I now turn to these two arguments.
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2.4 First response to List: The ontology of free will and the link 
with moral responsibility
I now wish to examine in more detail what the metaphysical status of 
free will arrived at in the way List sets out amounts to. On this account, 
we can’t  view free  will  merely  instrumentally  –  as  a  useful  tool  that 
doesn’t have any ontological significance (an analogue of the instrumen-
tal view in the philosophy of science). List specifically rules this out be-
cause  he  thinks  the  natural  ontological  attitude  forces  us  to  take  our 
commitment to agentive modalities at ‘face value’.  Instrumentalism of 
this kind would be another ‘ontological option’ here if we’re considering 
the analogous possibilities from the philosophy of the physical sciences. 
However, once again, I won’t challenge this point for the purposes of ar-
gument as what I want to say still applies when we do embrace the spe-
cial science ontology of freedom in the way List wants us to.
The first thing to note is that the ontology of free will generated by the 
application of the naturalistic ontological attitude to the special sciences 
and social choice theory need be no thicker than the theories making use 
of the term require in order that they constitute successful theories. Given that 
rational choice theory is trying to model and explain why we act as we 
do and how we should act given our desires and goals etc, it seems un-
contentious that the modal notions it makes use of need not be those of 
(or make reference to) microphysical possibility, instead course grained 
phycological descriptions are sufficient here. Microphysical descriptions 
are in fact inappropriate, not merely unnecessary. To say this is not to 
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make the instrumental move either. The point is rather that the relevant 
entities such as ‘choice over option sets’ can enable the theories in ques-
tion to work to their full potential without needing to be metaphysically 
anything over and above an agential-psychological phenomenon. Specif-
ically, we don’t need the notion of ‘choice over alternatives’ that’s in play 
when we’re working in social choice theory to require the truth of physi-
cal incompatibilism. If we’re trying to model the rationality of behaviour, 
then we can do it successfully with a thinner agential (compatibilist) no-
tion of choice over alternatives.
With all this in place I can proceed to give my arguments against List. 
These are motivated by questioning whether his sense of free will is: (i) 
the same as our ordinary language sense, (ii) what we want, or, (iii) the 
one we need? In short, is List’s free will the free will that’s traditionally at 
issue in the free will debate?
A worry — what are the ordinary language semantics of ‘can’ or ‘could 
have done otherwise’? 
I wish to press the point that in order for List’s argument to constitute a 
successful defence of compatibilism about our concepts of free will and 
responsibility, he must go on to demonstrate that the truth conditions of 
the natural ontological attitude (NOA) generated sense of free will are 
coextensive with our ordinary language sense. The key point here is that 
it doesn’t follow from the fact that we can derive an ontology of free will 
in the way that List describes that that sense of free will is the same as 
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our ordinary language notion of free will, i.e. the sense at issue in the free 
will debate. That is, it doesn’t follow from his NOA argument that the 
everyday sense in which we think agents can do otherwise than they do 
is underwritten by the compatibilist modal semantics that List develops 
in his toy model. This is because List’s central argument is not an analy-
sis  of  the  semantics  of  ordinary  language  terms  but  is  instead  built 
around the deployment of a theoretical (methodological) device, namely 
the NOA, which tells us what we should and shouldn’t have in our ontol-
ogy given our best theories of agency. I don’t wish to take issue here with 
the use of the NOA, I’m instead claiming that there is a gap in the argu-
ment unless we are shown that List’s free will is the same as the ordinary 
language concept. 
That said, List does very briefly discuss the ordinary language issue in 
section six of the paper. He notes that the present analysis is broadly con-
sistent with some accounts of  the ordinary meaning of ‘can.’  He then 
goes through some examples from Angelika Kratzer’s account from the 
1970s, and mentions work by Ann Whittle and John Maier on the agen-
tive modalities. In response, my point is simply that none of these argu-
ments are uncontentious. A much more thorough analysis is required. 
Perhaps it might be said that because List has put a compatibilist modal 
semantics on the table, the ball is in the incompatibilist critic’s court giv-
en the burden of proof in the dialectic. I concede that this would indeed 
be the case if  List’s modal semantics had been derived from ordinary 
language analysis but they’re not. Furthermore, as I shall demonstrate in 
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the second argument below, we have good reason to think that the ‘agen-
tive’ modal semantics List develops are not coextensive with our ordi-
nary language usage. 
At this point in the discussion it is worth remembering the distinction 
between the two types of compatibilism I outlined in the introduction: 
diagnostic and prescriptive. It seems that List isn’t exactly clear which of 
these camps (or both) his project falls into. On the one hand the method-
ology of using the NOA might be seen as falling under the prescriptive 
heading. List’s telling us we have reason to adopt a certain sense of free 
will independent of the conceptual analysis of ordinary language. On the 
other hand he does engage in diagnostic work here, precisely because he 
mentions the Kratzer semantics and is at pains to point out this is evi-
dence that his analysis accords with ordinary usage. Towards the end of 
the paper and pertinent to this issue, List discusses what we should do if 
it was discovered that determinism were true and we woke up to the 
morning  papers  with  headlines  announcing  the  fact.  In  that  circum-
stance, after considering options like ceasing with responsibility practices 
and the institution of punishment or in fact carrying on much as before, 
he says; 
Surely we would do the latter:  giving up our conventional  under-
standing of free will and revising the very fabric of how human soci-
ety works would be an overreaction. The approach to free will offered 
in this paper shows why this is so. The mildest revision of our techni-
cal vocabulary—namely the shift from physical to agential possibility 
in  the  analysis  of  free  will—is  sufficient  to  rehabilitate  practically 
everything we conventionally believe and say about free will, even 
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against the background of determinism. For this reason, my proposal 
seems to have common sense on its side.
In conclusion, I suggest that the best way to defend the compatibility 
of free will  and determinism is to recognize that free will  is  not a 
physical phenomenon, but a higher-level phenomenon on a par with 
other familiar higher-level phenomena such as beliefs,  desires,  and 
intentions. If we are searching for free will at the level of fundamental 
physics, we are simply searching in the wrong place.80
The phrase “mildest revision to our technical vocabulary” is telling 
here. Revision would imply that List’s concept of free will is not exactly 
the same as the one we have been using? If he is happy to accept that the 
concept he advocates isn’t quite the same as we find in ordinary practice, 
why is it so important to discuss the Kratzer semantics? Still, in defence 
of  the latter  discussion,  presumably the milder the revision the better 
here and so just because a project is revisionist that doesn’t mean that 
concern with ordinary usage evaporates. However,  even if such revision 
is mild, we need to know whether the revision licenses the continued 
deployment of the family of concepts and practices that free will is taken 
to be connected up with in our ordinary beliefs and practices here. In 
short, we must discuss the link with responsibility. 
The central issue in the free will debate is whether in a deterministic 
universe we would have the type of control relevant to moral responsi-
bility. My claim is that after the application of the natural ontological atti-
tude to rational choice theory, List still needs an argument to establish 
 List (2014: 174)80
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that his resultant ontology of free will is sufficient for moral responsibili-
ty. 
Traditional compatibilist analyses of ‘could have done otherwise’ in 
ordinary language automatically resolve this worry about responsibility 
(if they are successful). This is because the ordinary language concept of 
moral responsibility is linked to our ability to do otherwise in such a 
fashion that if  we can be shown to have the latter (in a deterministic 
world) then we may (under the right conditions) be justified in predicat-
ing the concept of responsibility of particular actions and people. In or-
dinary language analysis, if we have shown something about free will 
then we have also at the same time shown something about a necessary 
condition of moral responsibility. But, in close analogy with what I have 
said above, the free will List has argued for must still be shown to be suf-
ficient for moral responsibility because it’s not obvious that it’s the same 
as that necessary condition of responsibility deployed in ordinary dis-
course. 
Interestingly this worry remains even for those who are not particular-
ly concerned about whether List’s free will is coextensive with our ordi-
nary language sense of free will. Why? This is because you still have to 
show that List’s freedom is sufficient to hold someone responsible (even 
if you’re a revisionist about the concept of responsibility as well!) Imag-
ine for example, a person very impressed with the NOA argument, who 
concedes that List has shown us a robust sense in which we can be said 
to  have  free  will.  Such a  person may (indeed must)  still  intelligently 
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question whether it makes sense to hold people morally responsible for 
their actions in a physically deterministic world. 
The reason why there is room for me to make this criticism indepen-
dently of the worry about ordinary language semantics is because the 
special science theories that posit free will in List’s sense don’t obviously 
try to model our practice of holding agents morally responsible. Hence 
more argument is  needed to establish that  List’s  ontology of  freedom 
should stop people worrying about the threat determinism might pose to 
moral responsibility. What rational choice theory does is model the ratio-
nality of agents given certain goals and desires they have. It models how 
we should act given our desires, resources, abilities etc. But why should 
we expect that the theoretic entities that special science theory commits 
us to would also be related in the right sort of way to our notion of moral 
responsibility? The problem is that those models, i.e. social choice theory, 
don’t  seem to  make any assumptions,  one way or  another,  regarding 
whether the sense of choice at issue in them is also the kind of choice that 
would be sufficient for the control condition on moral responsibility. In 
summary then, it may well be true that decision theory uses a notion of 
choice  that  commits  us  to  the reality  of  alternate  possibilities.  In  that 
sense List may well be right that we can be said to be free, or have free 
will. All of this said, it does not follow that the notion of freedom or free 
will that is relevant to these successful social science theories that List 
bases his argument on is the notion of free will that is relevant to the  free 
will debate. List needs to give us an answer to these questions.
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 Note that I’m not saying that ordinary language analysis is crucial for 
any successful argument in this domain. The same point as I  develop 
above must also be answered by those who advocate a revised concep-
tion of moral responsibility. Another way of proceeding would be to es-
tablish that the free will generated by List is connected up in the right 
kind of way with our practice of moral responsibility as we should con-
ceive it (even if that too is a revised concept). That is, if it could be estab-
lished that we should embrace control requirements for moral responsi-
bility and it was true that those requirements were instantiated by List’s 
account of free will, that might be a way of vindicating List’s position.
2.5 Second response to List: Microphysical modality is relevant to 
assessing claims about what agents can and can’t do
So far I have tried to develop an immanent critique of List’s position by 
showing that even if we grant him his set up and resultant ontology of 
free will, this might not be what we were after or in fact need given our 
responsibility practices. I now wish to develop a different line of criticism 
concerning the relations between the physical and agentive modalities. 
According to List, in a deterministic world where there is only one phys-
ically possible future, it can be nevertheless true to say that an agent can 
do otherwise.  Leaving aside the arguments for this position and their 
shortcomings (that was the focus of the first argument above), I will con-
sider  some  consequences  that  microphysical  facts  appear  to  have  on 
!141
what we intuitively take ourselves (described at the agential  frame of 
reference) to be capable of.
Suppose I’m at the counter in the canteen and I’m trying to decide be-
tween chocolate cake and fruit salad. It will be true, barring any funny 
business, to say that I could have taken the fruit salad when I in fact take 
the chocolate cake. The ‘could’ in the last sentence is the ‘could’ of agen-
tive possibility. But we may wonder about the microphysical bases on 
which these different ‘agential’ choices are supposed to supervene. On 
List’s model,  What about the physical supervenience bases of these dif-
ferent choices? On List’s model, the supervenience base for the counter-
factual choice of taking the fruit salad was physically impossible, given 
that the chocolate cake supervenience base was determined to be the case 
instead. This is because when we are evaluating what’s possible at the 
micro-physical level, it is physical possibility that is relevant, not agen-
tial. So, given the distinction between the different types of possibility 
here List is bound to say that you could have chosen the fruit salad de-
spite it also being the case that the physical base that would have realised 
that alternative decision was (physically) impossible. Is this problematic? 
To insist it is (without argument) is to simply beg the question against 
List’s position here. After all, List has argued for that distinction and giv-
en reasons why it is the agential perspective or frame of reference that is 
the relevant one here. He has also explained how the different types of 
possibility are related in his toy supervenience model and hence why 
they needn’t run together here. Nevertheless it seems legitimate to say 
!142
that his position is very counterintuitive. It is surely natural to think that 
when I make claims about what I can do at the agential level, on the as-
sumption that  I’m a physicalist,  I  am also committed to the superve-
nience bases of these different choices being physically possible. List seems 
to deny this and it is hard to understand how that can be right.
It might well be objected here that all my complaint amounts to is that 
List’s position is counterintuitive. And, perhaps, in pointing to this as a 
problem I am simply demonstrating that I am still in the grip of the very 
modal confusion List was addressing. On the other hand, it does seem 
like the most natural thing in the world to insist that the physical super-
venience bases for my agentive possibilities must be physically possible 
whenever the agentive possibility is there. Again though, this might just 
be a statement of the confusion when we talk in the same sentence across 
reference frames here. If something like that is right, at the very least one 
would welcome some more explanation from List as to why this com-
mon modal assumption is made, why it seems so natural and what ex-
actly is mistaken about it. Perhaps he might say that have a deep (and yet 
mistaken) implicit view that the microscopic physical frame of reference 
is somehow ‘more real’ than the agential, or something of this kind, and 
maybe that may well be right. However, List has not provided enough 
to dispel this very natural line of response here.
 In the mean time, I think it is possible to strengthen the objection that 
List’s  position is  counterintuitive and argue that there is  a substantial 
problem here.  On the other hand I will now go on to argue that there is a 
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real problem here. I present this below in a new line of argument which 
concerns the locations in space time of the microphysical particles that 
make up our bodies. Even then, this argument may further illustrate that 
i am still in the grip of the modal confusion List claims is at the heart of 
incompatibilist  thinking.  But the argument may also demonstrate that 
List’s position is not convincing.
The ‘physical information machine’ argument
As outlined above, List claims that the correct frame of reference for as-
sessing claims about agential possibilities is not the microphysical one 
and so the truth of determinism would not mean agents couldn’t do oth-
er than they in fact do even if microphysical determinism is true. My ar-
gument is intended to put pressure on that claim. I have already said that 
it seems weird to be committed to saying that an agent can do otherwise 
(all described with reference to the agential frame of reference) and yet 
hold at  the same time that  the physical  supervenience bases  of  those 
agential alternatives are physically impossible (given the current state of 
the world and the laws etc).  I  will  now develop this point further by 
means of an example.
Imagine that you are trying to decide whether or not to go and visit 
your friend at the weekend in Manchester. You live in London and, at the 
agential frame of reference there is nothing that would prevent this. You 
have the money, you would be welcome, you’re not so unwell that you 
couldn’t travel to Manchester etc. You can also stay in London if you so 
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choose. At the course grained agential frame of reference there is nothing 
stoping you either way. It’s Friday night and you are wondering what to 
do in the morning, specifically wondering whether you should go or not. 
You think (correctly, according to List’s model) that you could visit Man-
chester or you could stay. In this case imagined the crucial modal claim 
you make on Friday night is that ‘I could go to Manchester’. Now sup-
pose that physical determinism is true at your world and you don’t end 
up going, and instead stay in London to work. Now, you also just so 
happen to have access to a ‘physical information machine’. This machine 
can’t  communicate in anything other than the microphysical  reference 
frame but it can print out a perfectly accurate set of microphysical coor-
dinates for where the microphysical particles that constitute your body 
will be in space time at any point in time. Imagine that on Friday, you 
request a print out telling you where your set of particles will be tomor-
row. The machine prints out a form that tells you the particles in your 
body will be in London all weekend. (We can stipulate into the example 
that the machine has the means to represent the area of space time we 
call “London” and its space time coordinates in relation to that part of 
space time we label as “Manchester” etc.) According to List this micro-
physical fact (its truth arising from the way in which the single line of 
physical possibility is playing out at your determined world) does not 
falsify the agential  claim you make on Friday night when you say “I 
could go to Manchester tomorrow”. But that now seems manifestly false: 
I claim that it seems that it does exactly that - how could you go to Man-
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chester if the atoms that make up your body were always going to be in 
London at the weekend? Physical information about where your body is 
going to be in space time (described physically) is relevant to agential 
claims. You can’t (at least in this life) go somewhere without your body 
in tow. If this is correct then it is not the case that determinism at the mi-
crophysical frame of reference is irrelevant to modal claims at the agen-
tial frame.
The  above  thought  experiment  is  generalisable  to  any  decision  an 
agent is going to make where they think they are choosing from a range 
of options. This thought experiment seems to constitute a strong case for 
saying that our ordinary language claims about what it’s possible for us 
to do are threatened by the truth of microphysical determinism.   
What could be said in response to this thought experiment here? It 
might be said that my machine is not an innocent stipulation, given the 
problems of formulating bridge laws between subvenient and superve-
nient reference frames (as Fodor discusses) and that consequently I can’t 
assume that the information on the print out would be interpretable in 
such a way that you would be able to deduce ‘my atoms will be in Lon-
don tomorrow’ etc.  In response to this worry we can imagine a possible 81
world as follows. Each microphysical particle that exists (and that is sub-
ject to the strict deterministic microphysical laws) has been uniquely la-
 see in particular: Fodor. (1974), “Special sciences (or: The disunity of science 81
as a working hypothesis)”, Synthese 28 (2), pp. 97–115, and Putnam. (1975) “Phi-
losophy and our mental life”, in Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: C.U.P.
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belled by God. God has made the world including the machine. The ma-
chine has a microphysical GPS that can tell where the machine is situated 
in space time. It also has an ‘airport style’ body scanner that can scan 
your body and detect the uniquely labelled atoms in your body. Given 
the  machine  is  programmed  to  know  the  initial  starting  state  of  the 
world  for  each numbered particle  and the  future  coordinates  of  each 
numbered  particle  given  the  laws,  the  machine  can  tell  you  that  the 
atoms labelled in your body (the ones just scanned in the machine) will 
not be more than 10 miles from where the machine currently is for the 
next 24 hours. If the machine is in London then you know your body is 
not going to be in Manchester tomorrow. It has been determined from 
the dawn of time that the atoms that constitute your body will  be no 
more than 10 miles from the machine (which is in London). However, 
List’s  account has it  that  consistent with all  this,  you can go to Man-
chester tomorrow. That seems wholly implausible.
Perhaps it might be said that I am still equivocating between the agen-
tial and physical frames here. It is one thing to say that the particles con-
stitutive of my body described purely physically can’t be in a certain part 
of space tomorrow but that doesn’t mean that I can’t go to Manchester. The 
latter sentence is explicitly not to be assessed in terms of microphysical 
possibility according to List. Is the very equivocation List was outlining 
still implicit in my argument here then? In response, it’s not obvious why 
we should think that my given my example is explicitly making a dis-
tinction between the different frames and kind of information they can 
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provide. Given certain physical information, it seems I can make deduc-
tions about what is possible for me as an agent in the world described 
non-scientifically. List needs to explain away this powerful intuition. It is 
difficult to see how he can without simply arguing that we should be only 
using agential possibility here. But that is not the point at issue in the 
traditional  diagnostic  free  will  debate.  Hard-Incompatibilists  may  well 
agree with him that we should understand agential possibility in the way 
List outlines but the thought experiment suggests that we do in fact think 
microphysical properties (in this case spatial location) are relevant to as-
sessing claims about what agents can do.
There is another related argument here that is simpler and less prone 
to worries  about how the machine could talk in terms that  we could 
‘read off’ properties like ‘in London’ or ‘in Manchester’ from. Imagine 
the same case where you decide to stay in London rather than go to 
Manchester at the weekend. On Monday you learn that microphysical 
determinism is true. Armed with this knowledge you now know that the 
atoms that make up your body couldn’t have been anywhere other than 
they have been in space time in the past. Worries about spatio-temporal 
information bridging aside, you now know for sure (i) that your constitu-
tive atoms haven’t been to that part of space time we call “Manchester’ at 
the weekend. But now we also know (due to determinism), (ii) that those 
atoms couldn’t have been there and so we again arrive at the claim, (iii) If 
I can’t go to places that my atoms can’t go to then I couldn’t have gone to 
Manchester. 
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In conclusion, I have argued for two claims in this section. Firstly I 
have shown that even granting that List can demonstrate we do posses 
free will in the sense of being able to chose from among agential possibil-
ities, it is not clear, and it does not follow from List’s arguments that this 
sense is the sense of free will at issue in the traditional debate, i.e.  the 
sense that we standardly conceive of as the control condition relevant to 
moral responsibility. If so, then in spite of his original and ingenious spe-
cial  science  methodological  argument  and  his  formal  supervenience 
model, List’s ‘free will’ doesn’t (without further argument) appropriately 
speak to the free will problem. Secondly, I argued that our intuitive un-
derstanding of  the  relationship between ourselves  as  agents  and our-
selves as physical entities composed of the particles that are the subject 
matter of microscopic physics puts further pressure on List’s claims and 
is  evidence  that  we  cannot  combine  microphysical  determinism  with 




3. The threat to compatibilism independent of the issue of 
alternative possibilities
3.1 Can agents be the ‘source’ of their actions in the sense re-
quired for moral responsibility if determinism is true?
In the first two chapters of this thesis I examined issues concerning alter-
nate possibilities and moral responsibility. The first chapter was devoted 
to  arguments  that  tried  to  establish  alternatives  weren’t  required  for 
moral responsibility and the second chapter examined arguments to the 
effect that the kind of alternative possibilities required for responsibility 
are in fact consistent with the truth of determinism. I argued that both 
these different projects fail. However, even if either of these arguments 
had been successful (i.e. managed to put to rest the leeway worry), any 
resulting compatibilist theory would still have to face up to a different 
challenge from the incompatibilist: the source worry. The relationship be-
tween determinism and the source and leeway worries is not as it might 
at first appear. For instance, it might be thought that if alternative possi-
bilities were not required then the purported threat of determinism to 
freedom and responsibility is at once removed. After all, if we don’t need 
any ‘wiggle room’ in the actual sequence why would we require inde-
terminism? However, it doesn’t follow that determinism is no threat even 
!150
if we don’t require alternatives. The source worry is about whether we 
can have the kind of control relevant to moral responsibility if the causes 
of our actions ultimately trace back to factors and forces beyond our con-
trol. This last sentence is of course vague and contains words subject to 
both compatibilist  and incompatibilist  readings (for  example;  ‘control’ 
and ‘ultimate’ here are crucially at issue in the debate). Those are the is-
sues at the heart of the source worry. Nevertheless, the point now is that 
these worries can still be pertinent for someone who has rejected the al-
ternative possibilities requirement. On the contrary, a similar burden lies 
with someone adopting a compatibilist reading of alternative possibility. 
Armed with a sense of ‘could’ consistent with determinism and a good 
argument for it still isn’t obviously to have the means to immediately re-
ject the source worry. In both cases, it still makes sense to ask whether 
determinism would rob you of the control salient to responsibility if all 
your actions were traceable to events in the distant past coupled with the 
laws of nature. This worry can be motivated regardless of your position 
on alternative possibilities. Pereboom is a good example of someone who 
has rejected the need for alternatives as a result of the Frankfurt strategy 
(his buffer cases) but who maintains incompatibilism as a result of the 
source worry.  Although it  is  fair  to  say that  the most  immediate  and 
widely discussed issue linked with the threat of determinism is the prob-
lem of  alternative  possibilities,  the  free  will  literature  also  contains  a 
broad family of related arguments that make determinism a threat with-
out mentioning alternatives at all. The so called direct arguments, ultima-
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cy arguments and manipulation arguments all proceed in this way. Direct 
arguments run roughly as follows: the laws of nature and the past states 
of the world jointly determine the current state of the world including 
your actions.  You are not responsible for the past states nor the laws, 
therefore you are not responsible for the current state including your ac-
tions. See Peter Van Inwagen (1983) for the classic formalised version of 
the  direct  argument.  Ultimacy  arguments  make  use  of  the  same core 
worry about source-hood. See Robert Kane (1996), Martha Klein (1990) 
and Galen Strawson (1986, 2010) for examples of ultimacy arguments. 
Klein captures the main idea when she says, “… Agents should be ulti-
mately responsible for their morally relevant decisions or choices —“ul-
timately” in the sense that nothing for which they are not also responsi-
ble should be the source [or cause] of their decisions or choices.” (1990, p. 
51).  Galen Strawson develops arguments based on a very demanding 
idea of being ultimately responsible using a notion of U - freedom (see in 
particular his 2010, Appendix G, p 291). Manipulation arguments on the 
other hand proceed by arguing that there is no relevant difference be-
tween a case of a manipulated agent (where we have a clear intuition of 
non responsibility due to the agent not being in control) and everyday 
normal deterministic agents (hence we should conclude people are not 
responsible if determinism is true). Pereboom (2001, 2014) had developed 
a detailed multi stage manipulation argument to this effect. In summary 
then, it should be clear that embracing the Frankfurt strategy, or on the 
other hand adopting a form of leeway compatibilism does not necessari-
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ly give you the means to reject a direct, ultimacy or manipulation argu-
ment. All these arguments must be addressed on their own terms which 
don’t mention alternative possibilities at all.
I will not discuss direct or ultimacy arguments in this thesis and in-
stead focus on manipulation arguments designed to show that if deter-
minism is true we can’t be the source of our actions in the way required 
for moral responsibility. The most sophisticated manipulation argument 
in the literature is Derk Pereboom’s four case argument. I will outline 
and evaluate the four case argument in the rest of this chapter and dis-
cuss how compatibilists might respond to it. The four case argument is 
difficult to evaluate properly in so far as assessing it requires carefully 
situating it against the background dialectical burdens between incom-
patibilist  and  compatibilist.  Once  these  background  dialectical  issues 
have been made explicit it should be easier to assess the status of the in-
tuitive reactions to the different cases Pereboom gives us but without 
such careful background stage setting the four case argument is apt to 
result in a quick stalemate with both sides in the debate running the cas-
es in the direction that suits their position. This diagnosis will hopefully 
be borne out in the following discussion of the argument.
The key to any manipulation case is to coherently describe a situation 
where all the compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility are satis-
fied and yet intuitively the agent is not morally responsible. It’s therefore 
important that the part of the story that elicits the intuition of non re-
sponsibility  does  not  at  the  same  time  undercut  basic  conditions  of 
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agency in such a way that the agent in question is immediately disquali-
fied from being a candidate for performing intentional voluntary action. 
If that were the case then rather than being a specific challenge to a com-
patibilist theory we would simply have a description of non agency and 
the predictable intuition of non responsibility to go along with it. How-
ever, if a manipulation case is made coherent then the compatibilist must 
either respond by modifying their account and pointing out that in fact 
there is another condition on responsibility which is violated in the ex-
ample or, alternatively, by biting the bullet and arguing that the agent is 
in fact responsible, contrary to intuition. Such a case as this, if made co-
herent, would constitute a simple challenge to the sufficiency of a set of 
compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility but it would not on its 
own be an argument to the effect that determinism rules out the relevant 
type of  control  necessary for moral  responsibility.  Consequently,  Pere-
boom’s four case argument starts with a manipulation case as described 
above (case 1) and then proceeds to describe other cases, which by de-
gree become the ordinary deterministic world (case 4) in which agents go 
about  their  business  in  the normal  way without  any manipulation or 
other interference. Pereboom then argues that there is no relevant differ-
ence between the early cases involving manipulation and the later ordi-
nary deterministic cases cases that would allow us to conclude that while 
the agents in the early cases were not responsible the agents in a normal 
deterministic situation are. Specifically, he argues that the best explana-
tion of the non-responsibility intuition in the early cases (1 and 2) was the 
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fact that the agent’s actions were causally determined by factors beyond 
their control and that we should therefore apply this same reasoning to 
the normal deterministic cases (3 and 4) and conclude that determinism 
rules out moral responsibility. The four case argument is outlined below.
3.2 Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument
All of the four cases involve Professor Plum deliberating and then de-
ciding to kill White. The first case is supposed to be a scenario where it is 
very  intuitive  (to  both  incompatibilists  and  compatibilists  alike)  that 
Plum is not responsible:
Case 1: A team of neuroscientists has the ability to manipulate Plum’s 
neural states at any time by radio-like technology. In this particular 
case, they do so by pressing a button just before he begins to reason 
about his situation, which they know will produce in him a neural 
state  that  realizes  a  strongly  egoistic  reasoning process,  which the 
neuroscientists know will  deterministically result in his decision to 
kill White. Plum would not have killed White had the neuroscientists 
not intervened, since his reasoning would then not have been suffi-
ciently egoistic to produce this decision. But at the same time, Plum’s 
effective first-order desire to kill White conforms to his second-order 
desires. In addition, his process of deliberation from which the deci-
sion results is reasons-responsive; in particular, this type of process 
would have resulted in Plum’s refraining from deciding to kill White 
in certain situations in which his reasons were different. His reason-
ing is consistent with his character because it is frequently egoistic 
and sometimes strongly so. Still, it is not in general exclusively egois-
tic,  because  he  sometimes  successfully  regulates  his  behavior  by 
moral  reasons,  especially  when  the  egoistic  reasons  are  relatively 
weak. Plum is also not constrained to act as he does, for he does not 
act because of an irresistible desire – the neuroscientists do not induce 
a desire of this sort.82
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Pereboom is quick to claim about case 1 that Plum meets all the stan-
dard conditions familiar from the history of compatibilism. For example, 
given Hume’s requirements, the action is not out of character for Plum 
and the motivating desire  is  not  irresistible.  Similarly,  with respect  to 
Frankfurt’s own hierarchical view, the effective desire to murder White 
conforms to the higher order desires Plum has in the right kind of way. 
Plum also satisfies the conditions for reasons-responsiveness in Fischer 
and Ravizza’s theory as the relevant desires can still be be conditioned by 
the rational consideration of reasons for action. To satisfy R. Jay Wallace, 
Plum can regulate his behaviour by consideration of moral reasons. Fur-
thermore,  Plum  has  the  ability  to  reflectively  revise  and  develop  his 
moral  character  over  time,  given the  commitments  of  Mele  and Haji. 
Plum allegedly meets these conditions in all four of the different cases in 
Pereboom’s argument. 
I find it intuitive that Plum is not morally responsible for killing White 
in case 1. Pereboom points out that one possible explanation for this is 
that Plum’s decision is causally determined by the scientists and hence 
beyond his control. What about case 2?
Case 2: Plum is just like an ordinary human being, except that a team 
of neuroscientists programmed him at the beginning of his life so that 
his reasoning is often but not always egoistic (as in Case 1), and at 
times strongly so, with the intended consequence that in his current 
circumstances he is causally determined to engage in the egoistic rea-
sons-responsive process of deliberation and to have the set  of first 
and  second-order  desires  that  result  in  his  decision  to  kill  White. 
Plum has the general ability to regulate his actions by moral reasons, 
but in his circumstances, due to the strongly egoistic nature of his de-
liberative reasoning, he is causally determined to make his decision to 
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kill. Yet he does not decide as he does because of an irresistible desire. 
The neural realization of his reasoning process and of his decision is 
exactly the same as it is in Case 1 (although their causal histories are 
different).83
I think it’s also intuitive that Plum is not morally responsible in this 
second case as well. In case 2, the manipulation is in the pre-program-
ming so that the relevant piece of egoistic reasoning occurs at the right 
time. No intervention in Plum’s neural processes occurs during the de-
liberation as in case 1. But it’s surely natural to think that the time differ-
ence doesn’t matter, how could such a time lag matter with respect to the 
question of whether or not the agent had the kind of control required? 
Apart from the time lag the actual sequence plays out in exactly the same 
way in both cases 1 and 2. Again, one obvious candidate explanation for 
why Plum in case 2 is not responsible is that his action was causally de-
termined by factors beyond his control.  Both in cases 1 and 2, the in-
stances  of  manipulation  -  local  and  remote  -  causally  determine  that 
Plum decides to kill White. 
Cases 3 and 4 move away from manipulation altogether and describe 
more familiar scenarios. The role of these cases is not to illicit the intu-
ition of non responsibility (that is precisely is what is contested in these 
cases between compatibilist and incompatibilist) but instead to make it 
clear that if a compatibilist wishes to hold Plum responsible in cases 3 
and 4 they better be able to draw a principled distinction between these 
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scenarios and cases 1 and 2. This is exactly what Pereboom claims cannot 
be done. 
Case 3:  Plum is an ordinary human being, except that the training 
practices of his community causally determined the nature of his de-
liberative reasoning processes so that they are frequently but not ex-
clusively rationally egoistic (the resulting nature of his deliberative 
reasoning processes are exactly as they are in Cases 1 and 2).  This 
training was completed before he developed the ability to prevent or 
alter these practices. Due to the aspect of his character produced by 
this training, in his present circumstances he is causally determined 
to engage in the strongly egoistic reasons-responsive process of delib-
eration and to have the first and second-order desires that issue in his 
decision to kill White. While Plum does have the general ability to 
regulate his behavior by moral reasons, in virtue of this aspect of his 
character and his circumstances he is causally determined to make his 
immoral decision, although he does not decide as he does due to an 
irresistible desire. The neural realization of his deliberative reasoning 
process and of the decision is just as it is in Cases 1 and 2.84
In order for the compatibilist to claim Plum is responsible in case 3, 
they must explain what necessary condition on responsibility is not met 
in cases 1 and 2 but is met in case 3. Pereboom claims it is difficult to see 
what this might be. Finally we have a ‘normal deterministic world’ sce-
nario with no manipulation, funny business or problematic upbringing 
for Plum:
Case 4:  Everything that happens in our universe is  causally deter-
mined by virtue of its past states together with the laws of nature. 
Plum is an ordinary human being, raised in normal circumstances, 
and again his reasoning processes are frequently but not exclusively 
egoistic, and sometimes strongly so (as in Cases 1–3). His decision to 
kill  White  issues  from his  strongly  egoistic  but  reasons-responsive 
process of deliberation, and he has the specified first and second-or-
der desires. The neural realization of Plum’s reasoning process and 
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decision is exactly as it is in Cases 1–3; he has the general ability to 
grasp, apply, and regulate his actions by moral reasons, and it is not 
because of an irresistible desire that he decides to kill.85
There seems even less scope for making a distinction between cases 3 
and 4 on the basis of the violation of some necessary condition on re-
sponsibility.  Hence we appear compelled to treat cases alike and con-
clude  that  Plum is  not  morally  responsible  in  case  4.  This  completes 
Pereboom’s argument as case 4 is just the standard deterministic case. In 
summary, it’s intuitive that Plum is not responsible in case 1 and there 
are no salient differences between cases 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and finally 3 
and 4 that allow us to explain why Plum wouldn’t be responsible in the 
first case in one of these pairings but not the second. Moving through the 
cases from 1 to 4, we should therefore conclude that Plum is not respon-
sible in case 4. That is the four case manipulation argument for source 
incompatibilism.
3.3 Criticism of the four-case argument
I will now evaluate the four case argument paying careful attention to 
recent criticisms of it made by Alfred Mele, Michael McKenna and Kadri 
Vihvelin. As a first pass at how the compatibilist might try to drive a 
wedge in between the cases in a principled way, William Lycan points 
out that case 4 doesn’t involve manipulation by other agents, whereas the 
early cases do. Perhaps it’s the fact that other agency is interfering with 
our own rather than the fact that the process is causally deterministic 
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that’s driving the intuitions of non responsibility in the early cases. If that 
were true then the incompatibilist wouldn’t be entitled to run the argu-
ment through the cases claiming ‘no relevant difference’ between them. 
Pereboom has replied that the intuitions of non responsibility in cases 1 
and 2 are just as strong when instead of manipulation by a team of scien-
tists, the causal interference is produced by a ‘spontaneously generated 
machine’, specifically a machine with no intelligent designer.  A similar 86
response is to imagine cases 1 and 2 where a lightening strike or strong 
electromagnetic force field cause the desired effect as has been suggested 
by Carolina Sartorio and Al Mele respectively. This seems right so we 
should conclude that it isn’t the fact that other agency is involved that dri-
ves the non responsibility intuition.  However,  it  should be noted that 
even though these considerations rule out other agency being the source 
of the problem, they don’t rule out that in the early cases it’s interference 
in Plum’s agency (whether that’s by other agency or not) that’s driving the in-
tuitions as opposed to the mere fact that the situations are causally de-
termined. This last point is important given that case 4 definitely doesn’t 
involve interference in this general sense. This point will  resurface re-
peatedly in the discussion to follow.
Stephen Kearns sets up a dilemma for the four case argument in the 
following way.  On the first horn, Kearns’ worry is that if it’s the manip87 -
ulation that  is  the  source  of  the  non responsibility  intuition then this 
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doesn’t apply in the normal scenarios of cases 3 and 4. On the other hand 
if the manipulation is not doing this work, it must be possible to use a 
case that doesn’t involve manipulation to elicit the non responsibility in-
tuition. However, this would mean the manipulation examples were re-
dundant. Patrick Todd replies to this argument as follows:
… the proponent of the argument contends—and clearly must con-
tend—that the manipulation is irrelevant as concerns what makes the 
agent unfree. She instead says that the manipulation can help us see 
that something does make the agent unfree. In other words, she first 
presents the scenario (say) to an agnostic, and asks whether the ag-
nostic thinks that the agent is free (or responsible) in that scenario. 
And suppose the agnostic says ‘no’. She then points out that whatev-
er would make the agent unfree in that scenario would also make the 
agent  unfree  in  a  qualitatively  identical  scenario,  except  in  which 
blind natural causes have taken the place of an intentional agent.88
It seems coherent that the manipulation’s function in the early cases is 
to make salient the fact that we are causally determined and that this fact 
is what’s really driving the intuition rather than the manipulation itself. 
However, we need an argument to show this or at least to make one of 
these positions more likely a good explanation of what’s going on than 
the other. Todd and Pereboom need to do more than just make their read-
ing of  what’s  driving the  intuitions  coherent  they need to  argue it  is 
what’s actually going on.
In response to  this  exchange between Kearns and Todd,  Pereboom 
sums up the dialectic as he sees it. He points out that when people first 
engage with the free will problem they assume that agents are ordinarily 
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morally responsible in the basic desert sense when they knowingly do 
wrong. When the idea that we might be part of a causally determined 
universe is presented, this doesn’t challenge the assumption of responsi-
bility  for  (what  Pereboom  calls)  the  ‘natural  compatibilist’  but  the 
thought would challenge (though not obviously defeat) the idea for the 
agnostic on this issue. Pereboom claims that these reactions don’t ade-
quately respond to the threat of determinism. He claims that (reiterating 
the intended methodology of the four case argument) that compatibilist 
and agnostic intuitions are more properly challenged by running a de-
terministic manipulation argument and then in stages (cases 1 through 4) 
showing that there’s no responsibility relevant difference to be had once the 
manipulation  is  subtracted.  Hence  determinism  is  made  salient  as  a 
threat. In response, this summary of the dialectic (although perhaps true) 
still  doesn’t  engage with the best formulation of the challenge Kearns 
presents. As I said in the paragraph above, the compatibilists now claim 
that there is a candidate on the table for a responsibility relevant differ-
ence and it is precisely that the agents are being manipulated as opposed 
to the simple fact that they are causally determined to act as they do! I 
therefore  reiterate  that  further  arguments  are  required  to  establish 
whether (as Pereboom thinks) it’s the causal determination that’s driving 
the intuition, with the manipulation functioning merely as a way of mak-




Alfred Mele argues that Plum being manipulated in a ‘particularly inva-
sive way’ in the first two cases is a better explanation of the non-respon-
sibility intuitions than the fact he’s causally determined.  Mele compares 89
the changing intuitions to different kinds of manipulation cases (both de-
terministic and indeterministic) across the differently held positions in the 
debate  (incompatibilist,  compatibilist  and  agnostic).  Specifically,  he 
points out that in response to Pereboom’s initial manipulation cases (cas-
es 1 and 2), both compatibilists and incompatibilists have the non-respon-
sibility intuition. Furthermore, in indeterministic  manipulation cases it’s 
also the case that both compatibilists and incompatibilists often share the 
intuition of non responsibility. The main asymmetry of intuitions arises 
when people consider the ordinary deterministic case (i.e. case 4) when 
compatibilists do not have the non responsibility intuition whereas in-
compatibilists do. Given this pattern of intuitions Mele argues that it’s 
more plausibly the common factor of manipulation per say that’s pro-
ducing the non responsibility intuitions in Pereboom’s initial cases than 
specifically causal determinism.
In response to this argument Pereboom notes that some types of ma-
nipulation  of  indeterministic  agents  doesn’t  automatically  rule  out  us 
having intuitions that those agents are responsible. Specifically, an inde-
terministic case where manipulation enhances the strength of egotistical 
reasons but doesn’t causally determine their bringing about a certain de-
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cision (we can assume the agents have libertarian free will here) seems to 
leave it open that they can still (intuitively) be morally responsible. This 
is a problem for Mele given his claim that both sides in the debate have 
the intuition of non-responsibility in certain indeterministic cases. Which 
indeterministic cases are relevant here? Given Mele’s argument it will be 
important to consider the exact indeterministic (libertarian) analogues of 
Pereboom’s cases 1 and 2. What would those analogues be and what in-
tuitions do we have about them? The indeterministic analogue of case 1 
would presumably be a scenario where an egotistical reasoning process 
of  exactly the same motivational  strength is  implanted just  before the 
(now libertarian Plum) is about to make the decision. Contra Mele’s ar-
gument, I think it’s intuitive that libertarian Plum is still responsible al-
though with some degree of diminished responsibility.  Why? Plausibly 90
because  the  egotistical  reasoning  doesn’t  now  causally  determine  the 
subsequent decision. Plum the libertarian agent as agent-cause determines 
that and hence the buck stops with him. The same goes for the relevant 
analogue of case 2 as far as I can see. It’s important to note here that in 
 Helen Steward has pointed out in comments that the intuition of responsibil90 -
ity is very plausibly diminished in this (libertarian) version of the manipulation 
case. I agree that responsibility can be a matter of degree in these cases depend-
ing on the  strength of  the  desires  at  issue  but  still  maintain  that  if  the  im-
planted/pre-programmed desires in question are not irresistible and the agent’s 
choice isn’t determined by them then the responsibility intuition, although in-
deed diminished, is still robust enough to constitute a problematic disanalogy 
with  the  exact  deterministic  analogues  of  these  cases.  Specifically,  all  other 
things equal between the deterministic and the libertarian versions of cases 1 
and 2, this still allows Pereboom to claim (contra Mele) that it’s the determinism 
and not the manipulation that’s the source of the non-responsibility intuitions.
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these  libertarian  analogues  now under  consideration  it’s  the  fact  that 
Plum isn’t determined and does the causing as agent-cause that’s salient 
and not the fact that Plum ‘could have done otherwise’ in this scenario. 
Pereboom is making use of these manipulation arguments as part of his 
articulation of the source problem for compatibilism and not the leeway 
problem having already rejected the alternative possibilities requirement 
so the latter move re alternatives would not be dialectically appropriate 
here.   So the fact that both sides would agree that some incompatibilist 91
manipulation cases elicit  an intuition of  non-responsibility  won’t  help 
Mele block the four case argument here. If the relevant libertarian ana-
logues  of  Pereboom’s  early  cases  are  brought  into  focus  it  seems the 
comparison in fact serves the opposite end of helping Pereboom make it 
plausible that it’s the manipulation as part of a deterministic process rather 
than manipulation per say that’s driving the non-responsibility intuitions 
in these cases.
Interestingly, in his recent book, Pereboom doesn’t immediately reply 
this way, i.e. by considering straight away the relevant indeterministic 
analogues  of  cases  1  and  2  and  then  arguing  that  country  to  Mele’s 
schema there is in fact an asymmetry of intuition that comes out in his 
favour rather than a symmetry as Mele contends. Instead, Pereboom de-
velops the ‘dam analogy’ to show that the fact that we sometimes do 
have intuitions that indeterministic manipulation undermines responsi-
 Thanks to Mike Otsuka for drawing my attention to this point regarding why 91
we think libertarian Plum is responsible in his comments.
!165
bility cannot automatically be used to establish that manipulation per say 
is the more plausible cause of the non-responsibility intuitions. The aim 
of the analogy is to show that there can be more than one type of event 
that can count as a token of the same general causal explanation. The 
very fact that the tokens are suitably different does not mean they consti-
tute competing causal explanations so long as they both instantiate the 
more generic type of causal explanation at issue. The analogy is as fol-
lows:
Imagine that a dam at one end of a reservoir would break if the reser-
voir were filled with more than one billion gallons of water, because 
the dam could not withstand the pressure that this volume of water 
would exert. Suppose the reservoir is in fact filled with more than one 
billion gallons of water, and the dam breaks. It is natural to say here: 
“what explains the dam’s breaking is the water pressure.” However, 
someone might object:  “if  the reservoir were filled with more than 
one billion gallons of oil,  it  would also have broken. So the water 
pressure doesn’t explain the dam’s breaking.” To this the correct re-
sponse would be:  some true causal explanations set  out the actual 
sufficient conditions for an event’s occurring, and accordingly the ex-
planation by way of the water pressure is true. But there is also an 
explanation of the dam’s breaking common to both the water pres-
sure and the oil pressure scenarios: liquid pressure higher than a cer-
tain level caused the dam to break. But the water-pressure explana-
tion doesn’t compete with the liquid-pressure explanation—they are 
explanations at different levels of generality.92
I agree with Pereboom that this analogy (applied to the Mele schema 
under consideration) makes clear that the fact that indeterministic ma-
nipulation can undermine responsibility is not necessarily a challenge to 
the claim that causally deterministic manipulation also undermines re-
 Pereboom (2014: 83)92
!166
sponsibility (or just causal determinism alone for that matter) because it’s 
deterministic, which is the conclusion Pereboom is trying to establish. This 
is because, as Pereboom points out, there can be more than one way of 
undermining the type of control necessary for moral responsibility (just 
like there can be more than one way of getting the dam to burst).  In 
summary,  Pereboom suggests  that  when indeterministic  manipulation 
undermines responsibility it may be because it stops the agent properly 
‘settling’ what decision is made. In contrast, determinism can undermine 
the necessary control as decisions are produced by factors outside the 
agents control. This all seems coherent. However, it should be clear that 
the analogy doesn’t get Pereboom to the conclusion that determinism is 
the more plausible cause of the non responsibility intuition in his cases 1 
and 2. It just enables him to stop Mele running his argument to the con-
clusion  that  manipulation/interference  per  say  is  the  more  plausible 
cause of the intuitions (and not determinism). Further argument is re-
quired to show that it’s one of these and not the other that’s driving the 
intuitions in Pereboom’s early cases. As I said above, I think Pereboom 
can establish this conclusion by examining the exact indeterministic ana-
logues of his cases 1 and 2 and noting that we have the intuition that 
Plum does seem responsible in them. After the discussion of the dam 
analogy Pereboom does mention this type of asymmetry when he says:
Even if, as in the kinds of cases Mele introduces, the indeterminism is 
only slight, this difference will be in place. Suppose in Case 1 the neu-
roscientists enhance the egoism of Plum’s reasoning process but not 
quite  to  the  degree  that  causally  determines  him to  decide  to  kill 
White. Then it still may be intuitive that he is blameworthy to some 
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degree, for example if the audience is imagining Plum to be an unde-
termined agent-cause.  To get  a clear non-responsibility intuition in 
the right sort of indeterministic case that fits Mele’s description, my 
sense is one would need to imagine an indeterministic event-causal 
situation  in  which  the  probabilities  conferred  by  the  reasons  on 
Plum’s decision to kill White are very high, and not doing so very 
low, but he does not settle whether the decision is made. Thus my 
broader account cannot be undercut by pointing out that there are 
cases of non-responsibility in which causal determination is absent, 
and manipulation is present, while the manipulation results in a type 
of causal circumstance that precludes responsibility-relevant control. 
While in each type of case such control will be ruled out, the way in 
which it is ruled out will be different.93
Once again, as I see it, the vital part of this paragraph is the claim that 
a particular indeterministic analogue (where according to Pereboom we 
imagine  a  manipulation  case  with  an  ‘undetermined  agent  cause’)  is 
prone to elicit an intuition of responsibility. The separate case of the inde-
terministic  event  causal  manipulation  example  with  the  probabilities 
stacked very high so as to make very likely the relevant action we can 
concede is prone to elicit the intuition of non-responsibility but this is not 
the kind of case needed anyway. Firstly, it will not speak to the agent 
causal  libertarian  here  and  secondly,  when  the  probabilities  are  high 
enough to prompt the non-responsibility intuition the case loses its bite 
as the worry that the desire is irresistible (or near enough to undermine 
responsibility)  arises  irrespective  of  the  issue  of  determinism.  This  high 
probability event causal case is therefore not a relevantly similar inde-
terministic analogue (as Mele needs it to be) of the deterministic versions 
of Pereboom’s early cases.
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So far, I take the above discussion to have adequately responded to 
that particular part of Mele’s argument which claims that there is also an 
intuition of non-responsibility in some relevant indeterministic manipula-
tion cases.  On the contrary I  claim,  following Pereboom’s  suggestion, 
that this simply isn’t  the case for the salient agent causal manipulation 
cases where the analogue of Plum is most often found intuitively respon-
sible despite the fact that an analogously implanted desire (as in case 1) 
was present. However, there is more to be said here because Mele was 
making two important claims that taken together he took to constitute an 
argument that manipulation per say, rather than the fact of causal deter-
minism, was the best explanation for the non responsibility intuition. The 
other part of the argument was the fact that the compatibilists didn’t have 
the  non  responsibility  intuition  in  the  standard  deterministic  case  4 
where no manipulation was present. Mele says the following:
The judgment that the determinism in a deterministic manipulation 
case  provides  the  best  explanation  of  these  compatibilists’  ‘nonre-
sponsibility’ intuitions about it is silent on the analogous indetermin-
istic case, and it yields the prediction that these compatibilists will 
have  ‘the  intuition’  that  Plum  is  not  morally  responsible  for  the 
killing in any straightforward deterministic story I might tell that in-
volves no manipulation and no monkey business of any kind. Obvi-
ously, the imagined data do not warrant that prediction.94
I have already explained why there is no problem of ‘silence on the 
indeterministic case’ by which Mele means no explanation for the intu-
ition of non responsibility in the indeterministic case. On the contrary, we 
standardly do have the intuition of responsibility and not the lack of it 
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(albeit  somewhat  diminished)  for  agent  causal  Plum.  However,  what 
about the fact the compatibilists have the intuition that agents are moral-
ly responsible in the standard case? Specifically, Mele claims that the in-
compatibilist take on things here predicts the intuition of non responsibili-
ty in the standard case 4. I wish to say two things in response here. First-
ly, as I understand the four case argument, Pereboom was never predict-
ing compatibilists would have any such immediate incompatibilist intu-
itions about case 4. Surely the idea was that working through the cases 
(from 1 to 4), people would be rationally compelled to adopt the status of 
non responsibility in case 4 given the initial non responsibility intuitions 
about the early cases coupled with the ‘no relevant difference’ claim here. 
So the fact that compatibilists have the intuition of responsibility in the 
standard case 4 isn’t a problem because it goes against what Pereboom 
predicts.  However, Mele can still ask whether the fact that compatibilists 
(and  many  others  besides)  have  the  intuition  of  responsibility  in  the 
standard case 4 is nevertheless a problem. Specifically, isn’t it the case 
that the intuition of responsibility in the standard case 4 carries some 
weight here and that this must be somehow accounted for (or explained 
away) by Pereboom? In short, even if Pereboom gets people on board 
with the four case argument and the process of moving through the cas-
es, it will be important to have not just an argument to the effect that 
people should come to hold a different intuition about the standard case 4 
(this I take it exhausts the role of the Pereboom’s four case argument as it 
stands by itself). In addition, a fully satisfactory incompatibilist response 
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should also have a story that explains why so many of us (not just com-
patibilists) had the intuition of responsibility in case 4 in the first place. 
What can be said in response to this demand?
It would seem that the incompatibilist is well placed to meet this chal-
lenge. Pereboom turns to Spinoza on this issue of the status of the com-
patibilist  intuition of  responsibility  in  the normal  deterministic  case  4 
and says the following:
….However, the concern that incompatibilists have about these intu-
itions is that in ordinary cases we are not aware of the actual causes of 
our  actions,  and  if  we  were,  we  would  or  should  reconsider  our 
judgments that agents are free in the sense required for moral respon-
sibility. Spinoza observed, “men think themselves free, because they 
are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, 
even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to 
wanting  and  willing,  because  they  are  ignorant  of  [those 
causes]” (1667/1985: 440). One serious possibility is that our choices 
and actions do in fact result from deterministic causal processes that 
trace back to factors beyond our control,  while ordinary intuitions 
and judgments about moral  responsibility do not presuppose such 
determinism about choice and action, and they may even presuppose 
that it is false. And crucially, the intuitions formed under such neutral 
or indeterministic suppositions might well persist even if it specified 
that the scenario to be assessed is deterministic (Nichols and Knobe 
2007). So it stands to reason that when we are reflectively assessing 
manipulation arguments, the intuition that agents can be morally re-
sponsible in ordinary deterministic situations should not be accorded 
whatever weight we might initially assign to it. What’s needed is a 
vehicle for making the supposition of causal determination salient in 
a way that effectively brings it to bear on these intuitions, judgments, 
and associated emotions. This is part of the point of the manipulation 
examples in the four-case argument. The idea is to devise scenarios in 
which the deterministic causes of actions are readily salient in this 
respect, and to show that there is no relevant difference between these 
causes and ordinary deterministic ones.95
 Pereboom (2014: 88)95
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In summary, Spinoza’s point gives us pause when we consider what 
faith we should place in intuitions of responsibility about the standard 
deterministic case 4. It does not claim that intuitions of responsibility are 
incorrect (that would be simply question begging in the current context). 
Instead, it draws attention to the fact that our intuitions about the stan-
dard case should not carry the sort of weight that Mele needs them to in 
order to run (that part of) his argument. To take the intuitions about case 
4 as informative in this context would not be to take seriously the chal-
lenge that the incompatibilist  claims to be putting forward here.  With 
this last point in place, the overall dialectic looks as follows: The intuition 
of non-responsibility is present in the early manipulation cases 1 and 2. 
There is  then the no relevant difference argument from these cases to 
case 4 (these two claims constitute Pereboom’s four case argument). At 
the same time many people don’t have analogous intuitions about agent 
causal  indeterministic  manipulation  cases.  (So  Mele  is  not  entitled  to 
claim that manipulation is the common factor across cases where we do 
have the non responsibility intuition, precisely because we don’t have 
that intuition in the agent causal analogue of Pereboom’s early cases). We 
finally have reason to place a question mark over intuitions of responsi-
bility elicited by the standard case 4 given  Spinoza’s point (this casts 
doubt on whether we should use that intuition of responsibility (if we do 
have it) about case 4 in the argument as Mele does). We should be agnos-
tic about case 4. I take it that all these taken together give Pereboom the 
advantage here. In particular the ball is still in the compatibilists court to 
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find a relevant difference across the cases. The intuitions (and crucially 
the status they can be accorded) seem to line up as Pereboom requires. 
3.5 Bypassing and a general dialectical strategy regarding pro-
posed compatibilist necessary conditions.
There is another response to Pereboom’s four case argument that claims 
the  manipulation  at  issue  bypasses  the  capacities  for  reflective  control 
agents have over their lives over time. The contention is that this better 
explains why the early manipulation cases give rise to intuitions of non 
responsibility rather than causal determinism. Mele and Haji have both 
raised this worry and Haji has developed it at length.  Key for Haji is 96
that  an  action  we’re  morally  responsible  for  issues  from us  given  an 
evaluative scheme we accept. That is, normative standards and delibera-
tive principles we accept as well as the motivation to act on these princi-
ples and achieve goals based on reasoning that issues from the delibera-
tive principles. So in the manipulation cases the crucial question is how 
the  implanted  beliefs  and  desires  that  causally  determine  the  action 
stand with respect to the evaluative scheme held and endorsed. It would 
appear that Haji is not worried by manipulation per say a long as it’s not 
the case that “Plum’s reasoning to kill  White issues from these beliefs 
and desires without engaging elements of Plum’s authentic evaluative 
scheme; the reasoning bypasses these elements.”  However, regardless 97
 Mele (2006: 166-7), Haji (2009: 166-8)96
 Haji (2009: 167)97
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of whether you’re a compatibilist or not, it’s not plausible that we can 
only be morally responsible for those actions that our evaluative schemes 
developed over time would endorse. This point was a notorious criticism 
of Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical or real self theory of freedom. According 
to Frankfurt we’re responsible only if our higher order desires line up 
with our effective first order desires (wills) and we endorse our effective 
desires at the second order. The ‘real self’ tag here signifies how the eval-
uative scheme and moral outlook an agent has is a condition on responsi-
bility here. However, the problem for both Frankfurt’s theory and Haji’s 
requirement is that most cases of blameworthy action result from people 
acting  at  odds  with  their  accepted  evaluative  scheme  and  normative 
standards due to weakness of will or because of anger etc. It’s true that 
psychopaths sometimes endorse morally terrible schemes and then act 
on them but this is the exception rather than the rule. For most of us, we 
simply fail to live up to the goals in agency we set for ourselves. This 
point alone threatens to undermine Haji’s criticism but in addition Pere-
boom counters with the immanent point that you can simply build the 
required evaluative endorsement Haji is after into a manipulation case. 
Imagine  a  Plum  who  reflectively  endorses  acting  egotistically  or  im-
morally when it is in his self interest to a great extent. He does this every 
now and then on his own. Pereboom then stipulates that in case 1 Plum 
would not have decided to kill White had it not been for the scientists im-
planting that disposition to reason highly egotistically. Consistent with 
the truth of this simple counterfactual everything else Haji requires ap-
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pears to be in place. The disposition clearly does not bypass Plum’s en-
dorsed evaluative scheme. The same can be analogously stipulated for 
case 2 and the result is the same, Haji’s condition appears to be met. 
The discussion of  Haji’s  bypassing worry here highlights a general 
move available to Pereboom when replying to compatibilists who seek to 
find a morally relevant difference between the four cases by presenting a 
condition on responsibility they claim is violated in the early cases. There 
is of course no guarantee this will work but Pereboom can always try to 
rework the early cases so that the condition in question is now possessed 
by Plum. Each cases must be judged on its own terms but this potential 
move must always be examined as and when new (allegedly violated) 
conditions on responsibility are put forward as candidates for causing 
the intuition of non responsibility in cases 1 and 2.
3.6 McKenna’s hard-line reply to manipulation cases
Michael McKenna has made the distinction between what he calls ‘soft-
line’ and ‘hard-line’ replies to manipulation cases. With respect to Pere-
boom’s four case argument,  the hard-line reply takes the bullet-biting 
path of claiming Plum is morally responsible in all four cases. A soft-line 
reply instead attempts to draw a line somewhere between the different 
cases and claim that Plum’s not responsible in the early cases but is in the 
later cases. So far in this chapter I have discussed compatibilist strategies 
that would fall under the soft-line heading but McKenna develops an ar-
gument for a hard line reply as follows. The dialectic is different from 
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Mele’s here but the particular point McKenna leans on appears to be in 
tension with the Spinoza worry articulated by Pereboom above. The ba-
sic idea is that just as much as Pereboom claims he’s entitled to run his 
argument from case 1 through to case 4, with the attendant preservation 
of the status of non responsibility, McKenna claims the agnostic would be 
justified in making the opposite move and (given the no morally relevant 
difference claim) transfer their agnosticism about case 4 back through to 
case 1.  The aim of  this  point  is  to  disarm the four case argument by 
pointing out that the opposite direction of travel through the cases cou-
pled with a worry about the status of intuitions is equally justified. If this 
is  correct  then  the  four  case  argument  would  lose  its  bite  without 
McKenna  having  to  take  a  stand  on  whether  compatibilist  intuitions 
about the standard case 4 are justified. It would be a way of removing the 
advantage from the incompatibilist camp and forcing a stalemate with-
out privileging any of the intuitions. Does this work?
Initially,  this  argument  may  seem  very  powerful  for  two  reasons. 
Firstly, McKenna is assuming that the incompatibilist and their interlocu-
tor now agree on the ‘no relevant moral difference’ premise. Secondly, 
unlike Mele’s argument above, the compatibilist intuition of responsibili-
ty in the standard case is never appealed to. Instead, the agnostic move 
McKenna claims is rational about the standard case 4 looks to be just 
what Pereboom himself recommends given the discussion of Spinoza he 
appeals to in response to Mele. It therefore looks like an internal critique 
given what Pereboom himself says we should accept here. In reply Pere-
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boom says ‘…if we are precise about the attitude it is rational to have 
about Plum in these examples, we will see that the force of this hard-line 
reply compatibilist response is compromised.’98
Pereboom clarifies what he calls the neutral enquiring response as op-
posed to the response of the confirmed agnostic to the standard determin-
istic case 4. He argues that the Spinoza considerations properly under-
stood justify the former and not the later and that furthermore this does 
not result in a stalemate given that the former position is sensitive to fur-
ther clarifying considerations/changes of intuition when running through the 
different  cases  in  the four case argument.  The neutral  enquiring stance 
(NES) properly claims that it is still an open question whether the mere 
fact that the process in case 4 is deterministic is a reason to think Plum is 
not morally responsible. Now it might seem that this is just to invite a 
similar  argument  for  stalemate  couched  in  terms  of  NES  rather  than 
whatever species of agnosticism McKenna had in mind. However, antic-
ipating the reiteration of the argument in terms of the NES, Pereboom 
says:
…. this suggestion does not take into account that adducing an anal-
ogy for which one’s intuitions are clearer might itself count as the rel-
evant  sort  of  clarifying  consideration.  If  the  neutral  inquiring  re-
sponse to an ordinary causally determined agent were initially epis-
temically rational, it might then be that an analogous manipulation 
case functions as a clarifying consideration that makes rational the 
belief that the ordinary causally determined agent is not morally re-
 Pereboom (2014: 91)98
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sponsible. The confirmed agnostic rules out this possibility, but not 
the neutral inquirer.99
The basic idea is that we should start off with NES upon consideration 
of case 4 and  then move from case 4 back towards case 1. Once our intu-
itions change to clearly indicate that Plum 1 and 2 are not responsible, 
we are then entitled to reason back through to the standard case 4 via the 
no-relevant-difference  premise  and  conclude  that  determinism  under-
mines responsibility. This is not an ad hoc move given the initial com-
parative function of the four case argument in the first place. It won’t 
work if  someone never gets intuitions of non-responsibility in cases 1 
and  2,  but  it  is  widely  accepted  now  that  many  confirmed  compati-
bilists/agnostics do have such intuitions and are therefore in need of a 
principled way of explaining them away. In summary, the most epistemi-
cally rational position (regardless of your stated view on the free will 
problem) is to take up the NES with respect to the standard deterministic 
case and then move between the cases until ‘clarifying considerations’ 
become available. If they do, i.e. in the form of a firm intuition of non re-
sponsibility in the standard case then we’re in a position to pass judge-
ment  on  the  standard  deterministic  case  having  run  back  and  forth 
through the cases as described. Pereboom is thus able to maintain the di-
alectical advantage here and the stalemate that McKenna seeks is avoid-
ed. 
 Pereboom (2014: 94)99
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In response McKenna agrees with Pereboom that the initial stance to 
the standard case should be open to further considerations as the NES is. 
However,  he  counters  that  the  intuitions  about  the  standard  case  4 
should  carry  some  weight  when  considered  alongside  the  intuitions 
about the manipulation cases 1 and 2.  The idea being that we should 
place more faith in our intuitions about ordinary cases than we do about 
the contrived manipulation cases. In response to this move it seems cor-
rect to reiterate the point from Spinoza which aims to bring to bear con-
siderations that challenge the status of our intuitions here. Again, Spin-
oza’s worry is that we should not trust our ordinary judgements because 
we  don’t  ordinarily  conceive  our  actions  as  part  of  a  deterministic 
process and what’s more, we may well be operating with a tacit assump-
tion of  libertarian free will  and moral  responsibility.  The fact  that  it’s 
stipulated  that the ordinary case 4 is deterministic is still  no guarantee 
that our intuitions will respond adequately given the deeply ingrained 
nature of the way we conceive of our place in nature. I concur that this 
response rebuts McKenna’s claim that intuitions about the ordinary de-
terministic cases are more reliable but what about the other claim that we 
should be wary of  our intuitions about  artificial  cases?  To this  worry 
Pereboom replies  that  the  artificially  of  the  manipulation  cases  is  re-
quired to make salient the fact of deterministic causation, given that (as 
is made clear by the first point) this supposition is ‘readily suppressed’ in 
our  thinking about  the  ordinary deterministic  case.  Talking about  the 
manipulation examples, Dana Nelkin goes on to suggest that, “one might 
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argue that their unrealistic quality helps ensure that we are focused on 
the stipulated features, and that we aren’t implicitly but unconsciously 
relying on background assumptions that we bring to ordinary life. In this 
way, the intuitions are arguably more reliable than the real life ones.”  100
Perhaps it’s exactly the opposite way round here once we have properly 
taken onboard Spinoza’s worry! Plausibly then, our intuitions about ma-
nipulation cases are more epistemically respectable than those about the 
standard case. In conclusion, it seems Pereboom still has the advantage 
here.
At this point, it might be tempting for the compatibilist to take a dif-
ferent  tack  when  trying  to  formulate  a  hard  line  reply.  Specifically, 
couldn’t a compatibilist feasibly have the intuition that Professor Plum in 
cases  1  and  2  is  straightforwardly  morally  responsible  in  the  normal 
way? It will be impossible to deploy the four case argument against such 
a person in order to change their mind. You wouldn’t get any leverage 
against them at all.  This might seem like a implausible way to go but 
such a reply has some historical precedent. Pereboom considers the New 
England  Congregationalist  theologian  Nathaniel  Emmons  (1745-1840) 
and his sermon on the bible story of Pharaoh and Moses. The main idea 
is that even though God directly hardens Pharaoh’s heart with respect to 
the treatment of Moses and the Israelites in Exodus (8-14), (this is the 
part which is meant to be analogous to the manipulation cases i.e. Plum 
in  case  1),  to  forgive  Pharaoh  and  not  hold  him morally  responsible 
 Nelkin (2012)100
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would be a mistake. The sermon Pereboom draws our attention to runs 
as follows:
It  is  often  thought  and  said  that  nothing  more  was  necessary  on 
God’s  part,  in  order  to  fit  Pharaoh for  destruction,  than barely  to 
leave him to himself. But God knew that no external means and mo-
tives would be sufficient of themselves to form his moral character. 
He was determined, therefore, to operate on his heart itself, and cause 
him to put forth certain evil exercises in the view of certain external 
motives.  When Moses  called  upon him to  let  the  people  go,  God 
stood by him and moved him to refuse. When Moses interceded for 
him and procured him respite, God stood by him and moved him to 
exult in his obstinacy. When the people departed from his kingdom, 
God stood by him and moved him to  pursue after  them with in-
creased malice and revenge. And what God did on such particular 
occasions, he did at all times. He continually hardened his heart, and 
governed all the exercises of his mind, from the day of his birth to the 
day of his death. This was absolutely necessary to prepare him for his 
final state. All other methods, without this, would have failed of fit-
ting him for his destruction … Pharaoh was a reprobate. God deter-
mined him from eternity to make him finally miserable. This deter-
mination he eventually carried into effect. He brought him into being, 
formed him a rational and accountable creature, tried him with mer-
cies and judgments, hardened his heart under both, caused him to fill 
up the measure of his iniquity, and finally cut him off by an act of jus-
tice.101
Pereboom points  out  that  many other  Calvinists  might  share  these 
hard line intuitions as well. What are we to make of this? It is clearly a 
local manipulation case with God and Pharaoh, a situation analogous to 
Plum in case 1. To start with I think it’s worth pointing out that a great 
many compatibilists, as well as agnostics do not take this approach, pre-
sumably given they don’t have the intuition that Pharaoh and Plum 1&2 
are responsible. As for those that genuinely do have these intuitions, one 
 Emmons, v. 2., (1860), 327, 330/(1987), 391–2; 395.101
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argument that can be brought to bear on them following empirical work 
done by Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe, is that these cases involve 
grossly morally bad actions (regardless of whether the agent in question, 
i.e. Pharaoh or Plum is morally responsible) and that this fact has been 
shown to sway intuitions towards holding people responsible compared 
to contexts where subjects otherwise exhibit intuitive reactions to cases 
indicative of incompatibilism.  This is hardly a knockdown argument 102
here but it is a worry about the reliability of intuitive responses in these 
extreme cases, extreme in terms of the badness of the deeds. Pereboom, 
discussing Nichols and Knobe, says, “…An explanation they consider is 
that in the high affect cases, the rational response is suppressed or pre-
cluded by emotion, here perhaps indignation or vengefulness. But one 
might argue instead that in the low affect cases, inappropriate sympathy 
suppresses the rational response, while in the high affect cases, inappro-
priate sympathy is more likely to be balanced off by indignation, allow-
ing the appropriate response to emerge.”  I personally feel that the orig103 -
inal suggestion of emotion clouding otherwise incompatibilist intuition 
is more plausible than the compatibilist move suggested by Pereboom - 
why would ‘inappropriate sympathy’ emerge in the first place - because 
the agents in question are understood to be causally determined? How-
ever, I concede I don’t have an adequate response to this position apart 
from to point out it’s rarely taken in the contemporary debate. It’s very 
 Nichols and Knobe (2007)102
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difficult to deal with someone who honestly reports these hard-line intu-
itions of responsibility in the manipulation cases but most people don’t 
and it’s fair to say that many compatibilists do see the manipulation ar-
guments and the intuitions they give rise to as serious problems that 
need to be responded to in defence of their position.
3.7 A worry about asymmetry — Do Pereboom’s manipulation 
cases deliver the same result for morally good action? If not, is 
this a problem?
In the literature both Susan Wolf and Dana Nelkin defend the position 
that moral responsibility requires the ability to do the right thing for the 
right reasons. The consequences of this are asymmetrical in that blame-
worthy action requires the existence of an alternative (the right path not 
taken) but praiseworthy action doesn’t. In contrast to this, Pereboom’s 
position is that moral responsibility (in the basic desert sense) for both 
blameworthy and praiseworthy actions is incompatible with causal de-
terminism. Given this, shouldn’t we expect the manipulation arguments 
to deliver the same results for praiseworthy action as for blameworthy 
action? It looks however, like some of the instances of manipulated good 
behaviour tend to elicit intuitions of responsibility, in contrast to their ex-
act analogues for blameworthy action. For example, Nelkin says;
… it would be instructive to vary the example so that Plum acts well. 
Suppose for example that we replace case 2 with this one. The neuro-
scientists have created Plum so that he fully understands and recog-
nizes good reasons for acting. He is moved by people in distress and 
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desires to help them so as to relieve their suffering. Suppose that one 
day he finds himself in a situation in which he can help a child only at 
great risk to himself. He thinks about the relevant considerations and 
decides that all things considered, helping is the right thing to do and 
resolves to do it. The intuitive force of this example seems to me to 
swing the other way. At the very least, it is much less appealing to say 
that Plum is not responsible. If indeed there is an asymmetry in our 
reactions to the cases, it suggests an explanation other than that we 
find people not to be responsible when their choices are determined 
by causes beyond their control.  What capacities one has when one 
acts  is  what  is  essential  here.  This  line of  response both questions 
whether cases 1–3 serve as independent counterexamples to the ra-
tional abilities view, and also points to an alternative explanation for 
our intuitions that allows us to resist the general conclusion against 
compatibilism.104
Another  example  along  these  lines  is  McKenna’s  discussion  of  a 
woman who is causally determined and also (see the discussion) manip-
ulated into making the hard choices to live a morally worthy and fulfill-
ing life in very difficult circumstances. As with Nelkin’s take on her ver-
sion of Plum 2, McKenna says of the striving woman in his example that 
intuitively she’s morally responsible for living her life and choosing as 
she does and that this intuition is likely to be widespread in responses to 
the case. 
I think Nelkin and McKenna are right that the manipulation cases for 
good actions tend to produce intuitions of responsibility more often than 
their  counterparts  involving  bad  actions.  Pereboom  himself  concedes 
that it seems intuitively more appropriate to praise in the ‘good action’ 
manipulation cases than it  does to blame in the ‘bad action’ ones but 
nevertheless contends that this doesn’t amount to showing that moral 
 Nelkin (2011)104
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praise is deserved in the basic desert sense in these cases. In defence of this 
claim he explains that many characteristics people have typically elicit 
praise when it’s at the same time quite clear that the people with those 
characteristics  don’t  fundamentally (in the basic  desert  sense)  deserve 
praise for them. Examples include, good looks, athletic ability and intel-
ligence. The key point here is that these characteristics don’t even involve 
agential activity so it’s not surprising that people tend to praise Nelkin’s 
courageous Plum or  McKenna’s  determined woman if  they  are  already 
happy to praise for (involuntary) desirable characteristics in general.  To this 
Pereboom adds the further point that there is an asymmetry in the ap-
propriateness of holding people blameworthy and praiseworthy based 
on the fact that no great harm is done if people are praised for things 
when they don’t  necessarily fundamentally deserve to be (in fact  this 
may well be what we should do here regardless) but that seems much 
less true of blame given that underserved blaming seems wrong from the 
get go. The explanation being that in the latter case harm is done to a 
person blamed when they don’t deserve it.  Given these considerations 105
Pereboom concludes that the (acknowledged) asymmetrical reaction to 
manipulation cases involving good and bad actions doesn’t undermine 
his claim that moral responsibility in the basic desert entailing sense is 
incompatible with causal determinism for all agency, both good and bad.
 For further discussion of this asymmetry see Pereboom (2001: 139-41)105
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Chapter 4
4. Revisionism about moral responsibility
4.1 Diagnostic incompatibilism, prescriptive compatibilism
In this chapter, taking my lead from the recent work of Manuel Vargas, I 
will explore the options for revisionism about moral responsibility.  By 106
revisionism I mean the idea that our concepts can be modified as well as 
simply maintained as they are or rejected altogether. They should be re-
vised when, while part of their content needs to be rejected, sufficient 
content remains such that the concept is still justified in being applied 
(post revision). The extent to which we are justified in revising concepts 
will be a matter of degree. The possibility of conceptual revision promis-
es to help in the apparent stalemate between compatibilists and incom-
patibilists in the free will problem because a revisionist position has the 
resources to accept (some of the) central claims made by both parties in 
the debate. More specifically, revisionism can concede the semantic point 
to the incompatibilist (that natural language uses of responsibility pre-
suppose the falsity of determinism) while at the same time maintaining 
that sufficient inferential import of the concepts at issue remains intact 
for us to be justified with continuing to deploy them.
The familiar distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism 
is often applied without it having been made clear exactly what is sup-
 Vargas (2013)106
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posed to be compatible or incompatible with determinism. Is the compat-
ibilist claiming that our natural language concepts of free will and moral 
responsibility are consistent  with the truth of  determinism, or instead 
that we should be compatibilists about freedom and responsibility, even if 
there are incompatibilist commitments in our folk conceptual scheme (i.e. 
even if what it normally means to say someone is morally responsible 
assumes the falsity of determinism). Both views are fairly called compat-
ibilist but they are different positions and you can hold one while reject-
ing the other. With respect to the concept of and characteristic practices 
associated with moral responsibility, a diagnostic view is simply your take 
on whether the concepts as they stand in natural language and practice 
do or do not presuppose the truth of determinism. A prescriptive view is a 
position on whether we should be deploying a concept of responsibility 
(perhaps suitably modified, though not necessarily) whatever diagnostic 
position is adopted. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the options for developing 
the second of these views. Working on the assumption that there are re-
calcitrant incompatibilist semantics in our concept of moral responsibili-
ty (diagnostic incompatibilism), many have taken the view that if deter-
minism were true we would have to deny there was any responsibility in 
the world. However, this is too quick because we can always be revision-
ists about our concepts, if sufficient justifications for revision exist. Some-
times when a concept’s commitments are found to be unrealisable we are 
duty bound to stop deploying it. There are also situations where suffi-
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cient referential or connotative content survives (albeit after some of the 
content has been found wanting) to be justified in continuing to deploy 
that concept.  I  will  evaluate what form revisionism for the concept of 
moral responsibility might take and our justifications for persisting with 
the concept.107
Working on the assumption of diagnostic incompatibilism, i.e. assum-
ing that one of the conditions on moral responsibility as we currently 
understand  it  requires  the  falsity  of  determinism,  what  justifications 
might there be for prescriptive compatibilism? In what follows I will ex-
plore two main options, firstly, the idea that even if folk incompatibilism 
is true, it might nevertheless be true that our concept of moral responsi-
bility does a good job at organising our distinctively moral practice. This 
would be a reason to revise and then retain it in the face of diagnostic in-
compatibilism.  Secondly,  what  I  shall  call  the  ‘freestanding normative 
argument’ or FNA, claims that we need to preserve the idea and practice 
(albeit suitably revised) of moral responsibility because it plays a vital 
role in the realisation of what we value in human community and social 
 Interestingly, there is space to be both a diagnostic incompatibilist/prescrip107 -
tive compatibilist as well as a diagnostic compatibilist/prescriptive incompati-
bilist! The second position is weird but coherent. Imagine a person who grew 
up in a culture where the folk concept of responsibility was compatibilist, yet 
who came to believe (perhaps due to theological commitments about sin and 
punishment) that we should in fact be deploying an incompatibilist notion of 
responsibility! The more familiar positions are diagnostic incompatibilism/lib-
ertarian commitment, diagnostic incompatibilism/responsibility scepticism and 
straightforward diagnostic compatibilism (i.e.,  Harry Frankfurt,  G.E. Moore’s 
conditional analysis compatibilism). Manuel Vargas is responsible for organis-
ing the debate around these distinctions in his Building Better Beings (2013).
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flourishing. These two justifications are not the same as it might be that 
the former line of argument alone could not supply adequate justification 
where the second might, i.e. even if our revised concept of responsibility 
(shorn of incompatibilist content) did not manage to systematically order 
our existing judgements in an adequate way, we may still be justified in 
adopting a revised concept if  it  was necessary to achieve an indepen-
dently motivated human flourishing.  In what follows I  hope to make 
clear how these arguments differ and also the extent to which they can be 
used together in a revisionist theory.
It is useful to look at instances of revisionism in other areas before 
looking at  whether analogous changes can be made to the concept of 
moral responsibility. Manuel Vargas claims:
Nearly any significant concept – physical, moral, or otherwise – that 
has a long enough history is unlikely to survive unrevised in the face 
of growing knowledge about the world. Given that the notion of si-
multaneity proper to physics, our conception of water’s essence, our 
moral notions of what constitute virtues, and our conception of mar-
riage have all been subject to revisions in various ways, it is not obvi-
ous why we must suppose that our concept of responsibility is im-
mune to revision. Indeed, given the particular sociocultural history of 
the idea of responsibility, and in particular, the role it played in Chris-
tian theology and pre-scientific conceptions of the self, it seems undu-
ly optimistic to suppose that this particular culturally inherited con-
cept will have come down to us in a form that is smoothly compatible 
with a contemporary scientific view of the world.108
 Vargas (2013: 76)108
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4.2 What is revisionism?
Vargas outlines various ways conceptual revision might occur. He illus-
trates these differences by considering the traditional problem of meta-
ethics. Originally many people held a divine command theory of morali-
ty, which claimed that the content of morality is (perhaps also necessari-
ly) determined by the will of God. As people started to reject theism the 
status of ethical and moral claims became the subject of debate. If you 
believed that what it means to say something was immoral was that God 
had said so, would this mean that you must  become a moral nihilist/
sceptic  once  you  also  became  an  atheist/agnostic?  It  is  now  widely 
agreed that this is not the only option and that what needs to be rejected 
is rather the thought that ethics requires God. People instead came to be-
lieve that the pattern of judgements and practices typical of morality can 
find justification in practical reason or as a means to the end of achieving 
desirable functioning and community. Deontological, contractualist and 
consequentialist justifications of various types have been put forward to 
this end. The key point is that we are still talking about ethics, not some 
hollow analogue of ethics instead, call it ethics* for example. Specifically, 
we are justified in saying we're talking about the same concept because 
enough of the inferential role of the concept is preserved. What enough 
comes to will be a matter of debate and borderline in some cases but it 
should be clear enough in many cases as to when we do have adequate 
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justification and when we don't. I will expand on this point about infer-
ential role preservation below.
We might understand revisionism about the status of ethics in two 
ways. Vargas makes the distinction between connotational and denotation-
al revisionism. In the former case you would be giving up on content that 
doesn't play a reference fixing role with respect to the concept in ques-
tion. Returning to the example of revisionism in meta-ethics, the seman-
tics of moral claims would be different but the referents will be the same. 
The set of wrong acts is the same but the terms used to refer to them 
would have (in part) a different sense, based on the meta-ethics adopted. 
To reiterate the point made at the end of the last paragraph, we would 
still be talking about ethics and not something else instead, because infer-
ential role would be largely preserved. A second possibility is that some 
of the content that fixes reference is itself given up. This, Vargas concedes 
is the trickier option to make coherent as it might just seem obvious that 
nihilism follows from denotational revision. After all, wouldn't we be re-
ferring to something other than we used to be? However, there is still 
space to call this type of denotational revision a revision of our existing 
moral  concepts  and not  the adoption of  new ones.  Of  course (in  one 
sense) it is the adoption of new concepts, if you are intent on calling any 
concept that has undergone change a new concept.  However,  it's  also 
true that after both connotational and denotational revision, the moral 
concepts in question can still play largely the same inferential roles with 
respect to how they organise our beliefs and practices – how they func-
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tion with respect to our broad moral commitment. Vargas concedes that 
even though denotational revision in one sense, 'changes the topic', it still 
respects what he calls 'the work of the concept'. Vargas defines 'work of 
the concept' as “the primary inferential roles figuring in those forms of 
life connected to the uses of the term, namely the import of morality.”  109
It is important to make clear that what makes denotational revision pos-
sible is that there be some other property which is in all the (or perhaps 
most of the) places that the old referents of our concepts were supposed 
to be. Furthermore this property licences the inferences, beliefs and social 
practices that are characteristic of our moral lives.
4.3 Examples of concept revision
Some of the best known examples of concept revision concern natural 
kind terms. We were always referring to the same stuff when we talked 
about water but we now know that we used to be wrong about water’s 
essence. Water is H2O and not whatever it was taken to be before. Con-
cerning the inferential role of the term water, after it was discovered to be 
H20 most  of  the old inferences we made using the concept were pre-
served, such as; people and plants will die without water, you can't walk 
on water, water is transparent etc. Some where not though, specifically 
whatever the old theory said about water's essence, inferences about that 
had to be rejected in favour of different ones based on the new science. 
The key point is that enough of the inferential role (in fact the vast major-
 See Vargas (2013: 88–9)109
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ity) was preserved such that we were justified in continuing to deploy 
the concept of water in light of the revised views on its essence. What 
about concepts that are not natural kind terms? I will consider some con-
troversial examples and non-controversial examples in order to better see 
what the prospects for revisionism about responsibility look like. 
4.4 Controversial revision
The concept of marriage has undergone significant revision over time. 
Originally, it was (partly) taken to mean a property relationship between 
man and wife, the husband coming to own the wife after the bride’s fa-
ther gives her away. Thankfully, most people have revised this sense of 
marriage and instead shifted to a concept implying a 'legally sanctioned 
and privileged relationship'. However, what has been a lot more contro-
versial in recent decades is whether this later rendering is also appropri-
ately applied to same sex couples,  i.e.  can gay couples get married? I 
wanted to bring the example of the gay marriage debate into the picture 
because I think it is very useful to compare the type of disagreement in 
that debate with the type found in whether we could or should revise 
our  concept  of  moral  responsibility  to  a  thoroughgoing  compatibilist 
sense.  Specifically,  when a conservative Christian says of legally sanc-
tioned gay partnerships, 'but that just isn't marriage', what are the paral-
lels between that stance and the reasons for holding it (and the reason's it 
may  well  be  unjustified)  and  the  incompatibilist  who  says  'but  that 
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wouldn't be real responsibility' to the prescriptive compatibilists suggest-
ed conceptual revision. I will explore these (dis)analogies below.
4.5 Non-controversial revision
Scientific concepts are perhaps the best place to look for examples of un-
controversially revised concepts. Vargas gives the example of the notion 
of simultaneity proper to physics. After Einstein's theories of relativity, 
that concept had to be revised accordingly. As with the examples of nat-
ural kinds above, certain inferences (notably those directly at odds with 
relativity)  had  to  be  given  up  on.  Even  so,  within  the  new scientific 
framework, the concept was still able to do a lot of work very similar to 
what it had done before (or mostly the same work – suitably qualified (if 
you prefer)) and was kept on. People didn't say 'nothing's really simulta-
neous anymore'.  They understood that  that  concept  meant  something 
slightly different now, but that at the same time enough of the inferential 
role could be preserved in order to recognise it as the same (though re-
vised) concept.
4.6 Revisionism and concept rejection
It  is important to note at this point that the nature of revisionism de-
scribed above does not guarantee we will always be able to revise our 
concepts (or that we should do so) in the face of new information. It is 
always possible that a concept may be found to be so wanting that it is 
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better to discard it altogether. An example from science to illustrate this 
point is the concept of phlogiston. Vargas discusses Phlogiston, which 
was thought to be a substance present in matter that made combustion 
possible and which was released when matter was burnt. As more and 
more experimental data became available it became harder to continue to 
underwrite the concept. Some metals were found to gain  weight when 
burned etc. The structure of the explanation/model that phlogiston fea-
tured in was shown to be false. In the end the concept was discarded 
from science and what it was supposed to explain was better explained 
as the reaction with oxygen. It might be said at this point that at a suit-
ably abstract level of description we might have had reason to revise and 
continue to use the concept. If the concept was meant to pick out (the 
key? ingredient) that made combustion possible then perhaps we might 
have re-fixed the referent to oxygen and some different process of chem-
istry? Why didn't we do this instead of dropping it altogether? The an-
swer is surely that phlogiston didn't pick out enough (in this case any-
thing specific at all) in the world. It was therefore more sensible to signify 
this fact by deploying new concepts altogether and dropping the label. 
What did do the work in explaining combustion didn't  look anything 
like  the purported referents  of  the term phlogiston.  This  is  consistent 
with the fact that there were some things that did what phlogiston was 
trying to explain. The point is that the new science rendered false most of 
the inferences that used to be made with the concept phlogiston; the in-
ferential role of the concept was not worth saving. There is a spectrum of 
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possibility here and no clear cut answer in every case as to when we 
should persist with (revised) concepts and when we should reject them. 
It's just important to note that nothing about the methodology of revision 
described above rules out discarding concepts.
4.7 A worry about claims of essentialism blocking revision
Given the above examples of natural kind and scientific concepts that 
have  been  revised  as  well  as  phlogiston  being  rejected,  it  should  be 
roughly clear as to the overall methodology of revision. If enough of the 
inferential role can be preserved then the concept gets to stay. The infer-
ential roles of the concept pre and post revision will not be the same but 
if they are sufficiently similar it makes sense to stick with the concept 
given the work it does for us in organising our ideas and practice. The 
fact that it's vague as to how much of the inferential role needs to be pre-
served in various cases is not a problem for the claim that this is how re-
vision proceeds. Each case must be judged individually. 
Having set out why revision occurs, there is a worry that the incom-
patibilist can nevertheless take a position which counts against the pos-
sibility of revising the concept of moral responsibility. Without yet hav-
ing argued that some suitable compatibilist notion of moral responsibili-
ty would preserve the important majority of the existing inferential role 
of the concept, what if the incompatibilist claimed that the incompati-
bilist content was essential to the content of the concept? Going back to 
the example of gay marriage above, this would be analogous to the fun-
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damentalist Christian saying it was essential that marriage was between 
a man and woman, even if the rest of the inferential role of the concept could 
be preserved for gay marriage. In response to this, I think the compatibilist 
is entitled to claim that the dispute would be merely verbal in that case. 
The important point is that the majority of the inferential role has been 
preserved and we are therefore justified in persisting with the concept 
that anchors this remaining inferential role – call it what you like the com-
patibilist might say, but it makes sense to carry on calling it responsibility given 
how it continues to fit in with the rest of our conceptual scheme! Of course, if 
the incompatibilist has an independent argument as to why the remain-
ing inferential role the compatibilist is claiming persists post revision is 
still implicitly assuming incompatibilist content then they would have an 
argument for the incompatibilist content being essential to the concept, 
but without that, the insistence on a particular component of the old con-
cept being essential would amount to a verbal dispute. I say that given 
the methodology of revisionism under consideration here. The incompat-
ibilist has to either give that argument or present an argument about why 
the general method of revision employed here is unsound. Failing either 
of those the dispute is verbal.
4.8 Related issues with reference
It is also worth noting that the possibility of revising concepts does not 
hinge on the outcome of the internalist/externalist debates in the theory 
of meaning. On internalist theories of meaning where reference is set by 
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sense or beliefs about what responsibility is, we might change some of 
those beliefs while at the same time retaining enough beliefs about the 
concept such that reference is preserved, i.e. in such a way that what we 
then go on to refer to are the same actions, practices and patterns in the 
world.  On externalist  models  of  reference,  reference is  determined by 
more than just our sense of the concept, for example ostention and causal 
links independently of our beliefs. It is easier to see how revision is pos-
sible for externalists than internalists about meaning. If  the inferential 
role or work of the concept just is what secures the reference of the term 
then this will arguably be robust in the face of us dropping some beliefs 
about libertarian powers we associated with the concept of responsibility 
assuming the compatibilist  remainder is  sufficient.  Either way we can 
revise our concepts. 
To summarise these distinctions and return to the topic of free will 
and responsibility,  the connotative revisionist  thinks that  some of  our 
folk beliefs about free will and responsibility need to be revised but that 
doing this would not interfere with the reference of these concepts. On 
the other hand, the denotational revisionist does think we need to change 
the reference of the terms but that we can re-fix the reference of these 
concepts in ways that preserves the core inferential roles, practices and 
beliefs associated with moral responsibility. Vargas uses the expression 
'earning the survival of the term'. How do we earn the survival of the 
term 'moral responsibility’?
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4.9 Arguments for revisionism about free will and responsibility
If we made the assumption that one of the conditions on responsibility 
was incompatibilist, it would still be the case that this condition was just 
one among a set of other necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for 
responsibility. Incompatibilist theories need these other conditions fully 
fleshed out as much as their compatibilist rivals. The other conditions 
here are familiar, being epistemic, concerning the degree of moral under-
standing,  the  capacity  for  intentional  agency and also  the  reasons  re-
sponsiveness of agents. One key question is therefore whether the other 
conditions taken together can be used to ground revisionism with respect 
to the role of the concept of moral responsibility. I will explore two op-
tions below. Firstly, we need to see whether the remaining body of condi-
tions can still manage to refer to and explain the characteristic body of 
acts, judgements and practices when the incompatibilist control condi-
tion is removed.  Secondly, we need to see whether that incompatibilist 110
control condition permits of a compatibilist reading/analogue which can 
be adopted instead and that then would (along with the other condi-
tions) allow sufficient  inferential role to be preserved. 
Regarding the first of the above options, the remaining conditions are 
compatible with determinism and together they do seem to carve out 
much of the use and inferential role of the concept of responsibility re-
 I say this consistent with the thought that there are other control conditions, 110
i.e. compatibilist ones.
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gardless of whether an additional incompatibilist condition is realised or 
not. For example when we look to explain why we moderated our reac-
tive attitudes in one case and not another, the difference might be due to 
a contrast between wilful harm infliction and accidental harm (intention-
al action). Perhaps another difference in the degree of blame we feel is 
appropriate to agents could be due to the fact that one was an adult and 
one only a child who had not yet developed a full moral sense (epis-
temic). Excusing conditions that don’t make reference to alternative pos-
sibilities are to the point here. The familiar theories of the reactive atti-
tudes developed by P. F. Strawson and R. J. Wallace are available to this 
end and can work to secure that portion of the inferential role without 
any alternate possibility condition alongside them. If the core arguments 
of this thesis are correct then Wallace and Strawson didn’t manage to es-
tablish  compatibilism  by  the  traditional  diagnostic  route.  However, 
working in a prescriptive vein as a revisionist it is perfectly acceptable to 
embrace their accounts of the reactive attitudes. If those accounts capture 
much of the inferential role of moral responsibility without any leeway 
conditions then that may well be enough to secure the ‘survival of the 
term’.
Alternatively, given the second option above, we can embrace a ‘could 
have  done  otherwise’  condition  alongside  the  others  but  read  it  in  a 
compatibilist way, like List does. It might be thought that a theory of re-
sponsibility that offers no treatment of ‘could have done otherwise’ is too 
radical a departure even for a revisionist project. The worry would be 
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that much of the inferential role of the concept would be lost without 
some rendering of the alternatives requirement here. This problem won’t 
arise if you embrace something like Wallace’s view but given that many 
people don’t, I need to say something about the scope for a revisionism 
that does build in a (compatibilist friendly) alternative possibility condi-
tion. Once again, what is required here is that the set of conditions taken 
together are sufficient for the preservation of the majority of the inferential role. 
In other words, the compatibilist reading is enough to allow the concept 
to do what it needs to do. It can be conceded to the incompatibilist that a 
metaphysical reading of possibility might also be required by the folk 
semantics, but the claim is that the absence of this from the revised con-
cept still allows the concept to organise our moral practice. List’s account 
of modal semantics looks to be an especially good candidate here given 
the problems with traditional conditional compatibilism and new dispo-
sitionalism.
4.10 The argument for the preservation of (most of) the inferen-
tial role of moral responsibility on a compatibilist reading of 
‘could have done otherwise’
Take any familiar set of incompatibilist conditions taken to be necessary 
and sufficient for moral responsibility. We can read the notorious modal 
conditions that require the agent 'could have done otherwise' in an agen-
tive rather than a metaphysical sense (List would say microphysical). We 
can also read the source hood requirement (however this is fleshed out) 
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in a compatibilist rather than an incompatibilist way. Conceding whatev-
er the incompatibilist insists on regarding the natural language semantics 
of agency, source hood and the ability to do otherwise, once we adopt the 
compatibilist  reading of  these conditions the claim is  that  the revised 
concept is still able to function in broadly the same way as the existing 
one. I mean by this that the revised concept has the resources to explain 
the distinctive pattern of intuitions we have about cases where people 
are/aren’t responsible.  Specifically, those kinds of cases where we are 111
worried that an agent is not responsible because they couldn't have done 
otherwise will depend on (roughly) whether  or not they had a reason to 
do otherwise that (for all they knew, or should have known) they could have 
acted on. If they did and yet they still did the wrong thing they may be 
responsible, if not, not. Worries about source hood should be understood 
in terms of the right kind of causal chain from intention to action that 
doesn't  involve  manipulation  etc.  Why should  we  think  the  agentive 
reading of the ‘could have done otherwise’ condition does what I claim it 
can? The key question is about cases where we do hold people responsi-
ble;  is  there  in  the  agentive  sense  something they could (for  all  they 
knew) have done instead or should have known about? It seems highly 
plausible that in almost all cases there will be something we expected the 
 This sentence may sound like a straightforward refutation of the revisionist 111
position. If such a revised concept is able to ‘explain the pattern of our existing 
intuitions’ then why isn’t it also to the same extent a good argument for diagnos-
tic compatibilism? What I mean here is the claim that the pattern of intuitions 
will be recognisably the same across the cases but absent the basic desert sense of 
moral responsibility. The rest of the variations and nuances can be preserved 
with basic desert removed from all responsibility attributions. 
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agent to have (for all they knew) tried to do instead. If there was no way 
of them climbing over the fence to save the drowning child then they are 
not to blame but if they (for all they knew and consistent with their gen-
eral agentive ability) could have climbed over and yet didn’t try to, then 
they are to be held responsible and so on for a variety of circumstances. I 
think  that  for  most  cases  where  the  possibility  of  doing  otherwise  is 
salient, the agentive reading of ‘could have done otherwise’ will allow us 
to get the right answer about the case and hence the concept of responsi-
bility to maintain its core inferential role. The main reason for this is because 
the metaphysical reading of ‘could’ that the incompatibilist claims is necessary 
normally runs together with the agentive sense of ‘could’ that the compatibilist 
thinks is alone sufficient. What I mean by this is that when the incompati-
bilist says ‘they could/couldn’t do otherwise’ they normally invoke both 
the senses without making the distinction, i.e. the incompatibilist thinks 
that in all those cases where there was something the agent could (for all 
they knew) have done otherwise, the agent is responsible (and of course 
they also assume that metaphysical possibility is present as well, the lat-
ter is the supervenience base for agentive possibility if you like). Hence 
we can just run the agentive sense alone where responsibility is intuitive-
ly present. Where the agentive possibility isn’t there (barring cases of in-
direct (derivative) responsibility and tracing) the agent won’t have been 
responsible, whether or not there was a bare metaphysical possibility of 




In summary then, for any case we might consider, if it’s salient that we 
establish whether the agent could have done otherwise, we can use the 
agentive sense of could alone and get the right answer about the case. 
The justification for this claim is that this sense of ability is always there 
in  those  cases  where  basic  desert  responsibility  was  traditionally  as-
signed because the agent could have done otherwise in a sense presumed 
to run hand in hand with metaphysical possibility itself yet distinct from 
it. If they couldn’t do otherwise in the agentive sense, then both sides of 
the debate will  agree that  they can’t  be responsible anyway,  i.e  if  the 
agentive possibility isn’t there then that is sufficient to rule out responsi-
bility whether or not there was a metaphysical possibility as well.  It’s 
important to remember that in a revisionist context I don’t need to argue 
that this agentive reading alone is sufficient to deploy the old concept (I 
have argued at length it isn’t), just that if we use the concept this way we 
can preserve the majority of the inferential role of the old concept minus 
the basic desert ascriptions. This much seems plausibly true.
At  this  point  the  incompatibilist  critic  might  well  throw  up  their 
hands. They might grant all I have said in the above two paragraphs but 
say that it is beside the point. No one is really responsible they might say. 
Even if the majority of our moral judgement and practice is still tracked 
and referred to by the revised concept no one is really the author of their 
actions, we're all determined to do what we do for good or bad etc, hence 
what's the sense in holding people responsible? This appeal to intuition 
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is not just rhetorical and I think every intellectually honest compatibilist 
should be candid about the hold such claims have on us even after work-
ing on this problem for a good while. It is a serious challenge and re-
quires the revisionist to explain the rational for continuing with the con-
cept, i.e. crucially it’s a demand for justification independently of the fact we 
might have demonstrated we can preserve a sufficient portion of the inferential 
role, 'the work of the concept'  as Vargas would call it, without the in-
compatibilist reading of ‘could have done otherwise’. What’s really being 
expressed here is something like a request for justification of moral prac-
tice in general. Presumably because without incompatibilist metaphysics 
the  suspicion is  that  moral/value assignments  don’t  make any sense. 
Another way of making the point is to say that even granting we have 
preserved ‘the work of the concept’ there is no deep justification for do-
ing ‘that kind of work’ anymore. I will try to answer this question in de-
tail in the next section.
The worry in the paragraph above is linked to the worry about claims 
of essentialism for the incompatibilist conditions that I mentioned in a 
previous section. In that section I classified the (without argument) insis-
tence on the incompatibilist condition being essential as causing a merely 
verbal dispute. The reason I gave for this was that if (without the incom-
patibilist condition) the majority of inferential role can be preserved then 
all we would be arguing over is what to call the revised concept that was 
doing the majority of the work that the old concept did. This would be a 
verbal rather than a substantive disagreement.  I  stand by this but it’s 
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now possible to read the claim of essentialism in light of this ‘throwing 
up of hands worry’ above. Perhaps the thought (and again the incompat-
ibilist will have to argue for it) is that the claim of essentialism was an 
expression of the idea that libertarian metaphysics are required for us to 
make sense moral practice in general. It is an interesting question as to 
where  the  burden of  explanation lies  here.  We are  not  arguing about 
whether our revised concept of responsibility requires incompatibilism, 
by stipulation it doesn’t, the point is that the incompatibilists want to be 
told the general rationale, all things considered, so to speak, for moving 
forward with our revised concept. We need an argument that gets a han-
dle on why moral practice and specifically the practice of holding people 
morally responsible (in the revised sense) is justified in general.
4.11 The Argument for Prescriptive Compatibilism
I now turn to answering the worry outlined at the end of the last section. 
Could we argue that we should be compatibilists because we need a con-
cept of moral responsibility? The justification for using our revised con-
cept would therefore be because we had to. This necessity would have to 
be of a kind that spoke to the worry that there’s no real point if it’s ‘all in 
the cards’, no point if determinism is true etc. Granting that we can pre-
serve the majority inferential role of the concept, why should we contin-
ue with it? This is not an easy question to answer satisfactorily but it also 
isn't a mystery as to what kinds of justification should be forthcoming. 
Presumably we couldn't do without the concept of moral responsibility 
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given some plausible foundational assumptions about what's constitu-
tive of the good and flourishing human life and the kind of practices, 
communication and interaction that's required to maintain it? This isn’t 
(by invoking value claims) to beg the question against the general worry, 
as it seems reasonable to suggest there are sources of value that don’t de-
pend on libertarian metaphysics anyway. Basically, without the responsi-
bility system and its concepts and practices all hell would (in the end) 
break loose. Nobody wants that, regardless of how much they thought 
that  libertarian  metaphysics  was  the  ‘font  of  value’.  It  is  possible  for 
someone to bite the bullet on this point and insist we should stop the 
whole practice of responsibility but I don’t see this possibility as dialecti-
cally that problematic for a revisionary compatibilist here. Presumably 
most people will get on board with this argument (if we do in fact need 
the responsibility system, given our desires to live in a civilised world).
The key idea is that we need the responsibility system to regulate our 
behaviour. It is a way of communicating when people have done good or 
bad things, in the hope that that they will realise the significance of their 
acts  and behave differently  in  the  future.  It's  important  to  do this  as 
without it we would descend into a barbaric world, unpredictable and 
dangerous where humans couldn't flourish and develop higher forms of 
culture. The responsibility system with its characteristic attributions and 
feedback is a moral conversation we continually have with each other to 
the end of living more harmonious better lives for us and those around 
us. This idea might look like it's subject to P. F. Strawson's classic worry 
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outlined in Freedom and Resentment about this kind of move. The 'effi-
cacy' of regulating our practice was not even the right kind of justification 
for our practices as we understand them Strawson said the incompati-
bilists would counter.  In response to this, it’s important that a view on 112
which we need the responsibility system because it's necessary to sustain 
the good life need not be read in a shallow means/end or utilitarian way. 
There are other ways we can understand the practice and the responsibil-
ity system could be an integral component living a dignified life for ex-
ample, partly constitutive of a virtuous life where ‘virtuous life’ is not 
reducible or able to be captured in terms of consequentialism or contrac-
tualism. So an argument that we need the responsibility system need not 
be read in such a way as would give rise to Strawson's worry.
4.12 The practical necessity of moral responsibility and the reac-
tive attitudes 
In  this  section I  will  firstly  lay out  the  argument  for  the  necessity  of 
moral responsibility and then in the second half turn to dealing with crit-
icisms of it, both existing and anticipated. In particular, as I have already 
mentioned above, it will be important to address the worry voiced by P. 
F. Strawson in Freedom and Resentment where any attempt to give a prac-
tical means end justification of the responsibility system and reactive atti-
tudes is ‘not even the right kind’ of justification. This is presumably be-
cause people are working with a basic desert  conception of moral  re-
 Strawson (1962)112
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sponsibility, the sense of responsibility which Pereboom says is the ‘one 
at issue’ in the free will debate. The basic desert conception entails that 
someone can be held responsible simply in virtue of having knowingly 
done something wrong and not in virtue of the anticipated effects of the 
attribution of responsibility or any other reason of that kind. So the wor-
ry is that working in a compatibilist revisionist framework I will not end 
up doing justice to the basic desert conception of responsibility that is at 
play in our everyday understanding. I will address this worry after lay-
ing out what I take to be the general justification for the responsibility 
system.
From childhood development and continuing throughout a person’s 
life, the deployment of the reactive attitudes and the (now revised) con-
cept of moral responsibility is necessary for the moral development and 
functioning of human beings. It’s necessary for them to develop moral 
understanding in general, empathy and sensibility in general. It’s neces-
sary for us to be able to live together safely in communities and work to-
gether.  This point is  discussed less than it  should be in the literature. 
Without attributions of  responsibility and the reactive attitudes as we 
know them it  is  difficult  to overstate how much of human life as we 
know it would cease to exist. I don’t just mean by this that the reactive 
attitudes themselves would cease to exist but in addition that the norms 
and patterns of behaviour that those attitudes helped foster and sustain 
would be in jeopardy as well. Perhaps it could be said in reply that other 
forms of moral  censure could be deployed instead that would do the 
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same  job  as  the  reactive  attitudes.  I  think  that  when  the  details  are 
fleshed out as to what such an alternative set of attitudes would look like 
we would end up with something practically very close to what I am 
recommending here.  What is needed is a set of attitudes and related 113
concept of moral responsibility that can play a certain kind of role, name-
ly help shape the kind of agents and community we have independent 
reasons for wanting to live with and within here. To the extent that any 
attitudes and practices do this successfully, they will be converging on 
the revisionist theory I am advocating here. In summary, given the con-
sequences of abandoning (were it possible) the responsibility system and 
the plausible premise that we do not want to live in such a world, we 
have the makings of an argument for the practical necessity of the re-
sponsibility system. Surely we want to live in a society and culture where 
human sensibility is conditioned by a responsibility system.
Is such an argument circular? Perhaps it might be said that the desir-
ability of the responsibility system I am using in the above argument is 
based on the fact that we are making judgements about its benefits from 
a culture with a responsibility system and that this is not a neutral place 
to make the argument from. One idea might be that if we were living in a 
society without reactive attitudes then we may not feel the pull of such 
Even supposing that Strawson’s objective attitude were an option combined 113
with cool non-affective censure and praise, it would still need to be considered 
whether it was more or less effective than a revised system of the reactive atti-
tudes and concept of moral responsibility as we commonly understand them. 
Working on the assumption that the objective attitude is not possible here, I 
leave these worries aside.
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an argument at all. In response to this it shouldn’t be controversial to say 
that the general aims and values I am using to underwrite the necessity 
of  the  responsibility  system here  are  meant  to  be  so  general  that  we 
would also endorse them in a possible world where we didn’t maintain a 
responsibility system in anything like its current form. At its core the re-
sponsibility  system  makes  possible  a  safer  world  where  individual 
agents can pursue their goals more easily then they would be able to oth-
erwise. This type argument can gain traction with all kinds of sentient 
beings who are able to plan and carry out intentional action over time. It 
should be clear that these assumptions are not in any way internal to the 
perspective of the responsibility system. It also makes possible a more 
just world, where standards of justice can be underwritten independent-
ly of any prior commitment to a responsibility system. Many options are 
on the table here, but to take one powerful recent example, you could 
generate a system of political norms via a contract theory in the way John 
Rawls or Ronald Dworkin have and then be in a position to justify the 
responsibility system (and for that matter the criminal justice system) on 
the basis of your foundational political theory. In both cases mentioned 
here there is no circularity.
It might be said that if the argument for the necessity of the responsi-
bility system goes through in the way I’ve outlined, it proves too much. 
Perhaps the argument is powerful enough to justify not only a revisionist 
compatibilist responsibility system but potentially the existing (and ar-
guably) incompatibilist responsibility system as it stands. Given that our 
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current practice (committed to incompatibilist content as I have argued) 
plausibly has some of, if not all of the desired effects that I’ve based the 
argument on don’t we also have an argument to justify existing practice, 
to justify the status quo? If sticking with our current system of reactive 
attitudes and the notions of basic desert  (in the incompatibilist  sense) 
they would entail delivered the same desirable effects why not stick with 
that? In fact it looks like as long as responsibility concepts are successful 
at generating the desired effects in the way I’ve outlined as necessary to 
maintain moral understanding, sensibility and consequent behaviour we 
can justify both compatibilist and incompatibilist concepts equally well. 
What does this mean for my overall aim as a prescriptive compatibilist? 
In response to this worry I want to point out that whether a particular 
system of responsibility concepts and practices delivers on the overall 
aim of fostering the desired moral outcomes is not the only factor when 
deciding which system we should endorse. Other factors must include 
parsimony and truthfulness for example. So if, unlike their compatibilist 
counterparts, incompatibilist systems presuppose concepts not realisable 
in the actual world, then all things considered we will have an argument 
for the prescriptive compatibilist responsibility system as preferable to a 
justification for our practices as they stand on the assumption that diag-
nostic incompatibilism was true. 
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4.13 Further worries about the revisionist project
In comments on an earlier  version of  this  chapter Helen Steward has 
pressed three worries: firstly, the issue of prescribing for the causally de-
termined about action itself, secondly, issues related to the ‘ought implies 
can’ principle and lastly on the claims I have made about inferential role 
preservation. I respond to these comments below. 
Firstly, Steward asks about whether a prescriptive strategy could work 
for agency incompatibilism as opposed to the more standard incompati-
bilism of free will that I discuss in this thesis. Steward holds the view 
that agency itself is incompatible with determinism and moral responsi-
bility is also incompatible with it because responsibility requires agency. 
Hence could it be argued (as I attempted to do concerning free will and 
responsibility here) that we should adopt a compatibilist  conception of 
agency if our current concept is incompatibilist at the moment. Without 
going  into  a  detailed  conceptual  analysis  of  our  concept  of  agency,  I 
would stand by an analogous treatment of this issue and claim that in 
principle the answer depends on the amount of inferential role that could 
be preserved if we were to attempt that. The nature of action is of course 
a philosophically controversial topic but it might be the case that all sides 
(including the incompatibilist) could agree that there was a lot of inferen-
tial role left intact once incompatibilist content was revised away, regard-
less of your initial position on whether that incompatibilist content was 
necessary for the concept as it stood in ordinary language and practice. 
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For example,  Donald Davidson’s  core ideas about  action being some-
thing someone does that is ‘intentional under some description’ are plau-
sibly captured in both compatibilist and incompatibilist models and cen-
tral distinctions between passivity and activity are likewise renderable 
within the compatibilist camp. This can still be true even if as a matter of 
fact you were an agency incompatibilist about our current concept. As I 
have already said,  claims of essentialism in these revisionary contexts 
seem to amount to verbal disputes as opposed to substantive ones. The 
substantive issue is about the degree of preservation of inferential role. I 
therefore see no principled reason (without undertaking an analysis of 
action) why I couldn’t argue in an analogous fashion for a prescriptive 
compatibilism about the concept of agency itself.
Steward’s second point concerns issues related to ‘ought implies can’. 
If ‘ought’ does imply ‘can’ then my claim that we should adopt a revised 
compatibilist conception of moral responsibility entails that we can do so 
(in some sense of ‘can’). Steward comments, “But how do we know that 
we can do so? Perhaps incompatibilist thinking is part of our cognitive 
architecture.”  In response I  wish to re-emphasise the distinction be114 -
tween the metaphysical or what List would call microphysical sense of 
possibility and the agential sense of possibility pertinent to claims like, ‘I 
can walk the dog’. My claim is that we should be working with the agen-
tial sense and not the microphysical sense when we make ability claims 
for agents, even though I stand by my diagnostic leeway incompatibilism 
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about  everyday  ‘could’  claims  pre-revision.  Hence  I  can  consistently 
deny we have certain abilities (as the relevant concepts of those abilities 
are diagnosed as requiring incompatibilist content) but maintain that we 
can do what we should do in the agential sense, which we should adopt. But can 
we adopt the agentive sense of ‘should’? Yes, we can adopt revised com-
patibilist conceptions of these things because that is within our power as 
agents in the agential reference frame, as opposed to flying to the next gal-
axy for example, or thinking as God might think which both clearly are 
not. All of this is consistent with the fact that determinism entails only 
one microphysical future and the fact that (given supervenience) some 
people so determined will never as a matter of fact adopt the agentive 
sense of could etc. It may well be right that modalities or alternative pos-
sibilities are part of our cognitive architecture, that a ‘leeway’ conception 
is in some sense necessary for thinking as we do but I don’t think it’s true 
that metaphysical possibility (that would require incompatibilism) has to 
be a necessary part of that leeway conception. Steward’s point raises an 
important test though for incompatibilists who believe determinism to 
be true (or  that  it  might  well  be  true).  What  sense can they make of 
‘should’ claims when they also endorse ‘ought implies can’ if they are 
not to embrace revisionism as I have? Interestingly, on this issue Pere-
boom explores the options for an ‘axiological recommendation’ reading 
of ‘ought’ claims that is consistent with determinism and linked with re-
sponsibility in a forward looking sense.  I don’t think we need to make 115
 See Pereboom (2014: 138-146)115
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that move given the availability of the agentive sense of possibility al-
ready discussed but it is worth mentioning as it is another possible re-
sponse to this specific worry.
Thirdly, Steward says the following on inferential role: 
…the criterion you suggest for deciding whether a concept can sur-
vive substantial  changes in  various beliefs  related to  it  is  whether 
most of its inferential role is preserved in the new context. But how 
do we decide what constitutes sameness of inferential role? To take an 
example, suppose we all suddenly realised that Berkeleian idealism 
was true. In that case, one might think, the word ‘table’ no longer re-
ally means quite what it did before. But one might think to suggest 
that  most  of  its  inferential  role  had  been  preserved,  despite  the 
change in a very fundamental belief about the nature of tables. But 
has it? Can I e.g. infer that if there’s a table in this room, there’s a 
piece of furniture in this room? Only if  the content of the concept 
‘furniture’  also  changes  accordingly,  so  that  ‘furniture’  also  now 
means  something  different  from  what  it  meant  before,  something 
compatible with the idealist nature of tables. Arguably, therefore, the 
inferential role of a concept like ‘table’ has to change massively to ac-
commodate the shift to Berkeleian idealism - and then we’d have to 
say it wasn’t really the same concept at all. And one could apply a 
like argument in the case of moral responsibility. E.g. ‘if S is morally 
responsible for result R, then (other relevant conditions being satis-
fied) it is just to punish S for result R’ can be preserved, one might 
say, only if the content of ‘just’ and ‘punish’ are altered accordingly. 
And this might threaten to rob the inferential  role criterion of any 
power, mightn’t it?  116
In reply to this third worry, I will first outline my response to the pur-
ported problem of  the inferential  role  of  ‘table’  if  Berkeleian Idealism 
turned out to be true and then I will consider if an analogous reply can 
work for the concept of moral responsibility. I would claim that in the 
Berkeleian scenario Steward outlines, there would likely have to be con-
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cept revision at a much higher level of abstraction, namely for concepts 
like  ‘material  object’  and ‘space’  and ‘dimension’  and so on.  Further-
more, if it was possible to make suitable changes at that level of abstrac-
tion (and this admittedly might include some instances of concept rejec-
tion) then many other concepts at lower levels, like ‘furniture’ and ‘table’ 
could in principle maintain (most of) their entailment relations with each 
other as we would want. For example, if the more abstract concept ‘ma-
terial object’ as well as notions like ‘spacial dimension’ are suitably re-
vised, then it seems as if the inferential role of the instances of those more 
general concepts would allow us to infer that ‘there is a piece of furniture 
in the room’ from ‘there is a table in the room.’ That much seems true. 
The sticking point might be whether it was feasible to modify and revise 
the more abstract concepts along the lines I have suggested above in the 
Berkeleian  scenario.  On the  other  hand,  as  a  second suggestion here, 
even if some of the more abstract concepts of ‘space time’ and notions of 
‘matter’ had to be rejected altogether, I would still argue that once new 
concepts had been adopted at a suitably high level of abstraction in their 
place, there is in principle no barrier to all of the less abstract concepts 
(like ‘table’ and ‘furniture’) being (all together) modified in accordance 
with those changes. In that case it may well be that the vast majority of 
inferences involving concepts at the lower levels of abstraction can carry 
on much as before.  Will something like this reply speak to the analogous 
worry about responsibility and the link with the concept of punishment, 
as Steward outlines it above? In principle I don’t see why not though I 
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also want to claim here that there might be a disanalogy between these 
cases. In short, it might be that there just isn’t a suitable compatibilist 
reading of ‘punish’ because that notion essentially relies on an incompat-
ibilist model of agency to make sense of its retributive content. Without 
arguing for this claim, if that was the case then it might well be true that 
we could no longer infer ‘it’s just to punish S’ (all other conditions satis-
fied) from ’S is morally responsible’ (in the revised sense). But that might 
be ok just because it’s no longer just to punish anyone anyway. In that 
case, as long as enough of the content of ‘moral responsibility’ is pre-
served, e.g. S wasn’t coerced, S knew what they were doing, S didn’t (in 
the agentive sense of possibility) have  to do that etc,  then there won’t 
necessarily be a problem here for other kinds of entailments of the con-
cept of responsibility post revision. That is to say, enough of the inferen-
tial role can in principle still be preserved even if we have to junk some 
concepts like ‘punishment.’ As for the other concept Steward mentions, 
‘justice’, I would claim it is possible to rely on a notion of justice that is 
not contingent on the metaphysical and moral issues at the heart of the 
free will problem. One suggestion here would be to make use of a Rawl-
sian notion of justice which would allow us to make inferences in these 
kinds of contexts regardless of the outcomes to issues in the free debate.
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4.14 Vargas’ six worries about ‘moral influence’ theories
In Building Better Beings, in the section on ‘Justifying the Practice’ Manuel 
Vargas considers six worries about the approach he and I wish to take 
here. Six criticisms of the core idea that responsibility practices can ulti-
mately be justified in the way I have contented - because of their desir-
able effects. I will conclude this thesis by going through these worries in 
turn. Vargas claims these are the key objections to moral influence theo-
ries developed during the last fifty years. My argument has been that we 
need the responsibility system as it is necessary to maintain the type of 
moral practice, i.e. behaviours and sensibility in people for community to 
flourish. As such I am squarely in the sights of these worries and they 
must be addressed.
The first worry is that moral influence (MI) theories are not able to 
make the appropriate distinctions between different types of agents. It 
looks like this might be a problem if both intuitively and non-intuitively 
responsible agents are equally susceptible to being influenced by the re-
active attitudes. More specifically, how do we explain the difference be-
tween the standard we hold adult humans to in comparison with young 
children and animals. The second worry is that it’s hard to see how MI 
theories are able to distinguish between moral influence (as distinctively 
moral) and influence in general that gets the same results as moral influ-
ence. These first two worries are related. The third worry is that the MI 
account  seems  to  equate  being  responsible  with  considerations  of 
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whether it would be rational or appropriate to hold somebody responsi-
ble  (depending  on  whether  they  can/can’t  be  influenced in  the  right 
kinds of ways). We commonly make a distinction between those things. 
Fourthly, Vargas worries that MI accounts fail to accurately describe how 
we hold people  morally  responsible.  It  is  consistent  with the require-
ments of a MI account that we never actually feel any of the reactive atti-
tudes required by the account but just behave as if we do in order to se-
cure the desired influence. Does this leave out the vital hostility that is 
arguably central to blame? The fifth worry is also a worry about misde-
scribing our practice here. If we praise or blame someone now dead for 
some action they had done in the past, it would appear that standard 
moral influence theories require that the attitudes expressed have influ-
ence, but this is not possible for the deceased so it must be for others still 
alive. However, it just looks unnecessary that this must be in place in or-
der for every instance of praising and blaming historic figures to be justi-
fied. Surely some instances are justified even if there was no influence at 
all. Lastly, the sixth worry is that MI theories are tied to some type or an-
other of consequentialism and given that this is controversial ground, the 
justification  of  the  responsibility  system  cannot  be  left  meta-ethically 
contingent in that way. I will now attempt to address these worries in 
turn.
Vargas thinks that many of these worries can be dealt with by a shift 
from requiring MI justifications for specific acts of blaming or praising to 
instead requiring them of general practice. He says:
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There is, I think, a temptation on the part of both moral influence the-
orists and their critics to think of the justification of moral influence in 
terms of the efficacy of particular tokenings of praising and blaming, 
of the practices of expressing those judgments and acting in charac-
teristic ways upon them. So, when, say, Lori criticizes Dan for being 
overly self-conscious, proponents and critics of moral influence ac-
counts have tended to think that the justificatory force derives from 
the efficacy of the particular instance of so criticizing or praising in 
that particular time and circumstance.
That’s a view. A more plausible view, however, construes the justifica-
tion for moral praise and blame as arising not at the level of particu-
lar  interpersonal  interactions,  but instead,  at  the level  of  a  general 
practice.  On the  model  I  propose,  the  justification  arises  from the 
group-level effects of justified norms that are ubiquitously internal-
ized by members of the community and regularly put into practice. 
This difference—both a scaling back of ambition and elevation of the 
source of justification from tokens to the in-practice effects of the sys-
tem of norms of praise and blame as a whole—turns out to dissolve 
many of the familiar objections to the idea of moral influence.117
This so called ‘scaling back of ambition’ helps us to resolve the six 
worries about MI theories. With regard to the first worry, that it’s difficult 
to make distinctions between agents, the MI theory itself is not supposed 
to explain this distinction in terms of influence. At a different level of ab-
straction an account of reasons-responsive or as Vargas develops ‘moral 
considerations-responsive agency’ is meant to do that. The MI theory is 
what ultimately justifies the responsibility system but it is not supposed 
to explain all the dynamics within the practice it justifies.  It is not, in oth-
er words a theory of moral responsibility itself. To ask it to be that is to 
look for  justification at  the wrong level  of  abstraction here.  I  have of 
course not developed a detailed account of responsible agency in this 
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thesis but am sympathetic with some kind of reasons responsive posi-
tion. The main point here is to clear up the worry based on looking for a 
justification at the wrong level. When we look for it at the right level, we 
should hopefully be able to draw the distinctions the worry outlined in 
the correct place and in consequence be equipped to distinguish satisfac-
torily between animals and humans, between children, adults and psy-
chopaths etc. The second worry is dealt with in a similar way to the first. 
In distinguishing between moral and non moral influence, we need to 
look at the theory of responsibility we are working with itself and not to 
what ultimately justifies the responsibility system (MI). So again, a suit-
able reasons-responsive account will  hopefully tell  us what the condi-
tions are for holding someone morally responsible but of course these 
will not delimit other forms of influence. That is why those other forms 
of  influence  will  not  be  candidates  for  holding  someone  responsible. 
Vargas says: 
…on this account, the appropriateness of praise and blame is parasitic 
on the truth of the judgment that the target of praise and blame is a 
responsible agent. And, as we have seen, that is given by a theory of 
responsible agency and not a theory of the justification of the respon-
sibility norms.
In contrast, other forms of influencing the behavior of agents have no 
such requirement that the agent be a responsible agent, and indeed 
no  such  supposition  ordinarily  built  into  them.  In  influencing  a 
household pet, there is (ordinarily) no judgment that the pet is a re-
sponsible agent. Hence, the form of regard expressed in distinctively 
moral praise and blame is not present. So, even if some of the prac-
tices of moral influence are superficially indistinguishable from non-
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moral  influence,  the  underlying  attitudes  and  judgments  are 
distinct.118
What about the third worry,  that MI accounts appear to claim that 
someone is only actually responsible when we should (in terms of ex-
pected influence) hold them responsible?  From the Vargas quotes above 
it should be relatively clear as to the way to reply here. The appropriate 
way to answer the question ‘is an agent morally responsible?’ is with ref-
erence to the particular  theory of  moral  responsibility  (i.e.  reasons-re-
sponsiveness) you have adopted and not the ultimate justification of us 
developing a responsibility system. Moreover it is consistent with the MI 
theory here that the particular judgements of the responsibility system 
(i.e. that Fred is morally responsible) can run coherently side by side with 
us having a reason not to deploy reactive attitudes in any particular case. 
Considerations  of  prudence  and  benevolence  can  still  happily  trump 
here as they can in the responsibility system as it currently stands.
As for the fourth objection, the fact that blame/praise like behaviour 
could be justified (if it were possible to produce it) by the same ultimate 
MI argument is not really a criticism at all. As long as our actual practices 
are justified (ultimately in terms of their effects), why should we have to 
worry that  other  practices  could be as  well?  The fact  that  they could 
doesn’t  undermine  the  justification  put  forward  here.  More  critically, 
there will  be good reasons contingent on human psychology why our 
responsibility  practices  (with  their  attendant  affective  quality)  are  in 
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place rather than merely the outward appearances of them. It’s not clear 
for example that the latter is sustainable or coherent.
With respect to the fifth objection, the particular theory of responsibili-
ty we adopt itself decides whether figures in the past were actually re-
sponsible (not the MI theory). Given that we’ve already seen that particu-
lar tokens of praise and blame don’t all need to be justified in a forward 
looking way anyway, we can reply here that as long as these instances 
(for example blaming the dead) are part of a general practice that is well 
justified internal to the responsibility system - and a good justification 
would be the fact that these instances would reinforce the appropriate 
sensitivities, judgements and norms) - there is no problem.
Vargas argues that the sixth objection doesn’t apply as accounts such 
as his are ‘explicitly modular’ and not committed to any particular ac-
count of normative ethics.  Earlier in this chapter I argued how a MI the-
ory could find justification within a meta-ethical framework that was ex-
plicitly virtue ethics centred as opposed to consequentialist, contractarian 
or deontological. Once again, keeping the different types of justification 
for different parts of an overall theory clearly distinct should help dispel 
this worry.
In summary, even though I have not (unlike Vargas) developed a de-
tailed theory of moral responsibility here, these general worries about MI 
justification needed to be discussed because MI is ultimately what justi-
fies the responsibility system. 
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4.15 Final Note
Finally, it’s always a good strategy to turn the challenge around and 
ask the responsibility sceptic how they think we would and should manage 
without the responsibility system. The effects of ceasing to hold people 
responsible, both children and adults would likely be significant. It is al-
ready well documented that children who are raised without being held 
accountable for their behaviour often turn out to be antisocial and have 
problems which makes it difficult for them to sustain relationships with 
others. Whether or not there was thought to be an incompatibilist condi-
tion on the folk concept of responsibility, it is plain that the price of giv-
ing up on the responsibility system would be too high (revised or other-
wise). We must continue with it, albeit in revised form and this provides 
justification enough.
The incompatibilist sceptic may reply to the normative argument that 
they agree we do need a system of censure and moral feedback for exact-
ly the above reason but that we shouldn't call it a system of moral re-
sponsibility. Presumably this is again for the reason that they take a nec-
essary condition on responsibility to be unrealisable. In this case howev-
er, the justification for the responsibility system is partly tied to the nor-
mative argument and also to the fact that we can revise our concept if 
enough of the work of the concept is preserved without the incompati-
bilist condition. So, in conclusion it's important to run the two arguments 
together.  It's  the  combination of  the  possibility  of  conceptual  revision 
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(because sufficient inferential  role is  preserved without the incompati-
bilist condition) and the fact that we need the responsibility system, that 
together provide the best argument against the responsibility sceptic. We 
need the revisionist argument about the preservation of majority inferen-
tial role of the concept to sure up the claim that it’s ‘responsibility’ we’re 
talking about and not something else and we need the normative argu-
ment to respond to the ‘throwing up of hands’ request for the all things 
considered rationale of the responsibility system. I believe that these ap-
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